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The machinery for weighing or 
measuring the popular will from week 
to week, or month to month has not 
been, and is not likely to be, inven-
ted. 
Lord Bryce 




.Peering into the tomes of history in 
an attempt to better comDrehend the ~;lerican 
mind during this cr:Ltical period of our his-
tory, the author has encountered many conflic-
ting and ambiguous state;~nts. But by CO.:.11pa:cing 
these opinions and by a detailed study of orig-
ina 1 30 urces the author has endeavored. to reach 
logical grounds for his reasoning. 
The opinions here oifered agree with 
those of others used, but only because the 
author through diligent study has arrived at 
like conclusions. 
That his own historic~l integrity has 
not been jeopardized by his faith in others is 
the author's sincere hope. 
V1ALTER ED1.m!~D HICKS 
University of Louisville 
Louisville, Kentucky 
Ootober 10, 1949 
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I • .A D3FHHTION OF PU3LI~ OPI:nOH 
When dealing with peonle, 
let us remember we are not deal-
ing wIth creatl,res of logic. We 
are dealing w:i th crea t); :tes of emo~ 
tion, creatL:.res bustling with pre-
judices and motivated with pride 
and vanity. 
Dale Carnegie 
iIow t o;'lin Friends 
, 
There are many reasons why the role of propaganda, 
in shaping public opinion in international politics and espe-
cially in war time, is receiving more careful scrLctiny today 
then heretofore. ~ie live among peonle who are puzzled more 
than ever, uneasy and vexed at the unknown cunning wnich seems 
to have d.uped and ta.t::en advantage of their implic it faith in 
what they read, see and hear. Little wonder that there is a 
1 
new suspicion and inc:uisitiveness abroad in the world. 
Public opinion may.be the label for a pseudo-scien-
ti fic concept ion. It is also a catch-phrase o~· great popular 
power that has ~een worn smooth and non-descript by generations 
of refor~ners and politicians. Public opinion and the american 
ideal of the freed03 01 the press are inextricably and pecul-
iarly woven together in our historY • .J.'his contributes to the 
diffic ul ties in dhltinguishing between public opinion and the 
press. 
Public opinion is a vocalization of the attitudes of 
individuals concerned with particular controversial issues. 
Such openly expressed attitudes are found in co;:aplex soci eties 
which permi t and enco urage argumen:;s and discussions as an es-
sential met:nod of arriving at either a provisional or a final 
settlement of matters of vital moment to the citizenry. There 
are, to be sure, many publics functioning in a society; one, 
1 





as it were, for ever/ controversy whieh arises and attracts 
the attention of a sizeable number 0::' followers. Obviously 
many of these gro upings overlap. Furthe rmore, in our kind of 
culture the opihions of these social groups are important. 
Pu1;J li c opinion may tnen be defined as a collection of indi-
o 
vid ual opinions represent ing a range of soc ial gro ups on a 
subject of general interest on which there is no unanimous 
1 
agreement. 
Again public opiniQn is based prir~rily upon the 
culture of the various groups with w.l'dch the members are af-
filiated. Since controversial issues usually involve a con-
flict of grpup interests, attitudes towards a c ontrover~~;y are 
in a large meas ure determined by the speCial groups to livhich 
the individua'l belongs. 'l'hus in controversies, opinions be-
corne ir:celevant and confused by the fact that the different 
groups to which the individuals belong have a variety of no-
t ions as to the rela t i ve importance of a certain iss ue. 30c ial 
attitudes, folkways or cultures are CO~TInon factors in the mind-
sets of those involved. They p:ce.)are the ::linds of group members 
to deal wi th the various classes of problems from numerous 
points of view. And we must remember, too, that the tempo of 
our culture does not easily prepare us to see all sides of a 
question. Of any 'lublie event we see at first only a single ' 
1 




facet of it. Our picture of it is controlled in part by those 
who transmit knowledge' to us'about it. If the event is of se-
cret or semi-secret status, and if little information is avail-
able on it, the picture which ta~(es pl9..ce in the mind is dis-
torted at once. i:'urthermore as one attempts to fill in the gaps 
on the basis of insufficient data in order to 'complete the pic-
ture the resulting imaginings then become known as stereotypes, 
and a stereotype may be, said to be~simplified and often a dis-
torted and rationalized conc~pt of a group of persons, insti-
l 
tution, or situation. 
When ~ iss ue ari ses and a cit izen for:llS an opinion 
about it, he seldom has the ti:ne, interest, or technical skill 
need.ed to garner the facts and the whole st ory about it even 
in favorable circumstances when essential facts are available. 
Instead there is likely to be too ready a reliance upon his 
personal aoc~ uired stereotypes to give him his cue. To be sure 
he knows something about the matter at hand. But that something 
is likely to be a stereotyped set of f31leged facts steeped in 
unrecognized prej udices surrounding them. Too often these suf-
fice. Consequently stereotypes simplify the complex world we 
live in and make it seem cOHlprehcnsible and manageable and pro-
gressive. Stereotypes function also unW':l:cily as defense and 
escape mechanisms inoculating us against the unco~llfortable 
1 
Ibid.) p. 81. 
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neoessity of ohanging our minds. 
Yet this world in wh ioh we live is not neoessar ily the 
world we want it to be. It is simply the .l,cind of a world we know 
ani. vbioh we readily beoome oontented v.ith, adjlJ..sted to, and off-
fuard may inevitably exneot it t 0 be. For after '3.11 this stereo-
type kind of a world saves us time and might even beoome what 
might be desoribed as a handy intelleotual.tool if we are not 
oonstantly on our guard. It tends als 0 to preserve us from the 
hustl$ and bustle and oonfusi.on of a bewildering world and aids. 
us in f inding pat so lut ions topers ona I and pub.lio pr oblems al-
most instanteo usly 'v'iithout provooa t ion. Yes', our opinions are in-
fluenoed by the folkways, and the mores and the morals of the 
world or worlds whioh surround us and of which we are members 
and whioh we permit to become our own ::J.oralizLd and :tational-
ized codifioation of facts along with an inolination to be too 
1 
prone to aooept at faoe value. 
Public ouinion has often been generated and cO[:lmilnioa-
ted by two extre111e c. altern t ing met :ods. One, the ~D:olioa t ion of 
physioal foroe and, two, the method of pers uasion through the use 
of symbols as illustrated by the wr it ten and spoken word. The 
resort to the use of physioal foroe as a method by whioh a group 
is a ompelled to be lieve some thing is so alien to the 1f.d.m6rioan 
I 
Ibid" p. 126. 
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way" that it can be di smissed at once. 'rhe assistance of. the 
alternavive method is therefore seized upon to d'o the "trick." 
In the d~dllf'ul enlistment of this latter method ulterior motives 
do not corae under suspicion. The applicat ion of this unsuspected 
ruse is orderly, painless a'fa. pres mllub ly gives evidence of a re-
spect for the personality of those appealed to. Prostitute the 
language lito this thinglt you want to "get across" and that will 
take care of it. It will also help to dramatize it, pantomiJile it, 
parade it, surrounu it with r.itual and audio-visual sugar-coated 
broadcast alld brochure. 
Language is the chief means for shaping public opinion 
and the clever use of it beco.~s the mOi3t reliable method for 
winning converts to a particular po'int of view wi thout arousing 
emotional recoil • .tUnerican newspapers in the first two decades 
of the twentieth centL,ry illustrate the truth of this claim as 
an incontestable means in both moulding and controlling the minds 
of their readers .v/hen it is, realized they comprised the only 
1 
readinE::: material for ninet,? per cent of the it.lerican people 
during this peri od we sense immedia tely the power that they 
wielded over the minds' 0 f men, wi th each new ·-·edi ti on suppress ing 
or playing up pet angles in behalf of a capitalistic order which 
might need a little lipruning" or "tl'il.11ming" here and there) but 
1 
Peterson, H. C.: Propaganda for War-- rhe Campaign against 




not very much)in order to uBher in the utopia j uSb ahead. 'l'hus 
have the owners and the hirelings of the press been guilty of 
finding ways of applying a self-imposed censorship by which they 
could preserve the stat us-quo, protect their vested interests 
and the monopolies of their friends and followers who approved 
their maneuvers. Here we have, of course, nothing less than a 
. 1 
deliberate atte.:l1ptto propagandize and bamboo~le the readers. 
It is likewise well known that co rrespondents and ed-
itors are human beings and are conseeouently inclined to color the 
news accordillg to their own ideas. It would be too much to expect 
them not to do so. Ni th these two classes 0 f wr it ers in mind we 
can disti~guish two so-called brands of censorship; 1. The aelib-
erste sup )ression- of facts while preten:.~ing to give complete news 
cove:cae;:e and 2. the unintentional circumvel:Jting <?f them. '[e 
have here what fllight be called then the two chief tools at the 
disposal of propagandists. lmd. If.e DUSt hasten to add that there 
are many times when the unconscious influences operatillg are mOl'e 
effective than the deliberate efforts to produce the coveted 
2 
ends. 
The three queBtions which are posed for us in the se-
que:nce are: 1. Is the information fed to us distorted or not?; 2. 
1 
Lasswell, OPe cit., p. 38. 
2 
Riegel, hobert E. and others; An Introduction to the Social 
SCiences, p. 1078. 
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Can we judge satisfactorily the motives behind the news presented.?; 
and 3. Is the news distorted deliberately or unintentionally? 
Such que,ctions imply the priLKl.ry reasons why propaganda provides 
no satisfactory guide to one who desires to weigh honestly a..l1d 
Beriously the reliability of the inforraation and the arguments 
uded to bolster up the news ad~~linis tered. PI' opaganda as such, over 
and over again, beco::'16s little more than a synonym for "lie. 1I 
Consider aB well that p::copaganda is s orne times defined 
to rooan the pl.·e~-5entation of one side as against the giving of 
both sides. But is it right for one to teacp. what he believes 
at long last to bs untrue or dangerous? Such a defini ti on may be 
requiring that one should do the very thing he is later condemned 
for doing. In other words. is it not true that at times one is 
obligded to distort the news fed to him in order to teach the 
truth? But be that as it may the word propaganda still remains 
a wo rd to be used to di scredi t the information and arguments with 
which one disagrees. Nor will it be amiss to recall that the word 
is used to describe the entrance of ulterior motives. In short, 
the VJord is inextricably intertwined with all information and 
activities, oral, written and pictorial, designed to influence and 
inflame another person's opinion or 'actions, and honestly requires 
the admissiontha tall definit ions of the word are often too aca-
demia for the many, since the few, have tODoften no scale of 
values other than those connoted by the words "good" and "bad." 
Consequent ly) "propaganda, If because of the uncertaint ies 
/ \ 
involved pertaining to the ordinary accepted virt ues. beco:nes 
a s:near word standing for something unreliable, sanething if you 
please, Which one does not want to have dealings with. It is a 
word in ill repute. It is used to discredit proposals, motives 
and actions of people with whom one, for one or more reasons, 
disagrees. Thus people rarely admit or consider themselves to be 
propagandists or the things that they think, say, wri te and do 
1 
to be propaganda. 
An infallable meth,?d of measuring and s u:l1marizing 
public opinion has not as yet been perfected althoGgh many are 
the gestures made in this direction by individuals or organiza .. 
tions in which a pure precipitate of public opinion is vi tal to 
their interest. The staterrent of the leader of'the group may be 
the opinion of the majority represented, but it is seldom the 
2 
opinion of ever;y'one in the group. 
There are incidents of the past which see:! to prove 
conclusively that one hypnotic leader, without/tile enlistment of 
.' , 
what is referred to as scientific analysiS (especially in the' 
field of politics) senses the pulse of public opinion sooner and 
more accurately than the application of the most scientifio meth-
ods known to-date. It is also possible that leadership of this 
kind might be used to swing people into line and on to the band-
1 
Riegel and others; Ope oit., pp. 1080-1082. 
2 
Lippman, OPe cit., p. 3. 
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wagon totally unaware of what they are headed for. In this form 
the one-sided spokesman of a sEnall seg,~lent of the populat ion may 
be knowingly or unknowingly a Iftoolll of the propagandist. 
The rise of publi<;: opinion as a significant TlOlitical 
and Bocial force dates back to the eighteenth century. It is 
closely identified with the rise of lIlia.dle-class democracy. In 
due time it became a fetish, blossoming out in the expandir~ 
grasp of democratic; desires to impregnate the minds of the peoples 
of Western Eu::,'ope and Ameri0B: during the last two hundred years. 
Other familiar associates are: nrogress, freedom of the press, 
freedom of asse:-oo ly, freedom of speech and freedom of- religion., 
Of these, freedom of the press and freedom of public opinion are 
intimately linked together in the ir history and tilis interrela-
tedness contributes toone of the di ffitulties in d.ist inguishing 
between public opinion and the "news. 11 Wi tb the rise of the print-
ing and newspaper industries it was but a short dtep for news-
paper proprietors to proclaim that their journals reflected the 
I 
II pub lic int erest • tI 
To repeat, the opinion of a Single newspaper does not 
reflect the opinion of - the hoi-polloi. It may be the opinion of 
the owner, edi tor or correspondent or the opinion of that small 
segment of the publio Which is vitally interested in the news-
papers cont inuance and the furthe ring of vested interests known 
or unknown. a survey by a newspaper, in the period under consld-
I 
vVilson, Logan and Kolb, William: Sociological.Analysis, (Lee, 
alfred McClung, Public Opinion in Relation to Culture) p. 310 
-9-
eration refleoted, for example, only a rough approximation of 
pub lio opinion at best, but l!Q~, for, at that time we had 
no device for measuring the opinion of a whole nation's popula-
tion with any degree of acouracy. Neither did the surveys suoh as 
those conducted by the Literary Digest reflect , the concerted 
opinion of the entire country when they were rrade. They often 
.,-f 
only reflected opinions of iifferent newspapers through~the na-
tion. And, to be sure, there is the remlote possi1Jility that the 
indi vidual newspaper reflected the correct opinion of the whole 
area to which it catered, but the chance of this be ing the case 
was very slight • .Again there is the possibility that the news-
paper was powerful enough to form and control pub lic opinion wi th;.. 
in a certain area at a certain time~ due to the fact, let us say. 
for example, that the newspaper comprised. the sole reading mater-
ial for ninety per cent of the American people during the period, 
1 
1914-1917. jut such conclusions are subject to correction. 
The polls undertaken by the Literary ~igest during the 
above mentioned periOd of our neutrality were forerunners of our 
more elaborate polls today. Then, there was no breaking down of 
the population into classes, either.econoillical~y or socially. 
"dhen the general public was polled the list of names came either 
from the Digest's own mailing list or from the telephone directory 
or some other more or less comparable listing. Hor did the poll 
consider the full range o;f possible opinions in a complex so-
c'iety and whether these ideas had been jelled to the place 
1 
Peterson, OPe cit., p. 7. 
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where they could be said to be based on abiding cOllvic;;ions. i3e-
sides the opinions recorded from such polls were too few in num-
ber, too shallow in depth and consec_uently -altogetner unreliable. 
nowever, \;.I.1e inaccuracy of th ese polls st. QuId not be charged to 
a false accounting of the organization conducting the poll. In 
the case of the Literary Dig-est it must be remembered, in fairness, 
that the magazine was atte:llpting to break rew ground and to secure 
a \'l/hole mtion's opinion with the only known instrument at hand. 
In this case the editer was not a social scientist or a politician 
but a business man intent on trying to devise a sound method of 
polling the na.tion to detect its pulse for the benefit of the 
readers of his magazine. This step mar.,.~ed the birth of that which 
has since develpped into what we now believe to be a "scientific 
instrument, ff even though the public opinion polls in vogue today 
1 
likeVJise have their weaknesses. 
The more or less scientifio poll of today however takes 
oognizanoe of the ideological differences that have come to play 
s uoh a tremenduous role in American politics, and today' s author-
ities in this new endeavor realize the potential danger here and 
are now engaged in experimenting vvith more and more reliable tools 
oapab Ie of me as ur~ng the intensi ty and breadth of t he opinions 
held. The progress that has been rrade through the use of batter-
ies of related questions have shown that "frames of reference •• 
• " relatively firmly rooted" in I1personal values" are credited 
.[. ~ • "-': ~'.e: 
1 
i1ilson and Kolb, OPe ci t., p. 321. 
-11-
wi th obtaining fI essentia lly th e sam:; results" from di fferent 
types of questioning from different points of view. Suoh an elab-
oration of the questioning provess may lead eventually to a re-
liable reoording of the sentiments involved and a reoognition of 
the important part they play in a more inolusive tabulation of 
publio opinion • .And it is a long step between the expression of 
a sooially aooeptable tolerant opinion and literally being more 
oonsiderate of another's religious and raoial loyalties in the 
1 
gi ve and take of everyday Ii ~ ng. 
30 despite the knowledge that no instruments were a-
vailable in 1914 to gauge aoourately the opinion of the .A,l;.1erio~n 
people we are reasonably safe in saying tbat at the outbreak of 
the European. struggle they favored a polioy of De utrality. They 
seenBd dete:tmined to stand by that polioy. Having said this we 
must also readily admit that there is no short out to the arriving 
at suoh a oonclusion in an effort to disobver why the American 
people, d~testing war and in favor of staying out of it, did 
enter it. Here emerges the neoessity for looking at the sooial, 
eoonomio, and religi OUB s ouroes and oauses, stereotypes and 
ideologies if we would, know and be assisted in solving the prob-





II. THE COURSE AIID ACTIO.N OF ]lURE IGN PnO P.AGAl1D.a. 
Secti on one: The theo ry of propaganda. 
Section two: Reality. 
Let any man speak long 
enough, he will get believers. 
Stevenson 
The l~ster of Ballantrae 
~HEORY 
The· aot of persuasion, known today as the art of prop-
agandizing, is as old as history but it was not until the present 
oentury that it beoame known as an art or trad.e. In the oomplex 
world of today we are oontinuallyatter.apting to "swing" votes 
and power to our own trend of thought and the use of propaganda 
is now very aOmffionplaoe. The use of Jropaganda to indootrinate 
and to proseo ute a war has made it an everyday term. 
There are basio fundamentals that must be follo .. ed in 
all propaganda. One is to . adhere to the truth as olose as possible. 
Another basic idea is to arouse the interest of speo ifio groups 
and a third is to nullify inoonvenient ideas, always remembering 
too,that to seoure a wide appeal one should use~straight-forward 
manner or style. It shoc,ld be written or spoken in a simple style 
so that it may be understood by. thE: "man on the dooks, or the ped-
dler on the street oorner. ff Paul Goebbels stated that propaganda 
must always be essentially Simple and repetitious, for in the long 
run the suooessful propagandist is the person who is able to 
"reduoe problems to the simplest term8 and who has the co urage to 
keep forever repeating ·them in this simplified form desnite the 
1 
objeotions of the intelleotuals." 
Thestrategio aims or four major objeotives of Allied 
propaganda were: 
1 
The Goebbels Diaries, p. 119. 
1. To mobilize hatred against the enemy. 
2. To preserve the friendship of Allies. 
3. To preserve the friendship, and if 
possible, to procure the cooperation of neutrals. 
4. To demoralize tile enemy. 1 
1'0 mobilize hatred against an enemy the propagandist must 
first accuse him of being quarrelsome, crude and destructive. He 
is degenerate in his conduct of the war and conducts a lying prop-
aganda. Then call him l:allleS and pic ture what the worl d wo uld be like 
if the enemy did happen to be victorious. The war can also be rep-
resented as a war of race or as a holy war. The enemy invariably 
mobilizes first against a defenseless nation, ei ther openly or 
secretly, and cor.ami ts acts of war. The enemy further incriminates 
himself by endeavouring to maneuver our government into the po-
sition of an aggressor and by dOing this he stands on a record 
of lawlessness, violence and malice, which offers unassaiLl.ble 
proof of a deliberate int~nt to maim or destroy our great nation. 
'To further his cause ani build up this hatred the propagandist 
attemtps to convince the public that his nation has entered the 
struggle to save business, family and church, and to add to pros-
perity, security and faith. Thus the enemy becomes the enemy of 
2 
each and everyone of us. 
Similar tactics can be used regarding allies, with whom 
ties of friendship should be preserved. The nropagandato bring 
1 
Lasswell, OPe cit., p. 195. 
2 




this about ma¥ incluue constant assertions of respect and dem-
onstrations of esteem, such as observing the allies' chief hol-
idays. In seeking to influence ne utrals the propagandist must 
introduce to the neutral the idea that his enemy is the neutral's 
enemy, ana. thus get the neutral to identify himself with the war 
1 
aims of the propagandist. 
The demoralizing of the ene,llY is chiefly accomplished, 
of course, by defeating him in the field. But the propagandist's 
part is to convince a nation that its troops are wavering. Leaf-
lets and other printed propaganda way have little effect, but 
when one's own na ti on I a events mai::e propaganda read as a lie, 
2 
national demoralization sets in. 
It must be emphasized that a group ca mot be sure that 
its efforts will accomplis~ the desired results, as propaganda 
has definite limitations. The willingness of the people to believe, 
brought ab out by other influences in their environment which have 
been so strong that their thifucing patterns are set, destroys its 
3 
effectiveness. Finally, its effects are limited by counter-prop-
aganda, whicn may be considered as t he pI' opaganda of the opposing 
4 
faction. Propaganda is alsO limited in its inability to control 
1 
Ibid, pp. 114-1260 
2 
Peterson, OPe cit., preface. 
3 
Riegel, h. E., OPe cit., p. 1087. 
4 












lists of w~r aims were pointed largely at home aUdiences but 
1 
such stater.1ents were a1so intended to influence neutra.l opinion. 
The various classes of Al1Erican society bad to be influenced but 
without antagonizing other classes. Social reform may be held out 
to wage-earners but middle-class people are likely to give their 
approval to war aims of a political or juristic character. 
nlfthe problem of reconstructing 
t he world is to be shorn of al,l...apparen t 
class bias, it must be concefived as a 
problem of a politico-juristic nature, 
for talk ab out world 19 gi sla t ures and 
courts tends to ingratiate itself where 
proposals for the administration of raw 
na terials by wor Id act .Lon, and for the 
use of the world taxing power to level 
up existing inequalities of opportunity 
are suspect." 2 
The League to En~orce Peace (1914-1919) is the best 
example of this branch of su ccess ful pro paganda (to ar ise dur ing 
the peri od of our ne utrali ty. 
The active propagandist is certain to have a helping 
hand from everybody with an axe to grind. Those groups who do 
not take action imrnediately can be b:.:'ought into the realm of 
the propagandist gradually,without their direct knowledge, by 
bringing to light those things which are of special interest to 
the group. To the economic and ecclesiastical groups already 
referred 10 could be added a constellation of artists, SCientists, 
teachers, or sportsmen wi thout end. The memb ers of the talka ti ve 
1 
Lasswell, Ope cit., p. 59. 
2 
Ibid., pp. 64-65. 
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professions who depend for their living on their ability to arouse 
emot ions are pract ically ind ispensable. 
Slowly but surely the successful propagandist brings 
his ~ uspecting vict iml'into the realm of imagining himself in 
the cold cruel war via /one way or another. ite must remember that 
most peo ple are more int erested in themse Ives than in anything 
else in the world. 30 when the propagandist has involved the 
public in the struggle to the extent that the vvelfare of the per-
son depends on the outcome of the war, following the general 
1 
pattern placed before him, the propagandist has succeeded •. 
For a meJuber of the general public who has been victim-
ized this way it proves exceedingly hard to trace the connection 
between the responsible authorities and their propaganda. When 
drastic action by t he government fo llows a heavy outpouring of 
propaganda and the officials are questioned as to their authority 
for such action, they may contend that the pressure of pub lie 
opinion forced their hand. ~hus it is a vicious circle once again; 
.2 
one a slave to the other. So far as there are formula tions of 
public opinion, legal rules cannot exist until public opinion 
has become fixed and settled, and cannot we 11 change unti 1 p!).blic 
opinion has ~efinitely changed. It follows that law is likely to 
1 
Lippman, Ope cit., p. 178. 
2 
Jiead, JallB s l.iorgan: Atr oc ity Propaganda, p. 17. 
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lag somewhat behind publio opinion whenever the latter is aotive 
1 
and growing. Thus the· neoessi ty arises for the government to 
mould the opinion of the publio until the publio demands that the 
measures proposed by the authorities are nade law. 
The suooessful propagandist is the one who oan create 
oonfusion among his vict.Lms and out of this confusion mould their 
minds to do his hidding In an unsuspecting manner. He must be 
careful not to let the confusion lead to mob-violenoe where this 
might oause antagonism to all that he is attem1ting to create in 
their minds. Dividing thei r thoughts and then conqueri ng them by 
direoting their thoughts into the channel he has prepared/is his 
2 
main attaok. Mobs can also oreate fear and thus be good propa-
ganda at times. 
The minds of the general pub lio must be made to justify 
tlleir part in the struggle. This is brought about by the general 
wish of c 11 mankind that good be trIumphant in the universe. It 
must. therefore, be that one's own m. tion is vindioating the 
right against the wrong. In the veryaot of delivering the blow 
the nation oalls for unity and viotory. It is the business of 
the propagandist to amplify and repeat the call. Then as right 
makes might, the mind assumes the idea that we are struggling 
with the .enemy in the name of peace and seourity. This is the 
1 
Ford, James: Social Problems and Sooial Polioy, p. 897. 
2 
Gillette and Reinhardt. Ope oit •• p. 643. 
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-
greatest war aim and in it the pllb lic finds the "peaceflllness of 
1 
b e i l1g a t war. f1 
1 
"When the pllblic belie ves that the 
ereroy began the war and blocks a perm-
anent, profitably and godly peace, the 
propagandist has achieved his sllpreme 
p Ilrp os e. tf 2 
-0-
Lasswell, OPe cit., pp. 54-58. 
2 
Ibid, p. 77. 
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Every mtion in the war tried to procure the friend-
ship and, if possible, the cooperation of the United States. But 
Great Britain, worldly wise from the experiences gained through 
the governing and controlling of her great empire, had an early 
start in the atte __ :pt to mould the a..'Uerican mind. Ina sense this 
headstart was not brought about by direct propaganda but by 
friendly incidents in international relations. One inciCtent in-
volved the Venezuela boundary dispute in 1896 which threatened 
war between the two English speaking nations in the application 
of the I1onroe Doctrine. ~7hen the act ion became pub lia, prominent 
men in both countries threw their weight to the side of concil-
iation. Joseph Chamberlain, an influential member of the cabinet, 
expressed official Dritish opinion when he declared in a speech 
in Dirmingham in January, 1896, "We do not oovet one single 
inch of .American territory. 'iJar between the two nations would be 
an absurdity as well as a crime. I should look forward with 
pleasure to the possibili ty of the Stars and Stripes ana. the 
Union Jack floating t'ogether in defense of a common cause san-
1 
ctioned by humanity and justice." 
Further cementing of Anglo-A~erican friendship was 
fostered by an incident at the Battle of ilanil, Bay, when the 
1 
Bemis, daIlluel Flagg: A Diplomatic History of the United States, 
po 421. 
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British fleet (as the newspapers reported it) checked a possible 
1 
GerUE.n intervent ion. ( This story was much exaggerated, but had 
influence.) At any rate, British diplomacy favored American 
policy during the 8panish dar and after. 
Since the turn of the century america had been favored 
with a stream of anti-German propaganCia from "-reat Britain. Since 
Ac.uerican newspapers rarely rraintdined correspondents on the 
continent their for~igh news came by way of London, where it was 
highly colored by the anti-German policies of The Times and other 
British newspapers, most of it emanating from newspapers owned 
2 
or controlled by Lord Northcliffe. 
This headstart of fifteen years in the battle of prop-
aganda stood G-reat 3ritian in good stead. Their imtnediate prob-
lem at the outset of war was to ass ure thems-el ves of the support 
of the leaders of Ame r ican life, and in this regard they were 
1 
2 
Ehodes, JaJa:3s ]j'ord: History of the United ;3tates, Vol. 9, p. 160. 
Lora Nor'thclifie, (1865-1922) in 1908 obtained control of th.e 
ilimes, to ovm willch had alwe.ys be,n one of the aims of his life. 
From 1900 onwards, through his news Da-oers, he had exercised an 
ever-increasing influence on politics • .ue bad at one time been 
anxious, like ~dward VII, and 0ec il Rhodes, to obtain a friendly 
understand ing between. :3ngland and Germany, but G-er,,1 an policy 
during the Boer war caused him to abandon the idea~as impract-
icable. His newspapers consistently pleaded the cause of a 
strong navy, and as consistently warned the nation for 20 years 
of the peril from Ger:~-any. i:'rom 1902 he sought to effect an 
entente ~.ith li'rance, and also to promote agree::1ents wi th Russia 
and the United i3tates, whose sentiments and prejudices he had 
learnt in many vi si ts. Before ·the Uni ted ,;jta tes entered the war 
he was offered and declined the post of British Ambassador at 
.iashingt on. He also owned the Exnress and the Daily l,lail. 
The Encyclopedia Britannica, 14th Ed. Vol. 16, p. 526. 
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fortuna te. The American aris t ocra twas dist inctly Anglophile. To 
assume a pro-Bri tish atti tude was the "thing to do" among cul-
tured Americans. This was accentuated by the fact that the eco-
nomic aristocracy did most of its foreign business thro~gh Lon-
1 
don. One of the 1,Io:c gan pa. rtners t Thomas Lamont, sta ted ~ "Like 
most of our contemporaries and friends and neighbors we (4. p. 
l'iforgan and Company) wanted th e allies to win the war from the 
outset. 
2 
de were pro-Ally by inheritance, by instinct, by opinion." 
At tm beginning o~ the struggle to control opinion 
Gerrrany possessed one advantage. Next to the iiri tish Isle St Ger-
many had rIB de the 1a rgest co ntri but ion to the .Ameri can popula-
tion. The greater number of German-Ar~ricans were of the second 
or third generation, men whose fathers or grandfathers had enter-
ed the co untry between the fo rti as and the nine ties of the last 
century and were now assimilated. after the United States entered 
the war they were patriotic, with only a small minority being 
traitorous t but previously they voiced pro-German opinions. Also 
unfriendly to the Allies were the Jews who had been persecuted 
by the RUSSians, ~ngland's Ally, and the Irish who could never 
3 
forgive the British Empire for its sub,jection of I:beland. The 
1 
Peterson, Ope cit., p. 8. 
2 
Time Magazine, Vol. XXVII, NO.3 (Jan. 20, 1936) p. 16. 
3 
l1illis, '.Ialter: The hoad to riar, p. 6. 
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Germans had conducted a form of propaganda, starting in 1902 
when the Kaiser's bI'other, Prince lienry, visited Alllerica. A 
museum of >Jerman culture was establi;shed at Harvard; an exchange 
professor was sent to Columbia; a number of prominent .i~'nericans 
were given honorific ribbons tow ear, but such feeble efforts 
made little headway against the British, and in 1914 American 
publicists wi th any views a t all on foreign affaL's were apt to 
1 
be rather pro-British and anti-German. 
ldany prominent \.;ferm.ans were aware 0:Z the task that 
faced the ~tatherland without a st upend.ous propaganda campaign 
to counteract the flow of British words. One of these men was 
Dr. Ernest Daenell, a uerman University professor. 
tlilothing has occu:r'red in the past which 
America can charge against us, yet there is 
one tremendous obstacle, between America 
and l7e rmany • 
"~Ye must overcome the peculiar histor-
ioal feeling existing betwen america and 
England; for those Arooricans who are respon-
sible for arreri can Dolitics and for the sha-
ping of public opinion are of Anglo-Saxon 
extraction." 2 
From the very beginning of the war, "'~ermany, like all 
of the warring nations, conducted a ca::npaign of patriotic prop-
aganda at home to keep up the morale o'f the GeruRIl people and 
the troops. This work had been put into the hands of the "](riegs-
1 
The Literary Digest, Vol. XLIX; No. 21 (Nov. 21, 1914) p. 1010. 
2 
;Jwain, Joseph iVard: Beginning the Twentieth Century, p. 474. 
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presseamt", which had also the task of issuing the war news to 
the German press. 'l'his double duty resulted in a failure to or-
ganize an effective propaganda systeel in the.:h'atherland, since 
the "Kriegspresseamt If c oncent ra. ted its efforts mainly on the 
1 
war news. 
The first move in the war of words occurred on August 
5. 1914, when the .ari tish cut the cables between ~errilany and 
the United 3tates, leaving the German government with wireless 
telegraphy as their only direct means of access to the American 
2 
pub11c. The second mOve was the cens orship of the ·press of 
Eng land, and although directed a2~ainst subversive activities 
throughout the Empire, indirectly affected .L1.iller1can opinion 
as Amer ican ne ws ci ispa tuhes. handled by London newspaper~ came 
3 
under this censorship. 
The third move was the censorship of outgoing mail 
and cables to control information passing between Ear ope and 
America. dchreiner 0= the Associated Press estirm ted that at 
this time (1915) nearly three-quarters of the dispatches written 
by American correspondents in Central Zurope were perishing 
4 
under the shears of the British censors. 
1 
Bruntz. George G.: Allied Propaganda and the Collapse of the 
German Empire in 1918. p. 194. 
2 
Peterson, Ope cit •• pp. 4-12. 
3 
Ibid., p. 13. 
4 
Ibid., p. 16; see also 1.1:1llis, OPe cit., p. 147. 
-25-
'llhe first organization for the dissemination of British 
propaganda was a Neutra.l Countries 3uboommi ttee, whioh, though 
begun on a private basis in August 1914, was takenovor by the 
government's Central Committee (Central Committee' for National 
Pa t;riotio Organizati ons) the following month. The method of the 
subcom:J.i ttee was as fa:c as possi ble one of direct personal 
approach. IJaterial was sent out, not in the name of the ·committee, 
but in the name of various distinguished ~litishers, wnose ao-
quaintances, colleagues ,. fell.ow worker3, or or:siness associates 
in ne utral lands recei ved-- of tent lmes unwi llingly-- propaganda 
material prepared and sent by the committee. By this means every 
possible variety of interests in the neutral countries was reach-
ed. dome 250,000 pamphlets, booklets and other publioations 
were thus distributed between august 1914 and January 1, 1916. 
The first official propaganda organization in England for act-
ivi ty elsewhere was the dar Propaganda Bureau, estE~blished by 
the l!'oreign office in the la.tter p:1rt of 1~14. It concerned it-
self with the distribution of leaflets, painphlets and other 
material in Allied and neutral countries. This official organ-
ization was nothing more than the .Neutral Countries Subcommittee 
under ot'ficial government sanction and control. The di rector of 
the bureau was the :cit. Hon. C. 11\ :Iastennan, and its headquarters 
were at 'Nellington House, the office 0.' the National Health 
Ins urance Company. The ex is tence of this cO;'l1mit tee was unl::nown 
to the general publio, as it was thought best to attach as little 




and neutral co unt r Les. 
One distinguished English e~cpert in this field wrot e. 
"Better than any pumped-in propaganda abroad was the method of 
making the leaders of the Imperial, neutral or Allied pre38 them-
selves the propagandists when they retul'ned home." Not bribery 
2 
but direct pel's onal approach'. In 2ne'land, !fArner .Lcan journal ists, 
publicists, authors, statesmen, greete:cs, and munition-malmrs" 
were courted assidueusly. "Clubs were open to them an] tea.3 and 
dinners were given for them. rhe AdericaTJ. wives of inglishmen, 
led by Lady Astor, formed a batt",:lion of solici tude lest ALrer-
3 
icans in London became homes iok ." These na ti ve Ame ri can prop-
aeandists were volunteers, some being indi viJually enli sted in 
'Ol:1e case~3, but in the main they were regimented into "soldiers 
of the king" by a process of elimina.ting, or at least curtailing, 
enemy interpretations 0:::' the war and by dominating the news with 
exaggerated and warped pro-ally accounts of what was happening 
or had happened. Once these Arnet'icans had acquired the Ifcorrectl1 
frame of mind, they were ffenlisted" for the "duration of the 1iJar." 
The formal propaganda groups acted Ii£) rely as connecting and re-
inforcing elements of the .ori tish propaganda organizations. The 
1 
Bruntz, Ope cit., pp. 19-21. 
2 
3 
Peterson, Ope cIt., p. 25 (Lord Beaverbrook, Politicians and 
the Press, London, 1927, p. 12)0 
Ibi d • ., p. 27 (Palmer, .lPrederi ck, dith idY Own Eyes, p. 332). 
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real propagandists were the A:.ae ricans -- our preachers, teachers, 
1 
poli t icians and Journalists. 
The first step in direct action propaganda or censor-
ship to directly effect America occm~red jU8t six months before 
america entered the war, wh en too few re:.1&ining cables were 
closed to the Hearst newspaper syndicate and their correspondents 
expelled. This ID9ant that all newsapers receiving their foreign 
news from t he In terna ti om 1 News ;;3ervice would ha ve to c onfor m 
to censorsnip or seek a new source of news. Hearst I s London 
representative was instructed to tell him that the prohibition 
would be effective at once unless Hearst would give his personal 
assurance that all dispatches would be printed exactly as received 
after passage through the British censorship.iihen. he heard the 
news Hearst said, flI am going to tell them to go to hell," where-
upon the British made good their threat, giving as official 
gro unds "the continued garbling of messages and b l'each of faith 
on the part 0:' the Ihternati onal News 3ervi ce. 11 Hearst res orted 
2 
to the pirating of news from a rival press association. 
From the partial studies which have been made of Ger-
man propaganda one thing stands out olearly; it suffered from 
military control.and ineffective organization. Professor :aanse, 
the nazi military specialist, attributes the superiority of 
1 
Ibid., p. 32. 
2 




English'propaganda to the fact that it was run by civilians, the 
German by soldiers. "The latter is the wrong way, because it is 
not the sOldier's but the psychologists' opinion that counts 
1 
here." ,H. D. Lasswell contrasts the strong coordina t ion of the 
British propaganda system in the United 3tates with the minimum 
of coordinated propaganda effort in Gerillany, where each department 
went ahead 4ln its own way, and the only formal cooperation was 
2 
in the press conference, which met two or three times a week. 
Others do not 'agree that the, German propaganda machine was de-
fective. 3idney .2ogerson maintains that "in 1914 Germany was the 
only power in Europe which had deliberately built up a national 
propaganda system. She had been at p:::ins to ens ~e that news 
favorable to Germany was disseminated in as thoro ughly organized 
a manner as she had organized her army, her navy, and her indus-
try. f1 Will Irwin hold s much the same opinion, that German prop-
3 
aganda had the advantage in the ea:cly days of the war. 
But if one is to follow t~~ugh on the splendid organ-
ization of German ina. u;3try and military power, we shall discover 
that this very idea, organization, was skillfully used by British 
propagandists to undermine american opinion of Germany by making 
efficiency and organization synonymous with regimentation and 
1 
Read, Ope cit., p. 104. 
2 
Lasswell, Ope cit., p. 22. 
3 




autocracy and in conflict with the ~rican ideal of' freedom. 
John Cowper Powys, staff lecturer on Literature for Oxford Univ-
1 
ersity Bxtension Delegacy, in his reply to Professor =Junsterberg's 
writings on Ger~an culture, used emotional language to undermine 
this .American opinion of German organiz~',tion. 
"Let Americans who waver in their 
allegiance to the cause of the future of 
the human spirit because of Junsterberg's 
talk by 'Cossacks. and their Progroms' 
and English and Prench with their 'colored 
races' think of the growth of their own 
republic. Let them tnink of' those great 
principles of indi vidual liberty, as a-
gainst all government-machines, upon which 
the American ideal is based. Letthem think 
of Jefferson and of Emerson, of .l1'ranklin and 
of Walt ;ihitman; and let them decide whe-
ther they prefer to live in a world dom-
inated by over-drilled and over-bearing 
'efficiency.' or in a world of free, in-
stinctive beauty, and free, instinctive 
faith!" 2 
The Germans, according to the admission of numerous 
authorities, like George Sylvester Viereck, editor of The Father-
land, were most inept at propaganda •. ,b'urther evidence of ineffi-
ciency is given by Count Von Bernstorff, Gennan ambassador to the 
1 
2 
Hugo .L,iunsterberg was a Ger;l1an-.A.raerican psychologist and philOS-
opher. He was in charge of the psychological laboratory at Har-
vard fro3 1892-1895. A few years later he became the head of the 
department of Philosophy at Harvard. He was the exchange prof-
essor from Harvard at the University of Berlin in 1910-1911. Be-
came professor of Philosophy of RAdcliffe College in 1916. One 
of the leading German sympathizers in America. 
Powys, John Cowper: The Nar and Culture, p. 79. 
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~ 
United States, Count Czerin, the austrian :.anister of Foreign 
Affairs during a part of the war and Kaiser Wilhelm himself. Those 
ohiefly responsible for disseminating the doctrines of the Central 
powers in ~nerice were Dr. Bernhard Dernberg, formerly Secretary 
of dtate for the Colonies, who came officially as the represent-
ative of the,Red Cross, and Dr. Heinrich albert, attached to the 
Embassy as Co~ercial Attache. George ~ylvester Viereok, as editor 
of i'he Fatherland, was already at If:.Ork before the German propa-
ganda machine oommenoed oper~tions through the establishment of 
the \.ierman Infm"'Llation Bureau in 1915. With the help of various 
Germans, ne ws releases were sent out to over 500 papers. 
In Deoember, 1914, Dr. Willia,:J. 3ayard Hale, a former 
clergyman, who had been a jourlJalist for many years as the lit-
erary edl tor of the li"ew York Times and editor of the ""arId r s 
Work, was e".lployed to prepare pro paganaa Ii terJ.. t ure • .cie was a 
1 
close friend of ./oodrow ',/ilson. This burea.u, which never had 
more than a dozen men in it, took care of the ordinary work of a 
propaganda organization. It published pamphlets, gave favorable 
support to authors desiring to publish books whioh were favorable 
to Germany, and later arranged for the release of some newsreels. 
It was realized, 0 f course, the. t the newspaoer was the most effeo-
tive propaganda medium tn the United .3tates. Consequently, muoh 
attention was given to tht:: problem of creating a more sJrnpathetic 
1 
Abrams, ..::\ay H.: Preachers PreiJent ..d.rms, p. 19. 
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attitude in the press. The Gerrmns were anpalled by the attitude 
of ~eric2.n newspapers'. The few friendly statements vJhich vvere 
pub lished were nat urally unh.liJOrtant in comparison with the flood 
1 
of arti cles wh ich r~ere unfrienctly. Pro-German co lU,;lllS r,ere con-
ducted by H. L. LIenc~;:en, in the Jal timore Jun, and by Edmund von 
:,Iach in the Boston:l'ralls Ci: ipt. Pirst published in August, 1914, 
2 
rhe .1!'atherland was undiluted pro-Germanism. 3ut these were drops 
in an ooean of pro-ally propaganda. 
Gerrran propaganda addressed i t::Jelf primarily. to gro ups 
from whioh it could expect a sympathetic response. It sought the 
old -fashioned American with .ii-eva lutiol1ary tradi t ions; the cotto.n 
grower ot' the .south, alma t bankrupted by the blockade; the Irish 
with a grudge against ~ngland; the Jew with a grudge against 
I,ussia; ana. last, not least, the German-American. The isolation-
ists whose world ends with the ROCk(y ~.Iountains lent a willing ear 
to the voice of the propagandists. The pacifists, except for those 
who regarded the Allied enterprise as a "war to end war,n clasped 
hancis with the pro-Germans to prevent Uncle Sam from increasing 
the ranks of the be llige _'ents. The radi cals co ope rc.:i. ted for rea-
sons of their own. Pacifism was the motive of some resentment 
against the capitalistic groups, the banks which loaned money to 
the Allies, and the munition makers whose war babies were sky-
rocketing in the stock ma.rket, infl uenced others; sti 11 othe rs 
1 
Peters on, Ope cit., p. 137. 
B 
Viereck, George dylvester: Spreading Germs of Hate, p. 49. 
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1 
were deliberately seduced by bribes. at one time German propa-
gandists in .. a.merica agreed on a mailing list composed of all 
those listed in M'rillo I s '.1ho in .ameri ca fl in addi tion to all members 
of Congress ani the state legislatures, but this was not carried 
2 
out. Later, in order to reach the intelligentsia, especially 
those ..... rooricans who had studied at German Universities, the Ger-
mans sapDorted a new organization known as the University League. 
3 
The aim of the University League was to be a na.cleus of Kultur. 
The German propagan~ists bad the cooperation of the 
Gernan-American .ti.lliance, which was well organized in the lter -
man st:..' ongholds over the na ti on: St. Louis, Chicago, Cincinnati. 
and ~iIilwaukee. There were numerous ~erman social clubs and 
societies. The Kriegsbund was com(losed of those who had se:cved 
in the German army. rhere were several veterans Dosts of the 
war of lB70. The Geneva Society was a specialized organization 
of German wai terse The Turner Societ ies and a 11 sorts of ben-
evolent organizations were thriving in every Genlan district. 
The Lutheran Church was a strong asset of the Gerrrans, for 
there were 6,000 congregations in the United States, whose 
4 
communicants numbered some three million. 'rhe American Truth 
1 
Ibid" p. 46. 
2 
Ibid" p. 57. 
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.... 
Sooiety, headed by ~"~. Jeremiah O'Leary, poured forth Germn 
propaganda under see~lingly dorrestio ausnioes. The .tUnerioan 
Humanity League, the .Amerioan Independenoe :Inion, and many 
other devotedly paoifisti 0 organizati ons of dubious parentage 
were very aoti ve. On June 19, 1916, th ey he ld a great mss 
meeting in New York wi th 1fr • .Bryan as prinoipal speaker, and 
with i~epresentative Frank Buohanan, member of the House Com-
mittee on naval Affairs, as another, and with diplonatio rep-
resentatives of the Central Powers on the platform inoluding 
: 1 
Captains Boy-Ed and. Von Papen, who were lferrnan propagandists. 
~ vast throng appeared and extra speakers harangued the over-
flow in the streets. Yet it did not help the emba"rgo movementl 
and had anyone learned that it was Ca.ntains Bo~,'-Ed and Von Papen 
2 
who supplied the funds, it would probably have destroyed it. 
The British propaganda on the conduot of the war was 
mostly based upon the appalling politioal stupidities oommitted 
by the Gernans. Starting with the invasion of Belgium and ending 
with the Zi~wrman note, the Germans oommitted a series of 
politioal blunders which were simply incomparable. new to the 
field of world power they had little appreciation of the faot 
that their aots had to be justified by something besides exped-
1 
2 
Franz Von Papen, later German Chanoellor and diplomat under 
Hi tIe r, ao "'. ui tted at Nuremb Ul'g trials, 1947. 
Millis, Ope oit., p. 203. 
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iency. In the G-erfJan attempt to sway .tUlleric'ln opinion they 
were hampered by their ignorance of .. 1.,'llerican Dsychology. J:1his 
rather than .:31~i ti sh cleverne ss swayed the balance of power 
towards the side of the allies in the moldine of .dJIlerican opin-
ion. Dy judicious editing and rather Jpecialized emphaSis these 
German errors were turned into veritable acts of frightfulness. 
'l'he emphasis on the fearful plights of flwomen and children" 
characterized ail Dr iti sh propaganda, but Jellingto n hOUS e rea-
lized that this procedure could reach perfection only if it were 
made less abstract. The outstanding exar;ple of this type work 
1 
was the Report of the 00rnmittee on Alleged Ger~an Outrages Which 
dealt vdth the Belgian atrocities. Due to the length of the orig-
inal report it was later condensed into eaSier reading and in 
order that "mankind" might have access to it, it was put on sale 
at the nominal price of one penny. The tragedy of Edith Cavell, 
when gi ven artistic treatment, came to be the second ranking 
1 
James 3ryce, 1st. Viscount .dryce (1838-1922), English statesman, 
jurist and author, was chairman of the Dritish commission to 
study the st aries of German outrages in .delgi urn and France .rhe 
character 01' the rep ort of the c ommissi on (hereinafter referred 
to as the Bryce Report) helps to explain how inaccuracies and 
exaggerations so frequently crept into the text. Report itself 
was a bookl0t of 60 pages, the .d.ppendix containing the proofs 
ran to 300 pages. Some 500 depositions were appended to the 
report, a selection from a total collection of 1,200. :,Iost of 
the d ep osi ti ons were mad'e by 3elgian refugees in England, some 
from .d.llied soldiers and a small number were excerpts from the 
diaries of Gerrmn soldiers. actually not one cleal'-cut case, of 
confessed "atrociousness" was in an.v of them, although many tell 
of the execution of alleged franc tireurs and more, of plunder-
ings. Read, OPe cit., p. 204. 
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atrocity story of the war. 
:rhe German submal~ine warfare also brought the war home 
to .tWlerica and. made it possible fo:t the Allies to claim that 
tnis was proof to substantiate their other claims of German 
barbar ity. In sp it e of all illi t iga ti r:g factor.:'. the s iniring, of 
the Lusi tania was the most damaging of all the polit ical errors 
made by the .xerlllans dur ing the war. It was disastro us to Germany 
bec&.use it ~-jas a striking and dramatic event. The spectacle of 
the innocent passengers .aRtie victims of German :cuthlessness 
outweighed any actualities of contricutory responsibility of the 
United i3tatea, lireat J3ritian and the Cunard Company, 'or the 
dub ious correctness 0 f the .d .. :Jerican policy concerning traveling 
in the wa:c zone. It branded uerulany as the malefactor. The entire 
fie Id of H:citish propaganda v,as benefi ttedby this inc icient. ihe 
most mar~ed advantage was galned with the .ame:cicans '''-liho had been 
enlisted or drafted as i3rit ish propagal1uists. :.Llhey saw a C o;-,1p16 te 
justification of their attitudes. The edito:cs on the ~itlantic 
seaboard lost their heads coapletely and all found it a type of 
2 
sensation which sold their newspapers for them. 
The arrival of the German sub:rE.:tine Deutschland at 
Baltlmore in July, 1916, received much attention in the American 
1 
Peterson, OPe cit., p. 51. 
2 
Ibid.) pp. 109, 125. 
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press-- which was we 11 1i vided on the me :cit s of such a mission. 
Slipoing through the 131:'i tish blockade, the sUbms .. :cine a.nnounced 
itself as being here tor the 9ucpose o::~ taking on badly needed 
supplies for too German government, but one can also iLlagine that 
it v~as here for propaganda purp'oses as the pay load of a submarine 
is ver:{ little even when comps.red with the smallest freighter. 
The :3altimore alIErican believed that the incident was the begin-
ning of "a ne w era in th e wo r Id 's rna rine his tory, If and the Bos ton 
Journal declared it Ifman's gr.eatest single vic;;ory over the sea." 
Otner newspapers th8.t could see value in the mission included 
the new York Globe which stated, "a pioneer, a merchant boat 
pure and 'simple," while the Hew Haven Journal-Courier believed 
the incident,vould aid the nation in remaining neutral. 
6ut ot he r rep resenta t ives of the .tl.ll1er ican p ress felt 
differently. "-'.1he Brooklyn Eagle asiced, flzepplins next?" vvhile the 
3nringfield Union believed the incident would "avail t.hero little," 
and the New Yor ~ dun considered it of lit t 10 importance. The 
Pittsburgh Chronicle-Telegraoh stated ironically, "The Deutschland 
wi 11 carry at least 1,400 tons of nickel and rubber for the 
starving babies of Germany." The general surlJ!,.'B.ry of the press, 
towards the inc ident, pr oved that a slight maj or i ty 0 f Ameri can 
papers commenting on the incident, had already made up their mind 
1 
as to whom they were supporting. Gerrran propaganda had a huge 
1 
Lit. Dig. LIII; 4, (July 22, 1916) p. 169. 
-37-
obstaole to overoome. 
Even the retaliation of the British government, the 
blaoklisting of Amerioan firms whioh had s~pplied the De~tschland. 
found m~oh support in ·the press. The BrooklYn ~agle remained 
oonsistent in its stand, calling the British aotion. "j~tifiablew 
while the Journal of Co.eroB t a spokesman for Amerioan moneied 
interests, believed that the firms were "run and oontrolled from 
Berlin." Fighting for what they oonsidered the law of the sea 
and the rights of nations wer~ the New York Evening Mail whioh 
oonsidered the aot ion as "vi olating a fandamental of interna-
tional law" and the New York World whioh believed that "Britain 
was inviting retaliation." The German lang~age papers foc.ght the 
1 
British with a h~e flow of words, b~t to little avail. 
Whether the German government disoovered that their 
friendlY visits to Amerioa were not having the desired effeots 
and deoided to Change their polioy is ~certain b~t on the morn-
ing of Ootober 9. 1916, the Amerioan p~b1io was amazed to read 
that the U-53 oommanded by Captain Hans Rose had penetrated the 
waters of Narragansett Bay and had s~ five ships almost within 
sight of the ooast. Two. of the ships belonged to ne~tral powers, 
Holland and Norway. This was the only effort ~t Germany to invade 
Amerioan waters. If this aot was intended to soare Anerioa ollt 
of entering the war, it had bad psyohologioal direotion, for in-
1 
Lit. Dige, LIll; 5 (J~y 29. 1916) p. 235. 
\ 
stead of keeping .A..!m ri ca ont of the war it proTed to DBny the 
1 
danger of German seapower. The New York Evening Post stated, 
"in qnarters olose to the Administration the extension of the 
German snbmarine oampaign to the Atlantio seaboard of the United 
States is regarded as constituting the gravest menace to the 
maintenanoe of good relations between the two countries which 
2 
has appeared since the sinking of the Lusitania." 
Not only did the Germans commit political blunders, 
they also failed in the first. step of opinion formulation, that 
of meeting the .public on the public's level. Ambassador Berns-
torff complained of the inadeqaacy of the material sent to Amer-





"The Press-servioe never sucoeeded 
in adapting itself to American requirements. 
The SaDe may be said of most of the ~ennan 
propaganda whioh reached America in fairly 
large qaantities since the third month of 
the wart part ly in German and part ly in not 
always irreproachable English. This, like 
the Press telegrams, showed a complete lack 
of understanding of American national psy-
chology. The oatstanding charaoteristic of 
the Average American is rather a great, 
even though superficial, sentimentality. 
There is now news for whioh a way oannot be 
guarant*ed through the whole country, if 
clothed in sentimental form." 3 
Another mistake of the u-erman a uthori tie s was 
George H. and others: T;Qe G,eat Wa1:, Vol. 4, p. 
L,t. D~i., LIII, 17 (Ootober 21, 1916) p. 1015. 
Lasswell, OPe g~~ •• p. 34 ( Bernstorff. M;,t Three Y~lrs 




fl1lly appreoiating the absoll1te neoessity of coa.nter-acting 
anti-German feeling in the new world. Propaganda was a.nderesti-
mated too long, the organizations which were handling it were 
inadeqllate, and the naterial issued was never sufficient. Upon 
his retur.n to Germa~t Von Papen reported to General Falkenhayn: 
"General, if 1'011 do not succeed in 
keeping the United States from joining the 
coalition of ollr enemies, 1'011 will lose the 
war; on this ppint there oan be absolutely 
no doubt. The enormous material and moral 
resouroes at the disposal of the United 
States are so wholly nnderestimated here that 
in my opinion it i8 above all things essen. 
tial to enlighten public opinion to an ex-
tent quite different from that which has 
hitherto been the case." 1 
The Berlin al1thorities realized tn. problem and attem-
pted to rectify their mistakes. In 1916 a syndicate dominated by 
Dr. E. A. RWDely bought the New York ~vening Mail. Unsl1coessfUl 
attempts were also made through 3aml1el Untermeyer to pl1rohase 
the New York Sqn. The International, a monthly magazine of liter-
ature and comment, was bought in 1915. It, however, turned out 
to be an unsatisfactory investment. There is some suspicion that 
the Jewish paper, Die Wahrheit was financed with German fUnds. 
The most sl1coessful of· the investments was the Fatherland, a 
weekly magazine edited by Viereok, but little was achieved by 
these efforts. The almost Illl&nimous opposition of the American 
2 
press could not be overcome. 
1 
Peterson, Ope Cit., p. 124. 
2 
~"P. 139; for further information, see, Pearson, Drew: 
Washington Merry-Go-Rognd, June 12, 1948, The Clarksburg l!lL-
&!:y, Clarksburg, West Virginia, p. 7. 
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i 
Ba.t despite their bad start, the German allthoritie's did 
learn one lesson-- by 1916 there were few political blunders. The 
British also fOllnd it impossible to arollSe any new indignation 
over German activities in the United States, since the propaganda 
and sabotage work of the latter had been practically eliminated. 
The Germans also took advantage of a new method of transmission, 
the radio, and sent fllll reports of .A.nsrican correspondents in 
1 
Berlin and on the German fronts. 
The Germans on the field of battle "were also beginning 
to sa.pply counter-propaganda by stopping the Allied victory drive 
which had been foretold with reams of words. The best the Bri ti sh 
2 
could now do was to boast that the Germans had not defeated them. 
The first big German campaign in America was to defeat 
the initial loan to the Allies and the pro-Germans adopted the 
pictllresqlle device of having sandWich men parade in'tront of Mr. 
Morgan's office, warning against the loan. German-Americans 
threatened to boycott banks and insurance companies investing in 
the anglo-French loan. In several ci ties, especially Milwallkee, 
this agitation, aided by the ~ational German-American Alliance, 
by the American Trllth SOCiety and others, seriollsly interfered with 
the handling of the bonds. However, the very fact that the pro-
Germans took such an active part in the campaign against the loan 
1 
Seymour, charles: WOOdrow Wilson and the World War, p. 160. 
2 
Peterson, Ope Cit., p. 242. 
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1 
intensified the aotivites of the pro-Allies in its favor. 
An attempt to influenoe Congressional aotion involved 
the program of the Embargo Conferenoe whioh was organized by the 
German propagania bureau to bring a halt to the shipping of muni-
tions. About 250,000 messages were sent to Congress and J. J. 
Tobias, of the Friends of Peaoe~ a kindred organization, empha-
Sized this threat by stating publioly that five million Teutonio 
voters were going to "rai se hell n with any party not in favor of 
2 
this proposed embargo. 
One of the most subtle forms of propaganda and also a 
new idea in propaganda was the use of motion piotures among for-
eign-born munition workers. The pioture financed by the Austro-
Hungarian government showed Austro-Hungarian workmen making shells 
whioh might kill their relatives on the other side of the ocean. 
In one soene the munition faotory burns down. The fire is attrib-
uted to a rival manufacturer, but the suggestion is obviOUS. How-
ever, no sentimental appeal oould compete suooessfully wi th high 
3 
wages. 
The Germans, first to os e a troo ity stories, failed to 
4 
propagate tl~m snooessfully. The German authroities were qniok to 
1 
Viereok, Ope git., pp. 30-31. 
2 
~" pp. 100-101. 
3 
Ibid" p. 103. 
4 . 
Bead, OPe oit., p. 73. 
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pnblish official reports establishing the "faots" of atrooities 
and tmdonbtedly convinoed the German people, bnt they conld not 
keep paoe with the Allies in the battle for pnblic opinion throngh-
ont the world. A major weakness in their tactics was the exoessive 
time and energy they nsed in defending themselves against Allied 
. atrocity oharges; if the items on defense of atrocities in the 
German press were weighed against those on charges of atrocities. 
the former would probably predominate. The Allies, on the other 
hand, paid little if any attention to the German charges. Another 
weakness of German propaganda lay in the work of the offioial 
agencies. Atrocity reports were pnblished by governmental de-
partments and lacked the prestige aoorning to the reports of 
Bryoe in England or of the appointed commissions in France and 
Belgium, on whioh noted jnrists and professors served. A third 
failing of the German atrocity propaganda was the absence of 
pamphlets and artioles detailing the enemy crimes. The official 
reports were all large and unwieldy, completely unfitted for pop-
nlar distribution and consumption. A fonrth defect was the failnre 
to translate them into the English langnage. Some of this was done. 
bntvery little compared with the flood of German atrocities re-
leased by the Allies. Of co nrse the a troo ity propaganda suffered, 
like all German propaganda, from the Allied control of the oables 
and news channels thronghont most of the world. Still, muop more 
oonld have been done in the ciron~tion of pamphlets and brochures. 
The German propaganda bureau did make one strong appeal 
to the American pnblio which had favorable results. This was the 
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I, 
German disoussion of British interferenoe with Amerioan trade and 
mails. It was suooessful beoause it dealt with sometbing of im-
portanoe to 'the United States. Thus for onoe the Germans utilized 
the British praotioe of dwelling on oommunity of interests, and 
for a moment oonvinoed the Amerioan people that their desires were 
identioal with those of Germany. The only other really suooessful 
German propaganda was that direoted against the export of muni-
tions. This was kept up over a oonsiderable length of time'and 
Amerioans agreed that the mnn.itions trade was not righteous. The 
Germans failed to talk of sensations. They philosophized and ex-
1 
peoted the people to listen to reason. 
The work of the German propaganda b llTeau was also bam-
pered by offioial United States government representatives, with 
the stealing of Dr. Albert's portfolio in July, 1915, the prime 
exarnple. The Amerioan explanation of the mystery of the pur 10ined 
portfolio is furnished by W. H. Houghton of the United States 
Seoret Servioe, in the Saturday Evening Post. An agent named 
Frank Burke was shadowing Dr. Albert on arders, saw him leave the 
portfolio and immediately pioked it up. Whatever the faots in the 
portfolio mystery were. the Albert brief oase was immediately 
t llTned over to President Wilson. The President entrusted the 
hornet's nest to Colonel House and photostatio oopies found their 
way into the offioe of the New York World. The pub1ioation of the 
Albert papers was a German oatastrophe. It dramatized German 
1 
Peterson, Ope oit., pp. 141-142. 
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propaganda. Henoeforth the Allied propagandists oonld go as far 
as they liked. The stamp of pro pagandawas fastened npon the 
1 
Germans. 
Other governmental interferenoe was the tapping of tel· 
ephone lines from the Gennan embassy and the reoording of every 
telephone IEssage from the German embassy to the ontside world. 
The oonversations between Embassy offioials and their friends in 
New York were spioed with nnoomplimentary referenoes to high per· 
2 
sonages in the White Honse and the State Department. 
German aotivities in tbe United States were in thaa· 
selves of no great importanoe in acoomplishing the objeotives for 
whioh they had been designed. The propaganda oonvinoed few people 
who were not already adherents of the German canse; pnrchases 
were too small to make any great differenoe to the 8ool1om10 ...... 
fare of the Central Powers; the sabotage only delayed-- it did 
not stop the snpplying of war materials to the Allies. These 
German operations were of oonseqnenoe in that they gave British 
propagandists horrible examples in Amerioa whioh served to illns-
trate dramatioally that the Germans were Amerioa's enemies and 
they were as evil as they had been p~otured. The trne signifioanoe 
of the German aotivities in the history of this period lies in 
the faot that the pnblioity given to them augmented greatly the 
1 
Viereok .. OPe oit., pp. 69-70. 
2 




anti-German feeling among the Amerioan people. Satfioe it to say 
that the Amerioan people got the idea that the GermA,n people and 
the German government were two separate things, and that the 
German government was a menaoe to the world. The German propa-
ganda, none too well reoeived at first, was ruined further in its 
effeotiveness by the sinking of the Lusitania. Minor misfortunes 
rooked the boat, but did not destroy it. The Germ~n prop~g~nd~ 
oraft was wreoked by German torpedoes. Whenever the propagandists 
had suooeeded in inveigling ~ublio opinion against Allied aggres-
, 
Bions, bang! -- another Amerioan ship would be blown up by a 
Po 
submarine. The New Republic oarried this idea to the extreme 
when it stated, " •••• the German government oannot and does not 
3 
oare to understand the demooratio view of the war." The finish-
ing orash oame with the exposure of the Zimmerman note-- "We 
oannot~" said Viereok, "remain the friends of a oountry that is 
4 
plotting to destory our own." 
In the House of Commons twenty years after the war .some . 
straightforward oomments on British propaganda were delivered by 
Mr. Harold Nioolson, ex-diplomat: 
1 
" •••• I·do not want to be selt-
righteous, beoause in a national emer-
Peterson, Opt oit., p. 151. 
2 
Viereok, OR. 9it., p. 59. 3 . 
BA.ker, R~ Stannard: Woodrow Wilson Life ~ Letters, Vol. 6, 
p. 410 (Ne. Republio, Deo. 30, 1916, p. 226). 
4 
Viereok, OPe oit., p. 114. 
genoy we can be as ~truthful as, or 
more nntrllthfnl than, anybody else. 
Dnring the war we lied damnably. Let 
us be olear about that. (An Honorable 
Kember: Splendidly?) No, damnably, not 
splendidly. I think sane of our lies 
have done us tremendous mrm and I 
should not myself like to see suah 
propaganda again." 1 
Muoh of the British atrocity propaganda was deliber-
ate deoeption built upon erroneona reports and misleading im-
pressions. The facts were frequently anestionable, the interpre-
tations misleading. and it wB:s this kind of propaganda that Mr. 
Nicolson deplored. Nevertheless milch of it was spread by people 
who sincerely believed what they were saying; their faith only 
2 
added potency to the propaganda. The best British propaganda 
was truth-- not necessarily the whole truth. 
The British propagandists in carrying out their work 
followed certain general lines which might be called techniques. 
In part they were as follows; 1. They told only that part of the 
truth which benefitted their cause; 2. They utilized backgro~d 
material t~ imply things for which there was no evidence; 3. They 
exploited to the fnllest the emotions and ideals of those being 
educated; 4. They gave· their propaganda an aura of authority by 
using big names, by quoting their enemy, or by appealing to legal-
ity: 5. They made the ir arguments simple and eliminated all 
1 
Read, Ope cit •• p. 187. 
2 
Loo. oi t. 
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qualifying statements; 6. They used endless repetition. 
There were a number of faotors whioh oontributed to the 
great suooess of Sir Gilbert Par.ker and his assooiates. In the 
first plaoe, there was a pro-British attitude among leading Amer-
ioans at the outbreak of hostilities. Seoondly, their propaganda 
was unobtrusive. Viereok quoting a British propagandist stated: 
"We spoke your language. Our men merged with the orowd. They 
passed as Amerioans. In ever newspaper offioe, in every great in-
dustrial oonoern, there were Englishmen whose national origin no 
:2 
one sppeoted or questioned." In the third plaoe, their prinoipal 
ene~ was a new rising nation with all the unpleasant oharaoter-
istios nominally ~noountered in the newly rioh and newly powerful. 
Finally, the ir 00 nt ro 1 0 f the 0 onven t i onal channa Is 0 f Ameri oan 
opinion made it unneoessary for them to oompete on an eqaal foot-
3 
ing with the Germans. Sir Gilbert Parker admitted to the last of 
these rea.s ona: 
1 
"Among other things, we supplied three 
hundred and sixty newspapers in the smaller 
states of the United States with an English 
newspaper Whioh gave a weekly review and 
oomment on the affairs of the war. We estab-
lished oonneotion with the man in the street 
through oinema. piotures of the army and navy, 
as well as through interviews, artioles 
pamphlets, eto •••• We advised and stimulated 
many people to write artioles •••• we had re-
Peterson, Ope oit., p. 36. 
2 
Viereok, QP. oit., p. 122. 
3 





ports from important Americans const~nt­
ly, and established association by per-
sonal correap ondence with inflnential 
~:md eminent people of every profession 
in the United States." 1 
"Practically since the day war broke ont," was Sir 
Gilbert's cheerfnl remark, "I was responsible for American pub-
2 
lioity." 
The Allied~opaganda, moreover~ enjoyed the inesti-
mable advantage of heing self-financing. Our publio clamored for 
the books, artioles and moti~n-pictures films which oonveyed it. 
Old established .American puhlishing houses found it profitable, 
and did not think it unpatriotio, to enter into agreements with 
the Entente governments for the distribution of propagandist 
war books, and there was a huge trade in volumes on trench life 
from the French and British standpoint. Those who voioed the 
German side of the oase found no such markets. The German repre-
sentatives in the United States had to give finanoial assistanoe 
3 
to their outlets. 
One of the lessons to be drawn from the sucoess of 
Brit is h pr opaganda in the United States is t he importance of per-
l 
2 
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sons as means of carrying suggestion. The powers behind the im-
personal agencies must be reached, and this is best managed by 
1 
pers ona1 contact. 
The most nearly perfect example of the British propa-
ganda bnreao. taking advantage of sensations ·to attract the atten-
tion of the Amerioan po.b1ic, concerned the famous Bryoe report. 
Perhaps it was only a ooinoident that on the same day that the 
.Amerioan po.blio was notified of the sinking of the Lo.si tania. 
when the boiling indignation against Germany was at its height. 
that this report was dropped into the maelstrom. The Belgian 
atrocities, if not preoise1y forgotten, had been sinking into 
the baokgronnd under the weight of an aoou.mnlating skeptioism. 
The whole thing had been rather overdone. Bu.t with the Bryoe re-
port, pnblished at ju.st that emotional moment, every dou.bt was 
obliterated. There was no name in England whioh conld have in-
spired more oonfidenoe in an Amerioan pnblio that that of Lord 
Bryoe; his six oolleagues were only less impressive. "Proof," 
2 
oried the New York Times, "now oanes to hand." 
Th~ YeA.sons for the effeoti veness of the Allied propa-
ganda may be snmmed u.p. in the words of an impartial historian, 
Carlton J. H. Hayes: 
"Entente propaganda in the United 
1 
Lasswell, Ope oit., pp. 212-213. 
2 





Sta tes was even more general than that 
of the Teutons; it was also more adroit, 
more sympathetic, and more conformable 1 
to American prejlldloes and Amerioan wishes." 
-0-
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III. THE REACTION OF THE AMERICAN PRESS. 
~ newspaper is a private en-
terprise, owing nothing to the pnb-
lio, Which grants it no franchise. 
It is, therefore, "affected" with 
no pnblio interest. It is emphati-
cally the property of its owner 
who is selling a mannfactured pro-
dnct at his own risk. 
Wall Street Journal 
The newspaper field must not be overlooked in attempt-
ing to sift out the co urse of pllblic opinion during the period 
of ollr nelltrality, prior to the entrance of the United States 
into the First World War. During this period the daily journals 
comprised approximately ninety per oent of the reading material 
of the Amerioan public and, although we have no hard and fast 
proof for the belief, we feel that they were bound to have in-
fluenoed the forming of many ~pinions. To the everyday reader, 
interested in the nation's welfare, the newspaper provided the 
. S ~ doings and say""of the world.,and the people as a mOler might 
have said;fwith a famous American, "All I know is what I read 
in the newspapers." 
Training in how to read the newspapers, knowing what 
diffioulties in their compilation to allOW for, detecting pre-
judioe,sllpplementing daily news in the longer disollssions to Qe 
found in magazines, are all part of the foundation of intelligent 
oitizenship. The newspaper has its own task and funotion. There 
is no jastification in making it, as it were, the scapegoat for 
failures of the community ~onscienoe. Yet newspapers are power-
ful weapons. Individual papers have been important if not the 
deoisive influenee on di fferent ocoasions in act ually bringing 
1 
abollt a war and in preventing wars. 
1 
Libby, C. F. : The Press and World Peace, (The Causes of War), 
p. 182. 
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All the reporters in the world working all the hours 
of the day co uld not wi tne ss all the happenings in the wo rld. 
Newspapers do not try to keep an eye on all mankind-- just 
certain spots. This makes the press agent or pUblicity man a 
valuable person who oan present-these spots in the most favor-
able or unfavorable light. ThllS every organization with a desire 
to express an opinion beoomes a wedge in plaoing its story in 
1 
the paper. Newspapermen have a feeling for words and moods 
and they know tha. t the pllb lio: is not convinoed by logio. but 
2 
seduced by stories. 
The swift interohange of threats among the Great 
Powers in the last week of July and the outbreak of hostilities 
in August brought the European orisis to the AImrioan front 
page. The .Nel York Times in partiolllar distinguished itself 
by printing in full the offioial British oorrespondenoe)rnnning 
to more than a hundred documents, as soon as the British govern-
ment made it available. From the outbreak of the war until the 
entranoe of the United States made neoessary a sort of military 
censorship, the Amerioan press continuously laid before its 
readers the fullest aco.onnt of ourrent events whioh oould then 
1 
Lippman. OPe Cit., pp. 338, 345. 377. 
2 
Lasswell, OPt cit., p. 32. 
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1 
be obtained anywhere in the world. 
The general reaction of 'the American press to the 
European blood-bath was a "Thank God for the Atlantio OoeAn." 
The Ohicago Herald proposed a rising vote of thanks to Chris-
topher Columbus. The New York Evening Post poored its oontempt 
~pon the three continental emperors, Franois Joseph of Austri~­
Hungary, Nicholas of RUSSia, and William of Germany-- "one of 
them senile, another subject to melancholia, and a third often 
showing signs of a disturbed mental balance"-- who had given the 
signal for the holooaust. "Oor isolated position and freedom 
from entangling alliances," the Literary Digest summed uP., 
"inspire our press with the oheering assurance that we are in 
2 
no peril of being drawn into the European quarrel." Amerioan 
sympathies were divided, but opinion was united in the belief 
3 
that the United States could never be other than a speotator. 
As many editors looked upon the situation they began 
to visualize incidents that might .ffect them in days to come. 
The St. Louis Rep~blic stated, "As the shock of the present 
experience passes away the oapital of the world Will be inves-
ted in suoh quantities'as never before in the industrial and 
commeroial enterprises of a oountry 4,000 miles from the orosse~ 
1 
Sloss on, Ope cit., p. 3. 
2 
BAle, William Harlan: The March of Freedom. A Layman's Historr 
of the Amerioan Peop.e, p. 207. 
3 
Seymour, Charles: AmeriQan Diplomaoy Doring the World War. p. 5. 
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bayonets of Europe." The He. York COmmergial snrveyed the soene 
stating, "If England can keep control of the seas onr trade in 
breadstnffs and meats will be enormons and highly profitable, 
beoause Russia. the ohief wheat grower of the world, will be 
shnt in and the grain orops of the valley o~ the Dannbe will 
be praotioally destroyed." The New York Jonrnal of Commeroe 
viewed the Situation differently, feeling that "higher prioes 
for clothing beoanse of wool imports sh Ilt off wi 11 be neoessary 
and the same for rllbber, odtp1?er and tin," while the ~ bel i eved 
that the sllpply of women's fashions from Paris would be shut 
1 
off. 
On ~e other hand thete was a widespread tendenoy 
on the part of the. Amerioan press to hold Gernany and her rnler 
largely responsible for the war. The New York Globe believed 
that "it is diffionlt to admit that German interests were men-
aoed beyond reasonable toleranoe •• ' •• .Amerioan opinion is almost 
solidly arrayed against Ge~any as the aggressor, rnthlessly 
plnnging Europe into what looks like the bloodiest of wars to 
satisfy the overwhelming ambi ti on of the Emperor." Bllt the 
Ne. York Herald felt differently, believing that "the Kaiser 
np to the very last moment almost went down on his knees to 
B 
Rnssia to indooe her to desist from mobilization. " The staid 
1 
LIt. Dig., XLIX. 7 (Aug. 16, 1914) pp. 256-267. 
2 
~., p. 264. 
Times also believed the aonfliat was the "least justified of 
all wars sinae man emerged from barbarimn •••• ", seeing the 
1 
Kaiser as the aggressor. The Springfield Repnblican bending 
baakwards to remain neutral "supposed" a JRrallel to Austria's 
case: "Suppose Texas filled with rebellions Mexicans anxiOUS 
to seaede to Mexioo, and a President of the United States ~sass-
2 
inated by a Texan affiliated with the Mexiaans." But the Liter-
ary Digest eXpressed the aommon opinion "that while onr trade 
Will be stimulated, we will e,ventually share in the economic 
3 
loss of such a disaster." 
From a survey of the .Amerioan press at the beginning 
of hostilities it appeared that, out of a total of 367 editors, 
105 admitted favor for the Allies and 20 for the German cause, 
the other 242 disavowing any' preferenae. The'feeling of the 
oommunities represented was given as pro-Ally in 189 aases, 
pro-German in 38, divided in 140. One might also feel that the 
editors were no different in ahoosing their favorite than the 
members of the aommunity-- only more aautious in expressing an 
opinion. The expression of war-time sentiment was partly seo-
tional. In both oases the Middle West was more pro-German than 
4 
the East, the Far West or the South. The evalcation of the 
1 
Lit. Dig., XLIX, 6 (Aug. 8, 1914) p. 215. 2 . 
Ibid., p. 216. 
3 
1.lli.\ p. 215. 
4 
!W., XLIX, 20 (Rov. 14, 1914) p. 939. 
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r 
midwest was probably wrong with the pollsters mistaking neu-
trality for pa.rtisanshlp or taking the isolated instames of 
German-American citizens in Chicago and Milwankee as repre-
senting the entire seotion. Sharp oomment by eastern news-
papers on the "paoifism" of the midwest pr ovoked a corresp onding 
sensitivity, an exchange which brought an amusing sequel, 
when, after the United States entered the war, western edi tors 
could show that recruiting prGceeded most rapidly in the 
1 
"paoifist" states. 
Some persons Ilrged from the start thB.t the oauses of 
democracy.ani oivilization were so closely bound up with the 
fortunes of the Entente nations that it was the moral duty of 
the United States to join these powers in arms. But the country 
as a whole saw no possible course save neutrality, a polioy 
diotated alike by present interest and by a oentury and a quarter 
of consistent praotice. August 4, when five nations had entered 
the war, President Wilson issued a formal proolamation of neu-
trality, which was repeated as successive states entered the con-
test; and two weeks later he made a special appeal to his fellow-
o it izena to be "neutral in fact as well as in name.... We must 
2 
be impartial in thought as well as in aotion •••• " Wilson re-
1 
Lit. Dig., LIV, 11 (May 19, 191') p. 1486. 2 . 
Ogg, Frederio Austin: The American Nation: A History, Vol. 27, 
National Progress, p. 329. 
-57-
1 
oQested this "impartiality", fearing hyphenated inflQences when 
offioial nelltrality was the obviOQS policy. OQr foreign relations 
were based QPon a theory or tradition of isolation, bQt eoonom-
ioally we.were entangled vitally in every part of the world. The 
government 00 Qld assert its determined ne Iltrali ty, for it had 
little politioally at stake; bQt OOQld Amerioan indllstry and fi-
1 
nance be kept nentral? The New York TimeS immediately reiterated 
the stand taken by t be President stating, "It is a S ouroe of 
great oomfort and satisfaoti~n to feel that in sllCh a time as 
this we have a President who knows so well how to do and say the 
right thing," Rnd on Ootober 1D they praised him again believing 
that President Wilson "has taken the exaot stand and has expres-
2 
sed it with admirable aoouraoy." Henry Watterson, in his own 
mind separating the German people from the German government, 
was anything bllt impartial to the government, as he wrote in 
the LOQiav1lle COQrier-Jonrnal, "~ Heaven proteot the Vater-
land from oontamination and give the German people a ohanoe! 
3 
To Hell with the Hohenzollerns and the HapsbQrga."· 
In general, it may be said that throllghoQt the nation 
the people listened to Wilson's proclamation of neutrality with 
great respect and probably intended to carry it OQt to the letter. 
Bllt a sustained neQtrality Qllder the oirollmstances was too muoh 
1 
Baker, Opt cite, Vol. 6. pp. 173-174. 
2 
Ibid., pp. 96, 162. 
3 
1Iillis, OPe oit., p. 67. 
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f 
to expeot. "Morally DiHltral the oountry never was," asserted 
John Dewey. "and probably the only stupid thing President Wilson 
did was to suppose, in his earl¥ proolamation, that it ooo.ld 
I 
be." Another minor oritioism of the President oame from the 
New York Times. jo.st four days after they had praised his stand. 
The staid Times believed that the President's "soh.olarly s ar-
roundings" persuaded him to take "too kindly a view of the good 
2 
intentions of foreign nations." 
With the Ger.man invasion of Belgium the Amerioan press 
was saddenly flooded with atrooity stories. An answer to many 
of them oame from a group of Amerioan newspapermen in Belgium 
who had been overtaken by the Ge~an advanoe and had oontino.ed 
thereafter with the (7erman armies. ~arly in September a bundle 
of Allied and neo.tral newspapers fell into their hands; they 
were astounded and shooked by what they read oonoerning the op-
erations they had jo.st been witnessing. Harry Hansen, Irvin Cobb, 
John f. MoCutoheon, Roger Lewis and O'Donnell Bennett dispatohed 
a joint cable to the Assooiated Press: 
"In spirit fairness we unite in de-
olaring Gennan atrooities groundless as 
far as we were able to observe. After spen-
ding two weeks with wernan army aooompany-. 
ing troops upward hundred miles we unable 
report single instanoe unprovoked reprisal. 
1 
Abrams, Ope oit., p. 21. (John Dewey, Amerioan philosopher and 
eduoator and long-time Columbia University professor.) 2 . 
Baker, Opt oit., Vol. 5, p. 180. 
-59-
Also unable oonfina r~mors proved gro~nd­
less •••• Disoipline berman soldiers ex-
oellent as oBserved. Io dr~ekness. To 
tr~th these statelD3nts we pledge profess-
ional personal wo rd. II 1 
Moreover, the Amerioan oons~l-General at Antwerp 
telegraphed the State Department that positively no bodily 
harm had come to Belgian women and ohildren in that oi ty, 
althongh the preoipitate exeoution of the exp~lsion order 
might have worked hardships on some of them. "In times like 
these, stor.ies of terrible at,rooities will orop o~t every-
. 
where b~t let Americans keep 0001 and remember a~diat~ et 
altera DArs." (the other party m~t also be given a hearing.) 
The State Department immediately answered Consul General 
Diederioh informing him that "O~r ne ~trali ty doe s not permit 
an express ion of opinion by o~ diplomat io or oonslllar offi-
2 
oers." This State Department message might have been the ex-
treme form ofne ~trality or the first hint that the Allies 
were oar "secret ohampion" in the ~aropean str~gg1e. Herbert 
Hoover, head of the Belgian Relief Commission, summed up the 
oase of the Belgian deportations: 
It is oar belief that the brutality 
of the operation was largely the fault of 
the looal commandants and lack of adeqate 
arrangeDEnts for the reoeption and distri-
but ion of the evaoues. We do not believe 
any SllO~ brutalities were oommitted with 
intent of high allthorities. We believe they 
1 
MilliS, OPe git., p. 68. 
2 
Read, 9D. oit., p. 45. 
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honest 17 and expedi t ioo.s ly corrected the 
matter as far as they were able when it 
oame to their attent ion, and we are infor-
med that disoiplinary measures were taken. 
We do not believe the stories of rape, or 
oono o.binage,· etc., sp,read in the propagan-
dist press. 
"The inoident is one of sllffioiently 
terrible order, bo.t as things go in this war 
it has res a.lted in less TO la.me of hlllDan 
so.ffering than many other oontinuing bar-
barities in Europe." 1 
"There has been nothing in the histor,y of the Ger-
man raoe." deolared the St. Louis Globe-Demoqrat, "to lend 
2 
credib ilit y to storie s of s uo'h a troci ties." The Milwaakee 
Free-Press. printed in a distinotly Gennan-Amerioan distriot, 
protested against the "Qnfair and insincere" emphasiS which 
oo.r newspapers and magazines had laid o.pon the atrooity char-
ges against ~ermany. It pondered "what these same po.blioations 
woo.ld be doing if the J:!'rench and English. or the Russians. 
were fighting on German SOil, if they were besieging and taking 
3 
German cities. The same destruction would be their lot •••• " 
The first break in pro-Ally sentiment ooco.rred in 
late September, 1914, when England, fighting desperatelY to 
halt the German war machine, began to halt Amerioan ships for 
searohing. The Wall Street Journal, from the predominantly 
pro-Allied east, could find no fao.lt in the action. If.!. conduct 
1 
, Read. oR. 0 it., p. 1 '11. 
2 
Lit. Dig., XLIX, '11 (Sept. 12, 1914) p. 141. 
3 
Ibid.) XLIX, 1'1 (Oct. 24, 1914) p. '1'1'1. 
friendly and impartial does not make it the d a.ty of the gOT-
vernment to prevent its oi t izenafroDl trading with any of the 
belligerent powers •••• The risk is his own •••• the loading 
1 
and clearing from port." But a week later when three American 
tankerS(headed for De~ark were halted, some of the Anerican 
reacti on was violen 'ti. "A. fe. more acts of piracy of this British 
kind," stated the New York Telegraph, "will force the American 
navy into action." Ba.t the Ne. York Journal of Commerge talked 
oalmness and fe It "that the r~ is nothing to get exci ted ab oa.t." 
Complaining bitterlY of the go-easy polioy of the government, 
the Brooklyn bagl. remarked that ".8 need not expect any displ~ 
of volcanio indignation from Washington." The ships were Iater 
2 
released following an offioial government protest. 
On December 8, 1914, speaking to Congress, PreSident 
Wilson stated that provision for voluntary mil~tary training 
shoa.ld be extended, and that the organized militia of the states 
3 
should be "developed and strengthened." The war in Ea.rope had 
oalled attention to th& small size of oa.r army and here began 
an agitation for "preparedness." Wilson refa.sed to become alarmed, 
. suggesting merely improvement of the militia. 
1 
Lit. Dig., XLIX, 16 (Oot. 17, 1914) p. 725. 
2 
Ibid.) XLIX; 18 (Oot. 31, 1914) p. 832. 
3 
Ogg, Ope oit., p. 286. 
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The oall for .. "preparedne ss· found the edit at" s of the 
Literary Digest placing an opinion poll before Ameri can news- , 
paper editors, requesting information as to what size oar Army 
and Navy should be. Three qaasti ons were askeel: 1. Are our 
na. ti ona 1 de fens es ade quate?; 2. Do you favor a st ronger stand-
ing army?; 3. Do YOIl favor a stronger standing navy? 
The newspapers participating gave a slight edge to 
the preparedness plan. Two hundred am seventy-five felt that 
Ollr defeIlS es were inadeq ll8.te ·'wi t h 119 believing them sllffi-
cient. Two hundred and forty felt that a larger army was neces-
sary with 158 opposed alld 285 favored a larger navy wi. th 109 
opposed. The Buffalo Times went so far as to state that "thE\Y 
oould see a yellow peril arising," but the idea'of Germany as 
1 
a potential enemy was not mentioned. 
The following month another poll was taken, this time 
concerning the prohibiting of arms and ammnnition to warring 
nations, as a means of halting the s.truggle and also of assuring 
Ollr Delltra1ity. FOllr hundred and forty newspapers replied with 
224 stating "no,".167 favoring the prohibiting and 29 being non-
oommital. The answers from cities of 50,000 or over favored the 
selling of weapons of war and the smaller towns asked for pro-
hibition by a small majority. The Digest stated "their votes 
1 
Lit. Dig., L. 4 (Jan. 23, 1915) p. 137. 
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1 
were baoked by hwndreds of reasons of all sorts." 
A boiled-down version of A.imrioan opinion in the 
early part of 1916. if the Literary Digest poll was aoourate, 
seemed to show the general publio for preparedness in oase the 
pr ogram of De utrali ty failed. But also with the new year came 
the submarine wa. that brought the European straggle oloser 
to the Amerioan fireside and was later to oause a general 
swibg away from our neutral polioy~ The first Amerioan oitizen 
to die from the cfireot result of \ierman torpedoes was on the 
. . 
British liner Falaba. The editorial pages roared out their defi-
anoe of the aot. "A orime against humanity," stated the Philadel-
phia Publio Ledger and the New York Herald-Tribune labeled it "an 
assassination." The Journal of Commeroe believed it "an atrooity 
against Whioh the oivilized world should protest with one voioe." 
and the New York Post condemned it wi t h one word; "piracy. It The 
Washington Post oalling for the publio to remain oalm, adopted 
a middle-of-the-road attitude and believed the aotion as bad for 
2 
one side as the other. Comment from the South and West on this 
inoident was not oarried by the Digest, in this or subsequent 
issues. 
It was on Kay 1, that the Lnaitanla eased out of 
her berth in New York and began her last tragio voyage to Europe. 
1 
Lit. Dig., L. 6 (Feb. 6. 1916) p. 226. 
2 
Ibid., L, 16 (April 10, 1916) :.. 789. 
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"Sails. Undistnrbed by lierman VWarning." declared the Times in 
a front page column. The passengers who were aboard co nld not 
cre.di t the extremes of ferocity to which maddened nations conld 
descend. They even commented lightly on the warning as "silly, 
1 
tommy-roL." Bnt Friday. May 7. 124 ~erican lives were lost 
with the Lqsitania off the Irish coast. 
The following day the morning papers were shonting the 
news in bigger and blacker headlines than they had nsed since 
the early days of the war, ani their editorial pages were blazing 
with horror and indignation. "From onr Department of State." 
cried the New York Times. "there mnst go to the Imperial Govern-
ment at Berlin a demand that the Gemans shall no longer make 
war like savages drllnk with blood." The Tribqne closed its phil-
ippiC with an appeal to a moving passage in onr history; "The 
nation which remembered tb:l sailors of the Maine wi 11 not forget 
the ciVilians of the Ll1Sitania~" Theodore Roosevelt leaped 
shont ing int 0 print. "This represents not merely piracy bnt pir-
aoy on a vaster scale of mnrder than old-time pirates ever prac-
tioed." From the violently pro-Ally Northeast the great wave of 
shock, ontrage and denllnoiation ~read thronghont the newspapers. 
at least. of every part of the conntry. Only two English-langnage 
papers in the United States-- one in St. LOlliS and the other in 
L 
Bake r, 0». oi t ., Vol. 5, p. 323. 
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I. 
Milwaukee-- OOD.ld be found defending the sinking. l~e ¥erp.phi8 
COmmeroial-Appeal was ~ea~ "to oonsider a deolaration of war." 
from LOD.isVille the Toice of Henry Watterson thnndered in vivid 
imagery: 
"TrD.ly, the Nation of the black hand 
and bloody heart has got in its work •••• 
The deoree of Satan went forth from ~erlin. 
The instruments of ~atan were forged at 
Essen. There was but a single ~atanio abate-
ment. ~atan's ambassador at Washington--
shameless in his infam:y, a.nder the sign 
'manoal of Satan's Embassy, insolent in ita 
disregard of law or oonsequenoes-- gave 
warning.. •• Shall any j IlS t man say tha. t 
Coa.nt Von Bernstorff is not guilty of 
marder? This holy Sabbath every pD.lpit 
in Amerioa should send a prayer to God in 
protest •••• and more than all the Christ-
ian president of the United States, a 0001 
and brave man, sprung from a line of heroes 
and saints-- oeasing longer to protest, 
should aot, leaving no doubt •••• that he is 
•••• a leader of men and nations and that 
he holds aloft the ~word of the Lord and 
Gideon." 
"Oondemnati on of the aot t II as the edi tors of the 
Literary Diges~ were foroed to leave it, "seems to be limited 
only by the restrictions of the English language." The lan-
guage had hardly given out before the penoila of the oartoon-
ists were reinforotng it with every kind of stirring and ter-
rible visoal appeal. The preaohers sprang to follow Marae Henry's 
advioe. A few, like Bishop Greer, oould nrge the nation to 
think oalmly; more typioal was the ory of the ~ev. John Henry 
Jowett that "it is a oolossal sin against God and it is pre-
meditated murder." The New York Sqn felt that the loss of the 
Lusi tania, '.'was no different from the other sinkings exoept 
in size, but realized that a lot more exoi tell2nt had been 
1 
created." 
But. the reaction of the Northeast was not the reaction 
of the nation. Secretary of Agricultur~David F. Houston, hap-
pened to be in California when the disaster caDI:!. He was to maet 
a delegation of Los Angeles business men that morning; the Sec-
retary was full of the news, but tba business men merely "talked 
for a few minutes about the ~rage~ without excitement" and did 
not mention the subject again through the reat of a long morning. 
"Nor. did any reporter of any local newspaper seek to interview 
me on the matter," though Mr. Hoo.ston was one of the most in-
fluential members of the Cabinet. "No citizen brought it up 
during the remainder of my stay in the west which lasted sev-
. 2 
eral weeks." The overwhelming consensus appeared to be that 
the PreSident should instantly compel Germany to disavow, to 
make reparation and to abandon her submarine war, but at the 
same time making sare not to get the United States into trouble. 
"The American people," as the Savannah News observed, "don't 
want their government to be placed in the position of retreating 
3 
from any position it has taken." 
1 
. Lit. Dig., L, 20 (May 15, 1915) p. 1133. 
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MilliS, OR. oit., p. 174. 
3 
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Wilson's attempt to preserve calm was criticized by 
some. Three days after the sinking of the Lusi tania, President 
Wilson addressing 15,000 recently naturalized citizens in Phil-
adelphia, stated: "There is such a thing as a man being too 
proud to fight. There is such. a thing as a mtion being so right 
that it does not need to convince ot~rs by force tmt it is 
1 
right." The New York Times expressed the solemn opinion that 
"this utterance of the President does not respond to the feeling 
of the pe ople." The Whi te HollS e was flooded ins tant ly with tele-
grams of condemnat,ion; and before the swift storm of elegant 
disapproval the President was weak. enough to announce that the 
speech had been made without reference to the Lusitania. The 
loyal World hastened to express it s rel ie fat this disavowal. 
"We have a pride that will make us fight," it said, "Let there 
2 
be no illusion on this score in Berlin or else~here." Henry 
Cabot Lodge, promenent member of the Senate Foreign Relations 
Committee and political opponent of the President, felt that the 
statement "shocked him the same as many others and I never again 
recovered confidence in Mr. Wilson's ability to deal with the most 
perilous situation which had ever confronted the united States, 
3 
in relatiOns with the other nations of the earth.-
The note of President Wilson following the sinking of 
the Lusitania stated that he would hold the Germans to strict 
1 
Baker, OPe cit., Vol. 5, p. 334. 
2 
Millis, OPe Cit., p. 178. 
3 
Lodge, Henry Cabot: The Senate and the League of Nations, p. 32. 
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"accountability" and his firmness, untouched by hysteria, seemed 
to meet public favor. 'The second note was more severe and caused 
Secretary of State Br,yan's resignation. 
Public reaction to ~ryan's resignation was divided. The 
Mob ile Register stated. "If Germany is misled int 0 acti ons still 
further violative of our rights, the resultant hostility will be 
largely attributable to Mr. Bryan, whose sole idea is peace", and 
the Philadelphia hegord sarcastically added, "The biggest popular 
vote he will ever receive wi~l be in endorsing his resignation." 
, . 
But in the West and Southwest Bryan was given the benefit of the 
doubt. The St. LOllis ReRllblic added, ".American people will not 
fail to give Mr. Bryan filII credit for his sincerity, his patro-
tism, his good spirit, bllt in the issue now joined the country 
is with the president." The Socialist New York Call condemned 
the capitalists with a sweeping statement. "The DIlPonts and 
Sahwabs have at last pried from President Wilson's cabinet the 
last piece of timber that resollltely barred the door against 
1 
war." 
It was at this time that the J!'rench and their pos i tion 
2 
in world affairs were placed before the Ame ri can pllblic. lla 
Olltloolt for May 12, 1916, carried an article entitled, "Plain 
1 
2 
Lit. Dig_, L, 26 (June 19, 1915) pp. 1449-1450. 
~he Literary Digest carries no report on American action towards 
Fr~nce in the same manner or style in which Great ~ritain is 
criticized. Reports are of a general nature dealing mostly with 
her war effort. 
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worde froll Ameri oa to Sister Nati ons in ~Ilrope, 11 by ItCivie Amer-
ieanns." To .irranoe the writ er said: 
"We shall never forget your friend-
ship and help in the days when we won our 
freedom •••• We oannot see that this war is 
in any way one of your ohoosi ng or of YOIlr 
making. No threat of yours, ho olaim of 
yours, entered into the w itohes oauldron. 
"You have not talked muoh, but YOIl 
have fou.gjli; well. YOIl have suffered enor-
mously, bu.t you. have not lost Yollr nerve • 
•••• Yoar silent General, you.r silent sol-
diers, your sober self-saorifioi ng people 
bave rmde a splendid reoord." 1 
Franoe reoei ved fu.ither praise from Wayne MaoVeigh 
in the North Amerigan Reyiew for July, 1915. MaoVeigh stated: 
"I know nothing more snblime in all history than 
the passi on for liberty whioh animates today the ohildren of 
Franoe in their oombatfor their oountry and for the world 
2 
against the orushing foroes of Attila's Hu.na." 
Franoe was praised frequently for not oarrying on 
the oampaign of propaganda that Britain and Germany had nnder-
taken; she was praised for sharing Amerioan ideals of demooraoy; 
she was praised beoause her aotionbad disproved ~tions Ollr-
rent in Amerioa of her deoadenoe, oorruption, and instability. 
The Philadelphia Horth Amerioan on July'. 1915 stated that they 
I 
were surprised to find her so "quiet" and "stubborn." 
" •••• the stirring thing is that lrranoe the frivolous, 
1 




Franoe the debonair, Franoe the oarefree and la ughterloving, 
has met the supreme ordeal of her existence in a manner to 
teach t he whole world Ie ssons of steadiness, of sobriety, of 
dogged courage, of concentrated efficienoy, and of nncomplaining 
1 
saorifioe." 
Henry Watterson had a kind word for the French. 
"I have not loved Paria as a Parisian, 
bnt as an American •••• I used to love to go 
there and to behold the majesty of France. I 
have always known What all the world now knows, 
that beneath the gayety of the ..I!'renoh there 
burns a patriotic snd consuming fire, a high 
sense of pnblic honor; a fine ~irit of free-
dom •••• Alone they did it -- the ..I!'renoh people 
-- the bard-.orking, frugal, loyal oommonalty 
of Franee-- withont asking the loan of a son 
from the world outSide." 2 
Proof that the .Amerioan press oould still see both 
sides of a problem when so desired, occurred in June, 1916, 
with the annoruncement that Italy had entered the war on the side 
of the Allies. "Cold-blooded caloa.lation, If remarked the Phila-
delphia Inqgirer and the Washington Past saw "territorial covet-
ons" as the reason. The Augu.sta Chroni,cle called the action 
"treachery" and the New York World remarked that "Morally she 
stands with Germany. Both tore np treaties of international 
signifioanoe." The Milwaukee Free-Press oalle d the entry one 
"of the blackest ohapters of the war" and the New York PQlt 
stated."That it must be assumed that the Allies outbid Germany." 
1 
White, Ope cit., p. 2'13. 
2 
Watterson, Henry: Marse Henry an Antobiography, Vol. 2, p. 69. 
Few papers defended the action of the Italian government. des-
1 
pite her linkage to the Allied oallse. 
Col. Edward M. HOllSe, personal advisor to President 
Wilson, writing to Sir Edward Grey, British Foreign Minister, 
June 17, 1915, snmmarized Amerioan pllblic opinion: 
" •••• the vast majority of our people 
desire the President to be very firm ·in his 
attitQde towards Germany and yet avoid war. 
They have told me that in their opinion the 
oOllntry was willing to accept the conseqllencese"2 
A like opinion was.expressed by several newspapers 
the same month, following the announcement that additional Amer-
ican lives ha.d been lost wi th the sinking of the British liner, 
Arabio. In the East the New York World annollnced that "every 
passenger ship, regardless of flag flying. presllmably oarries 
Amerioan oitizens," while the Tribune believed that it was "time 
to aot; withollt delay give the German ambassador his passport." 
The West also baoked t he East with the Phoenix Rep Ilb ligan, the 
Cheyenne Leader and the Salt T1ke Tribune calling for a "ruptllre 
of diplomatio relations." The Literary Digest cOllld find bllt one 
paper,. the .German-American Cinoinnati VOlksblatt plaoing the 
blame anywhere bllt on the Imperial government. "Diffiolllties," 
the Volksblatt stated. "with Germany cOllld be easily averted if 
1 
Lit. Dig., L, 26' (June 26. 1915) p. 1543. 
2 
Seymollr, Ubarles: The Intimate Papers of Colonel HOllse, p. 12. 
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Amerioans would plaoe themselves under the proteotion of their 
1 
own flag and not of a foreign co Ill1try. " 
Realizing the situation the nation was in, President 
Wilson fought for peace but at the same time he was determined 
to be prepared in case his plans failed. His previous oall for 
preparedness without oonsoription (December 8, 1914) ooupled 
with his St. Louis speech when he asserted that the Amerioan Navy 
"ought in my opinion, to be incomparably the greatest navy in the 
world, n brought praise from ~.he editors for what might have been 
two widely separate reasons. The Washington Post, whioh had been 
maintaining a middle-of-the-road attitude, felt that "we have the 
biggest job-- we need the biggest navy." The Milwaukee Sentinel, 
the only Ameri can paper labeled by Wellington House as being 
2 
pro-German felt the same way. "We must have enough power," the 
3 
editor stated, "to defend the freedom of the seas." Apathy in 
Congress and dissension in his own party foroed PreSident Wilson, 
as the Cleveland Plain Dealer remarked. to oarry the oase for 
preparedness before "the real court of authority-- the men and 
women of the United States." Sectional feelings also flared up 
~.g.,~l?-ln.?ort of the President's oall for preparedness and the 
1· 
Lit. Dig., LI. 9 (Aug. 28, 1915) p. 387. 
2 
Peterson, Ope Cit., p. 164. 
3 
Lit. Dig., LII, 8 (Feb. 19, 1916) p. 419. 
Winston-Salem Journal believed that the "people of the midwest. 
not milch Vi) rked up over preparedness wi 11 be awakened by the 
President_" The New York World called for the facts. stating that 
the "president is entitled to a hearing •••• and had handled the 
foreign affairs of the country during the most trying period sinoe 
the oivil war." The Press editor, seeking to look into the heart 
of the oall stated, "He still bates the sword •••• his heart is 
1 
not in it." 
At the olose of Fe~ruary, 1916, the Literary Digest 
editors plaoed another poll before the editors of the Amerioan 
press, this time asking. 1. What should be the size of the Army 
and the Navy? 2. Is militarism a peril to Amerioa? The answers 
proved to b~ almost an even split on the latter question with 
the biggest oomplaint being that the President would oontrol 
the looal militda aver the voioe of the governor if taken into 
2 
federal servioe which would make for too much patronage. Aver-
aging up the figures submitted from 600 editors the Digest foand 
them asking for a larger regular army of 286,078 with a reserve 
of 1,216,369. Forty per cent wanted a navy seoond only to Britain 
with the remainder asking for the largest in the world. Along 
the Atlantio seaboard only 11 editors feared the rise of mi1i-
tarism with 85 seeing no harm in an inorease in the services. 
1 
L~ t. D~£ •• Lll, 6 (Feb. 6, 1916 ) p. 269. 
2 




Further west the editors oalled for a smaller anny but a still 
1 
larger navy and the fear of militarism was still strong. 
The raid on Columbus, New Mexioo, March 9, 1916 by 
bandi ts nnder the leadership of Panaho Villa gave people oalling 
for preparedness an additional argument. The new Seoretary of 
War, Newton D. Baker, who had taken over Maroh 9,1916, following 
the resignation of Lindley M. Garrison due to President Wilson's 
failure to baok his proposed plan for oonsoript ion, was already 
on reoord for preparedness i~ possi ble wi thont consoription. 
The Cleveland Plain Dealer,already on reoord as baoking 
Secretary Baker and a preparedness plan, oalled it an "example of 
what nnpreparedness means."- The Kansas City Star pondered the idea 
of what might have happened and "suppose it had been a first olass 
power, instead of a bandit?" Col. Edwin F. Glenn, ohief of staff 
of the Eastern Divis ion of the Army, .and a man fully entrusted 
with na.tional seonrity stated, "The oold fact is that the Amerioan 
army today is the most pathetio thing any nation ever knew or 
oontemplated, and other nations know it very well, loan assure 
you." Machine gnns had failed and transportation was far from 
2 
suooessfn1. 
A report by two British jonrnalists on the Amerioan 
press was pnblished in September, one defending and one oondemning 
1 
Lit. Dig., LII, 11 (Maroh 11, 1916) p. 617. 
2 
Ibid., LI1, 14 (April 1, 1916) p. 883. 
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Amerioan opinion towards the Allies. Both were probably biased. 
Arraon Watson, following a cross-conntry trip stated: 
Chicago 
"Going west the less int erest there 
seems to be in t he events, whioh are making 
a oharnel honse of Europe. 
"A.merica. has no jonrnalist who makes 
an expert stndy of the war •••• and. there is 
no demand that the newspapers shall snpply 
complete and nnb iased news." 
Mr. H. S. Perris, also a jonrnalist, after a trip to 
reported: 
"I~elieve, on the oontrary, that 
no press in the world has, on the whole 
been more fnlly informed. of the nnderlying 
oauses and issues of the war, and the gen-
eral course of events, than the leading 
j onmals of the United States." 1 
Both reports were probably true to a certain extent. 
The West was little interested in the condu.ct of European affairs, 
but it was stretohing a point to s~ that no American jonrnalist 
had nade an "expert study of the war." Recognizing that American 
news came largely through British hands, mny AIIBrican journals 
were still printing both sides of the story as gar as possible. 
At 8:30, Saturday evening, .it'ebruary 24, 1917, there 
arrived in the ~tate Department a sensational cable from Mr. Page, 
our Ambassador to England. The British Foreign Minister, Mr. 
Balfour, the Ambassador reported, had just handed him the text of 
a cipher telegram from Zimmerman, Geman Foreign Minister, to the 
Imperial Government's Ambassador to Mexico, which had been trans-
1 




mitted on Janaary 19. through the Amerioan Embassy in Berlin to 
the German Embassy in Washington. 
"We intend to begin on the 1st of 
Febr uary unrest rioted so. brnarine warfare. 
We shall endeavour in spite 0 f this to 
keep the Un! ted States of Amerioa De utraJ.. 
In the event of this not suooeeding we nake 
Mexioo a proposal of allianoe on the fol-
lowing basis; mke war together. make peaoe 
together, generous finanoial sllpport and 
an Wlderstanding on Ollr part tla t Mexioo 
is to reoonquer the 100 t territory in 
Texas. New Mexioo and Arizona. You will 
inform the President of the above most 
seoretly as soon as the ont break of war 
with the united States is oertain and add 
the snggestion that he shonld, on his own 
initiative, invite Japan to immediate ad-
herenoe •••••• " 1 
The reaotion of the Amerioan press was violent while 
the German-.Amerioan press oonld "se~" fraud ani British triokery 
wri tten throughout the message. The Springfield Repnblioan. al-
ready anti-German, oalled it the voioe that oonld "solidify 
Amerioa," and the OShkosh Northwesterner remarked. "Patriotism 
has been fanned into a flame of fervent loyalty." The St. Lonis 
AmeriJta dec 1ared "no he si tation in deolaring it a forgery," 
while the New York Fatherland labeled it, IIbrazen forgery; im-
pndent hoax." The Milwaakee Free-Press, oalled the only pro~German 
Amerioan newspaper printed in English, remarked it was a note 
2 
"which even a sohoolboy's sense should suspeot of spnrionsness." 
Bnt there can be no donbt as to its gennineness' for Zimmerman when 
confronted for reasons for his aotion stated that "Germany in 
1 
..!It.i!., LIV, 10 (Maroh 10. 1917) p. 607. 
2 
Ibid" LIV. 11 (Maroh 17, 1917) p. 687. 
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1 
order to win the war needed Allies." 
The press as a whole supported the aation of arming 
our Imrchant vessels, following the pa.bliaation of the Zi~rman 
note, and tm Boston Joornal believed that the "oa.taome aommonly 
expeated is war." The Detroit Journal felt that the President 
"has taken the right ao a.rse and dangeroa.s, If while the Milwaa.kee. 
Joornal believed the "aation will be endorsed by every ai tizen." 
The Nashville Tennessean, a little more aonservative, felt that 
"90 per aent of the people Wi.ll applal1d him," and the Chiaago 
Herald aoa.ld see "no ta.rning back." The New York Sun attempted to 
speak for the State Department and rems. rked, "Government offi-
2 
oials exp ect war unless Germany do es an aboa.t face." 
Following a meeting of the Cabinet, Marah 20, the 
Li terary Digest. rep orted that we changed from "armed ne a.trali ty" 
3 
to "a state of war." Commenting on the aoming session of Congress, 
most of the Ar:reriaan press seemed to feel the salm way. II It wi 11 
be the duty of Congress to recognize the fact of war and aa.thor-
ize the President .... " , stated tre New York Ti1I8s. The Boston 
Transcript felt that "Germany was at war wi th I1S, and we shol11d be 
a t war with Geruany.!l 1)he New York ~Ir ib llAe ,wan ted to know "what 
we were going to do abol1t it?l'and the' Cleveland Press believed 
4 
"war is inevitable." 
1 
Halsey, Frana is Whi ti~, The Literary Di£est History of the 
World War, Vol. 4, p. 15; see also Enay. Brit. Vol. 23, p. 960. 
2 
Lit. Dig., LIV, 12 (March 24, 1917) p. 801. 
3 
Ibid" LIV, 13 (Marah 31, 1917) p. 881. 
4 




The aation of Congress, April 6, 1917, in deolaring 
war aga.inst Germany foUnd t~ .Arneria'an press Ilni ted behind the 
aall to arms. 1'he Chiaago Herald stated; "If this, indeed, be 
not the voiae of the nation, we are not fit to be a mtion," and 
the Courier-Journal remar1red that it was the "most signifiaant 
and momentous deliveranae on the part of the An:eriaan people 
sinae the Dealaration of Independenae." The Boston Transaript 
heard the voi ce of the people wi th the remark, "the president 
has heeded the mandate of the,people." The pro-German press and 
the German-American press also fell into line. The Milwaukee 
Free-Pre'ss );8triotically aalling that "where the flag leads all 
America will follow" and the llew York Staats-Zeitmv cOllld see 
1 
one goal and "b ut one duty -- .A.ue r iaa. n 
-<>. 
1 
Lit. Dig., LIV, 15 (April 14, 1917) p. 1002. 
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IV. THE REACTION OF CHURCH AND PACIFIST GROUPS. 
Where God hath a temple. 
the devil will have a chapel •. 
Robert Burton 
Anatomy .of Melancholy 
general found the American clergy oondemning the warring na-
tions and asking for peaoe. The BiShop of the Protestant Epis-
oopal diooese of New York, Dr. David H. Greer, was one of the 
first to oall for peaoe. publishing a prayer for use in the 
ohurohes of his diooese during the war stating, uWe are bre-
thren •••• open the eyes of the people •••• ha.tred and violenoe 
is weakness •••• bri ng to a speedy end.... war shall be no 
1 
mor e • " The last pro 0 lama t i on of Pope Pi us X was is sued th e 
day of· his death (Augast 19, .1914) oal.ling to all Roman Uath-
olios to pray for the "speedily removal of the evil oauses of 
2 
war, giving to thea who rule to think the thoughts of peaoe." 
The Rev. Fiederiok Lynoh writing in the Christian Work and 
Evangelist (nondenominational), August 29, 1'14, stated that 
"Christianity has been thrown to the dogs, am the na. tiona 
3 
have gone mad." The Lutheran (Philadelphia) organ of the 
Evangelioal Lutheran Church of North Amerioa agreed; "All 
nations have drunk deep at the well of irreligion and mannom-
4 
ism •••• all nations are equally to blame." 
Bev. Holden E. Sampson of the Corpus Christi 
1 
Lit. Dig., XLIX, 8 (Aug. 22, 1914) p. 312. 
2 
Ibid., XLIX, 9 (Aug. 29, 1914) p. 329. 
3 
~. XLIX, 11 (Sept. 12, 1914) p. 463. 4 I 
Ibid' l XLIX, 13 (Sept. 26, 1914) p. 578. 
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Churoh of New York Cit y. was one of the few vo ioes 0 f dissent. 
Writing in the New York World he stated. "war is not all bad • 
••• there are some good things •••• we are too self-oentered am 
1 
shrink from death." 
The nation's response to the President's call for 
prayers for peaoe "oould not have been more general or more 
2 
fervent n in the words of the New Yorlc Times. The Livl ng 
Chgrgh (Milwaukee) added that the nation should "pray for 
3 . 
internat ional pe aoe. n Whatever the 00 ursa and final settle-
ment of the war, stated the BroOklyn Eagle, the pOSition of 
the Catho.lio Churoh has been demonstrated in the ~ope's re-
oent enoyolioal. ~No oritia in the world oan misunderstand 
4 
it." 
By Christmas of 1914 members of the ministerial 
groups were aoti vely engaged in the llrnerioan League to Limit 
Armaments to aombat the foroes cAlling for inoreased defense. 
Those engased inaluded Bishop David H. Greer, Peray Stiokney 
Grant of the Churoh of the Asaensi on, New York City. and 
William Pierson Merrill, minister of the Briok Presbyterian 
1 
!W.., p. 5'18. 
2 
Ibid., XLIX, 16 (Oat. 1'1, 1914) p. '142. 
3 
Loa. a1 t. 
4 
Ibid., XLIX, 23 (Dea. 6, 1914) p. 1126. 
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Chnrch of New York City. Bishop Greer also headed the Chnroh 
Peaoe Union and maintained 'that "peaoe will never be obtained 
by the nse of foroe. The teachings of Christ. the IlBnmr of 
his life and of his death, were proof that he wonld be opposed 
1 
to war." 
The efforts of the 180ifis t o rganizati ons to enlist 
. 
ohnroh snpport tended to increase the antagoniSm of some of 
the olergy/towards them. Dr. Cb::Lrles A. Eaton wanted to know 
"who are these pe ople imposi~ on Simple half-baked women, 
. 
making their hasbands hang their heads in shame?" Maloom J. 
llaoLeod oouldn't believe that ifJull8 were living in the 
present he would be a paoifist; "I believe there are times 
when to be a paoifist is to be perilonslynear being a trai-
2 
tor." Dr. Walter Rausohenbnsoh of the RoohesterTheologioal 
Seminary,writing in the Congregationalist (Boston), first 
oonfessed to Gennan desoent and then stated "there is not a 
nation at war whioh has not aome jnstifioation and some 
spiritllal values at stake." He defended u-ermany bnt not to the 
3 
extreme. stating, "Nations rarely fight for moral issnes alone." 
The governor of 8onneotiout, aotive in the work of the Baptist 
1 
Abrams, OPt oit •• p. 24. 
2 
Ibid., p. 45. 
3 
Lit. Dig., XLIX, 19 (Nov. 7, 1914) p. 892. 
I, 
Chlltoh, requested the churches "to gather a census of the state's 
1 
war material in men." 
:Che Literary Digest could see no division along denomp 
inational lines in the ministerial stand against an increase in 
armaments and stated "there is no significance in the fact that 
it is the Protestanib Christian Work (New York) which believes 
Mr. Bryan's peace treaties worth a big anny.in every state." The 
CatholiC response was the same. The Catholic Monitor (Newark) 
stated, "It is to the credit .of oor people that they are s incere-
ly desirous of peace." All denominations called for "moral rearm-
2 
ament." In his struggle to coniJat militarism, Dr. Frederick 
Lynch wrote in The Christian Work. "Our noise in the world is not 
measured by oar guns. Our safety does not depend upon our navy but 
3 
upon our reputation." 
But what attitude would churchmen take when war's prob-
lems came closer to our shores? A survey of the opinions of church 
leaders of the nation was published by the New tork Times. M8y 10. 
1915, three days after the Lusitania was torpedoed. Collecting 
pulpi t expressi ons the Times re ported that the general reacti on 
of the clergy was: "A crime against civilization; an act not to 
be condoned; not piracy but organized murder; abhorrent even to 
1 
Abrams, OPe cit., p. 46. 
2 
Lit. Dig., XLIX, 26 (Dec. 26, 1914) p. 1281. 
3 
Ibi d., L, 11 (March 15 t 1915) p. 551. 
the standards of bloody war." The Rev. John Henry Jowett stated, 
"It is a oolossal sin against God and it is premeditated murder," 
and Rev. Henry Sloane Coffin saw the aotion as a oonfliot between 
1 
"barbarism and oivilization." The Times editorialized. "Possibly 
some of the olergy have oounseled turning too other oheek, but if 
2 
so we ba. ve not seen the ir words in print." But some words were in 
print. 1'he Rev. John Haynes Holmes of too Churoh of the Messiah. 
New York, stated." •••• show that A~rioa belives in peaoe", 
while .l:(ev. J. F. Keller of th:e Evangel ieal Lutheran' Church. Cleve-
land, remarked, "These passengers were warned before they sailed •• 
a 
•• war is war." The influeno'e of nati onal or !gins is seen in some 
oases. In Ohioago, an appeal was pub lished on ,Saturday, May 8, 
in several Uhioago newspaper articles signed by Lutheran olergy-
men, calling upon the German pastors in the interest of "truth 
and justice" to call t:Q,e attention of their congregations to the 
fact that "the German government had been forced by England to 
the horrible steps, and, aooording to international law, is not 
responsib Ie for the loss of .American life.~· One Lutheran past or 
4 
pOinted out that the passengers had oommitted suioide. 
1 
Ab raIIB t 0» • ci t ., p. 28. 
2 
Lit. Dig., L; 21 (~ 22, 1916) p. 1218. 
a 
Loo. 01 t. 
4 
Abrams, OPe oit., p. 28. 
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The loss of Amerioan lives due to sublIBrine s p1aoed 
the ward "preparedness" foremost in the minds of many ~erioans. 
The Seonrity League had already issued a oa11 for increased 
armaments and tlE younger business men and millionaires, baok 
now from the ir bloodless trenohes at Plattsb urg, were organ-
izing the Military Training Camp Assooiation to put more power-
ful pressures than General Wood himself oould exert upon the 
Congress about to oonvene. Colleges were adopting Reserve 
1 
Offioers Training Corps. 
Both the Congregational and Disoip1es of Christ 
Churohes struok baok against this oall wi th offioial state-
ments. 1'he National Counoil of the Congregational Churoh, 
meeting at ~ew Haven, Conn. t passed a resolution pointing out 
" •••• the futility of gigantio armazoonts as the guaranty of 
2 
international seourity and justioe." The Uhristian Century 
(Chicago) the offioial organ of the Disoiples of Christ, 
remarked that it was "time for religion to enter polit ios 
3 
to strive against militarism." 
With the arrival of the new year (1916) The Literary 
Digest felt that "while much of the paoifist sentiment has 
1 
Millis. OPe 01 t., p. 235. 
2 
Lit. Dig., LIt 21 (Mov. 20, 1915) p. 1009. 
3 
Ibid,,24 (Deo. 11, 1915) p. 1266. 
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emanated from clergymen, it appears to be an error to look 
upon this body of men as a whole as holding to the doctrine 
of non-resistance ani opposing the wide-spread sentiment in 
favor of preparedness," and published a poll of Presbyterian 
ministers taken by !he Continent (Chicago). The Digest editors 
also felt that a complete nation-wid,e view was impossible due to 
the scarcity of Presbyterian ministers in the ~ew England and 
Southern states. 
The poll: 
1. Are you in favor of complete 
disarmament by the united States? 
Yes, 95; No, 305; No vote, 29. 
2. Are you in favor of an Army 
and Navy sufficient in numbers and 
effiency to wi thstand ordinary attack 
while new for'ces are being organized? 
Yes, 375; No, 60; No vote, 37. 
3. Are you afraid of the dangers 
of militarism? 
Yes, 115; No, 278; No vote, 37. 
4. Assuming that all war is wrong 
should we ignore the possibility of attack 
by some nation whiah does not aacept tba.t 
belief? 
Yes, 76; No, 278; No vote, 47. 
5. A variety of reasons were given 
as to the best me thod of defens e. 
The editor of the Seattle Post-Intelligenaer, probably 
finding the results of the poll agreeing with his own ideas, stated 
that the "Presbyterians are a good aross-seation of the aountry •• 
• ~ the doctrine of national preparedness is decidely more popular 
1 
in this country than had been supposed. n 
1 





About the same time a poll of ministers of twenty~ie­
nominations in Brooklyn; conducted by the Daily ~agle. fo~d a 
large majority favoring preparedness. A total of 151 favored an 
increase in armaments wi th six qra1ifying theJr approval and but 
14 opposed. The Eagle. probably remembering that the ordination 
into the ministry does not insure one against cultural infauences, 
editorialized. "It seems that ministers in a given local~ty are 
perhaps affected by the same influences as other citizens and are 
1 just as good patriots as la~en.n Charles A. Eaton~ through. the 
pages of The Independent (March. 1916) gave assurances that "this 
war is the greatest blessing that has ever fallen on mankind Since 
2 
the berman Reformation." 
Sunday, October 4, 1915, the #Jay set aside by President 
Wilson for prayers for peace, was widely observed in the churches. 
The New lork Times featured the occasion on the front page: WHOLE 
NATION FRaYS FOli PEACE. Most of the clergy caught the spirit of 
the day, making strong appeals. Bishop William Lawrence of Mass-
achusetts believed that "people were becoming convinced that war 
was wickedness, useless, and stupid." Malcolm James MacLeod, of 
the Collegiate Ohurch of Saint Nicholas, New York City, asked his 
hearers to "think: of the dead boys today, the maimed ani the 
crippled. I don't care whether they are Germans, English or Russ-
1 
Ibid., LII, 15 (April 8, 1916)p. 972. 
2 
Abrans, OPe cit., p. 33. 
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I 
'ians. They are all their mother's sons and the sa~redness o~ 
human life is degraded. Worst of all is the moral degradation 
1 
and the legaay of ha. tea .. 
The Bri tish government, realizing the value of having 
the olergy speaki~ for the Allied oause, published a book in 
1915 entitled Sixty Amerioan Opinions on the War and the names 
of oertain olergymen found their way into the pages. One of 
them was Frank Isley Paradise. reotor of ~raoe Churoh, West 
Medford, Mass., who in January, 1915, had said from his pulpit: 
"At length, Id 0 believe we shall 
oatohthe spir'it of battle, and fling baok 
the ohallenge of Gennan nationalism. For 
we too have a oonsoious national destiny. 
The God of Israel has annointed us to oham-
pion the oause of the poor, the weak, and 
the down-trodden. We too shall struggle 
for world power. It Will be the healing 
power of Christian oivilization." 2 
But statements;!suoh as these were the exoeption, rather 
than the role. 
President Wilson's oall for peace following his re-eleo-
tion (Deoember 18, 1916) found supnort in the p'ages of The Amerio§n 
Hebrew. "We oount it more than fortunate that we bave at the head 
of the nation a man who towers head and shoulders not only above 
our statesmen, but also above the trained statesmen of Europe •••• 
a 
a burning passion for peaoe and righteousness." 
1 
Ibid., p. 22. 2 . 
.!J!19." p. 27. 
3 
Lit. Dig., LIV, 1 ,(Jan. 6, 1917) p. 24. 
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Pollowing the German note of January 31, 1917, notify-
ing the world of unrestrioted submarine warfare and making our entry 
into the war a.lmost inevitable, The Living Church (Milwallkee) and. 
The Churchman (New York) weloon:ed tl:e sllggeation of the Episoopal-
ian Bishop "to place flags in all our ohllrohes to teaoh the re-
lationship of the ohurch to 1Btriotism and its Christian express-
1 
ion." 
. Follow ing the rllpture of diplomatic relati ons (Maroh 4) 
and desp ite the isolated aoti.ons of oertain ministers in oont inlling 
their fight for peaoe, the ~ew York Federation of Chllrohes deoided 
to "mobilize its Christian strength behind President Wilson, pled-
ging to him all the servioe of whioh we are severally and oolleot-
ively oapable and to make a stand for the immediate establishment 
of llniversal servioe." Sllnday, Maroh 11, 1917 was designated as 
"War Sllnday" in the New York Churohes. One hllndred and fifty-eight 
ohllrohes favored the oall with 52 voting against it. Hesults: 
Presbyterian, 27 for, 22 against; Baptist, 16 for, 1 against; Con-
gregation~list, 10 for, 0 against; Episoopal, 27 for, 3 against; 
Methodist, 23 for, 4 against; Reformed, 19 for, 3 against. Voting 
in a group the Evangelioal Assooiation, the Sooiety of J,!'riends, 
the German Bvangelioal SynOd, the Lutheran Danish, the Heformed 
Episoopal and Universalist rejeoted the motion 11 to 2. 
Some ministGrs proolain:ed the "Holy War" from many 
plllpits. In Brooklyn, Dr. Newell uWight Hillis brollght his oon-
gregation to its feet in un-eoclesiastioal oheers with his 
1 
Ibid.., LIV. 8 (Feb. 24, 1917) p. 473. 
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sermon: "Why We Should Go to v~ar with Germany." A resolution 
in favor of conscription and pledging support for war _as 
adopted by 158 congregations in the city. "Our churches," said 
the Reverend Uharles A. Eaton in the Madison Avenue Baptist 
Churah, "have been preaching what amounts to a moral asphyx-
iation. Pacifists affliat the country •••• They make me want 
to swear, pray, laugh and weep.n It was a performance echoed 
1 
in countless otb3 r ci ties. 
The annoUDaezoont that Congress would meet in special 
session, Monday, April 2, 1917, focused public attention on what 
, 
was elpected to be the President's war message. A survey of 
the churches of .L'Jew York City found mili tancy again rising from 
the pulpit. Rev. Newell Dwight Hillis in Henry Ward Beecher's 
Church stated. "It is the solemn duty to send to Europe •••• 
mon~, soldiers and guns in the ~atio~rance sent to America.-
The congregation immediately drew up a resolut ion, asking Congress 
2 
to declare war. Rabbi Samuel Sch u.lman of Temple Bet.h-e 1, toned 
down his call for war, but as"~ed for a united front,If •••• no 
impression to go abroad tba t the' count~y is divided." A CatholiC 
sppkesman, Father Jahn· Hu.ghes of the Paulist .I!'athers, echoed the 
3 
cry. "We priests are ready and I say 'God bless u.s.'" 
1 l!il.) LIV, 12 (March 24, 1917) p. 820. 
2 
Ibid.) 15 (April 14, 1917) p. 1064. 
3 
Loc. ci t. 
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·1 
There was at least one New York minister of the Gos-
pel Wh 0 refllsed to be swept aw~ by the tides of war emoti on. 
At the Chllrah of the Messiah at Park Avenue ani 34th Street, 
the Reverend Mr. John Haynes HOlmes, a worker for peace since 
the 011 tbreak of the European strllggle, refused to alter his 
opinion and his morning sermon was a passionate deolaration 
of faith: 
"If war is right, then Christianity is 
wrorg. false, a. lie •••• No order of a. Presi-
dent or a Governor .wi 11 pers Ilade me or for ce 
me tot his b Ilsine ss of killiIlS.... Other 
olergymen may pray to God for victory far 
Ollr arms. I will not. In this church, if no-
where else, the ~ermans will still be inclu-
ded in the family of GOd's ohildren." 1 
Reverend Mr. Holmes' sermon gave his trllstees a bad 
afternoon. "Dr. Holmes is an idealist, ff one of them explained 
to the reporters, bllt this was not "the time to put his idealism 
into practice. We are not going to lie down and let ~ermany or 
anyb ody else wipe IIp the floor wi th llS.... The Church of the 
Messiah is going to fight first •••• to protect Amerioan right 
and Amerioan lives, and after we bave protected them we will go 
2 
on with our ideals." 
Some of the most extended efforts in the field of 
propaganda were made in the religi ous fields, b Ilt as to it s effect 
we may only surmise on the faot that the rna. j ori ty of the ch urches 
1 
Ibid., p. 1064. 
2 
Millis, OPt ci tt, p. 429. 
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j 
blessed our entry into the war. Wellington HOllS e, the headquarters 
for British propaganda~ sent appeals to all religions sects but \ 
speci alized on Episcopalians, because of the ir British background 
ani the Catholics, due to the large number of Irish in the church. 
. I 
Theypopularized and almost canonized Cardiml Mercier. A vast 
amount of literature was sent to AllBrican priests and preachers 
am many news stories seem to have been eomposed espeeially for 
2 
their benefit. The flaming vocabulary of religion still has the 
power to move the hearts at ~ny men,. and it is a poor propagan .. 
dist who negleets the spiritual and ecclesiastical interpreta-
. 3 
tion of the war by the SPokesman of every sect. "The churehes 
of pract ically every description can be relie d upon to b less a 
popular war, and to see in it an opport unity for the triumph of 
4 
whatever (;Odly design trey choose to further." 
The following week after our official entry int 0 the war, 
the Literary Dig es t 00 uld not fi nd one offici al eh ur ch sp okesman 
crying out for peace. The Methodist, Congregationalist, Presbyter-
ian, Roman Catholic and Episcopal echoed the eall of the people. 
1 
Desire Joseph Mereit r: Belgi urn Cardinal, Archbishop of Maline s 
and primate of jjelgium. 1851-1926. Noted for his fearless and 
determined attitude against the invading ~ennans. Received by 
King and Queen of England, 12 Sept., 1914, in celebration. On 
death of Pope Pius X, Freneh and English Cardinals proposed him 
for Pope. German ani Austrian against move ealling it, "a'hurch 
in pOlities." 
2 
Peterson, OPt Cit., p. 28. 
3 
Lasswe 11, OPe c1 t., p. 71. 
4 
.!..B!.S., p. 73 • 
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Even the Society of b'riends (Quaker, 'Philadelphia) whose fai th 
forbade them to bear ai-rna informed the government tlBt "organiza-
1 
tion and systematic givi~' is our duty." 
Despite the war-like stand taken by a IIBjority of the 
clergy, other church leaders, as mentioned acove, were working 
daily for the cause of peace. It was a long hard struggle, for 
organizations, sllch as the ~ational Seourity League, were pub-
ldlshing a most oonvinoing type of anti-paoifist propaganda. 
n In t he vooabu~ary of the league 
the terns 'German, 'pro-lZernan, paoifist, 1 
and 'anti-preparedness advooate' beoame 
synonymous and indistinguishable. One who 
favored the Allied oause was a patriotio 
Amerioan: one who favored the German side 
-- nay, even one who sought to maintain 
a neutral position-- was a 'hyphenated 
Amerioan a dangerous alien, a spy. a 
trai tor.' In its ory for inoreased arm-
aments it olaimed to be 'the best peaoe 
society in the United States. ln 2 
The popularity of peace societies in this country in 
1914 led many observers interested in that movement to believe 
that the "Golden Age of Man" was just ahead. Michael Clune, 
addressing the annual meeting of the New York Peaoe SOCiety in 
May of that year, refleoted the spirit of optimism. "Ambition,lI 
said he, "will never again drench a continent in blood. A higher 
oivilization than warts is appearing.'i At the outbreak of the 
European war, the American Peace SOCiety. through its president 
1 
Li t. Dig., LIV, laj (May 5, 1917) p. 1334. 
2 
Abram, OPe cit., p. 24. 
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j 
Senator Theodore E. Burton, and Arthur D. Call, the seoretary, 
issued a staterrent to the people of the united States, deolar-
ing tha. t oauses of the ooni lict to be military preparedness 
in Europe, and asked oar oitizens to unite "in prayer and sup-
plioation today and tomorrow, and •••• on eao:1 suoceeding day 
1 
until world peace is restored." 
The first organized movement in Amerioa directed to-
wards the oessation of hostilities was plaoed before the public 
during the winter of 1915. H~aded by the E~lishwoma.n, Mrs. 
Pethwiok LawrenoeJand assisted by the brillant Hungarian, 
Rosika Sohwim.IIer, a crusade against "the common enemy of man-
kind" was preached th:oughout the na~ion. This movement inspir-
ed Jane Addams to found the Woman's Peace Party, dedicated to 
2 
urging the immediate discussion of reasonable peace terms. 
The following spring Jane Addams led a large delegation to 
The Hague hoping to found a women's world wide peace oonference 
that would call the govemmen ts to the ir senses and end the 
confliot. But as the golden stream of war orders spread through 
our economy, such efforts by visionary females were regarded 
wit~ an only more soornful amusement. The more sophistioated 
peaoe movement was careful to avoid entanglement in anything 
ao "impractioal," olinging to the more popular objeotive of 
1 
Ibid., p. 161. 
2 




organizing peace only after the current war had ended in vio-
tory for the Allies. It was on June 17, 1916, that the League 
to Enforce Peace, the flower of this altruistic agitation, was 
fonnally launched at Philadelphia. Ex-President Taft was at 
its head; Dr. A. Lawrence Lowell was chairman of its executive 
committee; and many other eminent and high-minded men were 
enlisted in its ranks. A powerful propaganda engine had been 
created to add the military strength of the United States to 
the guarantee of a "permanent," peace system, once the Allies 
1 
should have safely destroyed "Prussian Militarism." 
On December 4, 1915, the steamship Osoar II,ohar-
tered by Henry Ford, sailed for Europe with 83 peace mission-
2 
aries aboard to "get the boys out of the trenches by Christmas." 
But too many important people had withdrawn from the vessel 
and the entire attempt was a fiasco. Ford left the party at Oslo. 
Nor waf, although a few die-hards moved on to Germany and Franoe 
only to find their efforts useless. 
The fight to force peace through negotiations was dying 
a slow death in the struggle-against those who favored peace 
after victory. Then on-the night of February 3, 1917, just three 
days after the German note informing the world of unrestricted 
submarine warfare, the pacifists made their last stand. William 
Jennings Bryan, speak ing to a crowd of five thousand or more in 
1 
Millis, 0)2. ci t., p. 198. 
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New York City, was cheered when he avowed that the United States 
wo uld not "get down and wallow in the mire of human blood." Out 
of this me~tinglthe Emergency 1:'eace Federation, sponsored by 
several peace organizations,toOk form. In the next three months 
it raised over ~76,OOO for its work. In Washington, an Emergency 
Peace Federation Committee~was formed, while in Chicago, long 
an active peace center llIlder the insp;iration of Jane Addams 
and Louis p. Loch~er, the pacifists began to take steps cal~ 
c ala ted to prevent our involv.ement in war. On February 12, a 
, 
large delegation of pacifists encamped a t ~vashington. Meetings 
were staged and conferences with Congressmen held. David Lawrence 
wrote to the New York Evening Post; "Somehow, the pacifists 
got a better recepti on than the ir most enthusiastic followers 
1 
have believed was possible in the national capital." 
Early the next month Jane Addams visited President 
Wilson and told of her reception: 
"He still spoke to IlS as to fellow 
pacifists to whom he was forced to confess 
that war had become inevitable. He said 
that as head of a great nation participa-
ting in the war, he would have a seat in 
the peace conference, but that if he re-
mained the representative of a neutral 
country he could at best be on call through 
a crack in the door. It was as if his 
heart's desire spoke through his words 
and -dictated his view of the situation." 2 
Certain pacifist groups, notably the flying squadron of 
speakers led by Chancellor-Emeritus DaVid Starr Jordan of Stan(ord 
1 
Abrams, op. cit., p. 44. 
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Universi ty, continued their energetic but futile efforts to stem 
1 
the tide of war • 
.As the country edged closer to the brink: of war com-
plaints began to pour in from t he more radically-minded members 
of the peace societies, ciaiming that the organizations were 
"side-stepping and watahfully waiting," and were "parties to a 
aonspiraay of silenae." As if to substantiate these alaims, 
various branches of the Society told of blacksliding members. 
The Pres ident of the Derry Pe.aae Society in New Hampshire aom-
plained because the leading members of the state organization 
"had joined the great preparedness army just now sweeping the 
aountry." On the eve of our declaration of war, the Society 
stated the rather obvious fact that the decision to enter or 
refrain from entering the war had "to be made by the United 
States government, II since the American Peace Soaiety could not 
"deaide the question. n On the last day of Marah, 1917, the 
Springfield Repub1iaan (Mass.) had already aongratu1ated the 
2 
organization on being suah a "good loser." 
Another group that must be taken into consideration 
was the Socialist Party, the avowed party of pacifism. Meeting 
in Convention at St. LOUis, in 1917, the party dea1ared the 
struggle a aapitalist war and promised opposition to its proiJ-
ecution. a step which led to the eventual arrest of many 
Socialist leaders, among them Eugene V. Debs, frequently the 
1 
Mock, James R. and Larson, Cedria: Words that Won the War, p. 26. 
2 





Sooialist party's oandidate" for president. The great wartime 
sohism in the ranks of the Sooialists did not ooour Ilntil the 
middle of April, 1917, bllt throughollt Maroh the press had oar-
ried stories reporti~ the oonversion of iniividllal Sooialists 
who had previous ly opposed entranoe int 0 what they regarded 
as an imperialist war. Those who left the fold did so on the 
belie f that the war was a war against all tooraoy. 
The basio reason for the trend of the Amerioan ohurohes 
from peaoe, to preparedness, :to war, is apparent. IJhristians and 
Jews have simplY'llsed the Bible to aid in rationalizing any 
praotioe or idea whioh they were oarrying out and believed to be 
just ified. It is th us a oommonplaoe that the Bible has been quoted 
to justify nearly every praotioe and belief know to man; war and 
peaoe, slavery and anti-slavery, ohild labor, polygamy and mono-
gamy, oelibaoy, the burning of witohes and the torture of here-
tios, oapi tal punishment, women sllffrage, oommunism, oapitalism, 
the oharging of interest, temperanoe and absolute prohibition, 
faith healing and eto. And finally the love of oountry exoeeds 
the love of mankind. Priests and ministers oalled eaoh other 
2 
names and aooused one another of worshipping false gods. It be-
oame a "Holy War." Another Tital relationship is that Which 
exists between the religion of Christianity and the religion of 
Nationalism. The ohurohes were oonsistent in the reoord of 
sllpporting all poplllar wars and proved, wha.t had long been sus-
1 
Amerioan Labor Year Book. 19l7-19l8~ pp. 373-379. 
2 
Abrams, OPe cit., p. 252. 
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petCted, that Christianity has been becoming in~reasingly nation-
alist iC, while the god of Na ti onalism is more powerful in his 
ability to command obedience and dev~tion unto death than is 
Jehovah himself. Natioralian reached its highest development 
during the First World War. There were thous,ands of appropriate 
places of Christian worship, as in the First Baptist uhurch 0"£ 
New London, Conn., far example, the pastor, a chaplain during 
the war, preached in his uhiform with a machine gun and an 
1 
American flag on the platforItl beside him. 
The conception of war as inevitable and as salutary 
under certain conditions is held by many conservative theologians. 
They do not regard it as having a place in the ideal order but 
regard it as a necessary eVil. A still more serious consequence 
of a literal interpretation of Jesus' teaching concerning non-
resistance is its bearing on the state. Its primary purpose is 
to defend itself and its ci tizens from unjust attack. This is 
the functi on of the army and the police • Without such use of 
force the state would disintegrate and there would be anarchY.. 
The attempt is often mde to draw a fundaIllental moral distinction 
between an army.and a police force. Hut in theory there is no 
essential difference. Indeed, anyone who believes in the state 
and understands what this. means must also believe that under 
1 




certain cirs umstances war is morally justifiable. 
The steady st'ream of atrocity stories~ the suppress-
ing of all evidences of better feeling on the part of any sec-
tion of the Gennan people, the disheartening effects of the 
pron~ciamento of the German intellectuals, the honest and 
sincere revulsion of feeling against a nation that action of 
whose leaders had plunged mankind into these unspeakable horrors--
all worked to make righteous anger seem a vhristian duty. The 
fact remains that in the heat,of the struggle the judgment of 
. ' 
many a minister did not conspicuously rise above that of the 2 . 
average citizen. The members of the cloth and their followers 
were susceptible to war psychology and crowd-thinking in the 
same manner as were the othe r ci ti zens. 'l'hey possessed no pro-
3 
phylacti c agains t the mob mind. 
In the first of the World Wars organized Uhristianity 
tended in general to endorse the ca use of the Allie s agains t the 
Central J:lowers, although favoring neutrality, and later supported 
the participation of the Uni!ed States~ in a war which they had 
come to regard as righteous. 
..()-
1 
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3 
Abrams, OPe cit., p. 246. 
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V. THE REACTION uF BUSINESS AND LABOR. 
Hnsiness is a oombination 
of war and sport. 
Andre Ma uro is 
/ 
The moo t aonvenient alassifiaation ot the prinaipal 
aauses of wars as we see them to have arisen in history is; 
religous, po,litiaal a.nd eaonomia. 'l'he latter two, espeaia.lly, 
1 
are intertwined beyond the hope ot disentanglement. 
The story of Ameriaan politiaal involvement as a result 
of eaonomia pressures is easily followed by a series of sucaess-
ive steps. First, a policy of striat neutrality was fOllowed. fhen 
the permitting of private loans to belligerent nati.ons followed. 
Third was the period of armed neutrality and then war itself. 
It must be remembeted that Britis# trade restriations 
were not devised for the purpose of drawing the United States into 
war. The primary object wa's to injure the enemies of Great Britain 
by every means legal and illegal. It sought1aooording to Winston 
Churohill, to treat, "the whole of ~ermany as if it were a be-
1eaguered fortress, and avowedly sought to starve the whole pop-
ulation-- men, women, and ohildren, old and young, wounded and 
2 
sound, into submission." The British government at the outset of 
the war realized that Amerioan economio assistanoe would be needed 
to bring the struggle in Europe to a s uaaessful oonol usi on, but 
only gradually did they realize the extent of their dependenoe on 
';i; . 
..... 
the Arm rioan e oonomy. 
1 
2 
Salter, Sir Arthur; Thomson, Sir. J. Arthur} Johnston, G. A.; 
Zimmern, Alfred; Andrews, C. F.; Libby, Frederiok J.; Atkinson, 
Henry A.; Steed, Wiokham and others: The Causes of War, (Salter. 
The Eoonomio Cagses of War,) pp. 15-16. 
Peterson, Ope oit., pp. 82-83. 
3 
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From almost the first, British naval power and poliOW 
made Amerioan foreign trade dependent upon the aotions of the 
British government. It also oaused the ~ermans to retaliate and 
thus oome in oonflict with the Amerioan government. Later. large 
munitions oontracts in this oountry meant high wages and higher 
profits for thousands of people in .amerioan industry. The next 
aot was loans to Britain. These gave some Amerioans a vested in-
terest in the Allied oause. All three oombined to oreate good 
will between the United State,s and lireat Britain and, indirectly, 
to oreate ill-will between the United States and Gerrrany. :ii:aoh 
1 
step was propaganda in the most praotioal sense of the word. 
The Amerioan policy at the outbreak of the war was in 
strict aooord with the rules of international law, which states, 
"Neutrals may legitirrately carryon all sorts of trade, and bel-
2 
ligerents may interr upt all. If Thus Britain, contrOlling the sur-
faoe of the seas I was able to halt ~er ioan trade to the c ont inent 
without destruction of American lives and shipping, and German~ 
forced to: retaliate with her only weapon, the submarine. found 
herself alienating the Amerioan public. 1'he aspects of the eoo-
nomio warfare as oarried on by Great Britain, although fully within 
the bounds of international law, was desoribed by many in the war-
1 
Peterson, Ope oi t., p. 71. 
2 
Woolsey, Theodore D.: Introduction to the Study of International 
Law, ChP~. 2, ~eo. 184, par. 3, p. 309. 
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1 
time phrase, If Grea t Bri tain rule s the waves and waives the r ules ~ n 
Representative Towner of Iowa was one of the few who looked into 
the future and· forsaw the danger. As early as AUgust 28, 1914, 
he sp oke agains tour b usi ne ss poli cy on the floor of Congress. fo 
ship food and clothing to the Allies, he warned his countrymen, 
was to aid them in their struggle wi th Gennany and Austria. "At 
best we would be fort una te if we co uld avoid being drawn into the 
war;" but to en 00 urage even commercial e:xp arts toone s ide, when 
the other was debarred from our uar"cets, would be "to invi te our 
2 
own entanglement." 
Towner took the position of Secretary of State Bryan 
who believed that if we are neutral ~ a 11 belligerents should re. 
ceive exactly the same treatment at our hands, [EhiS 'liQuId .nvolve 
strict prohibition of all trade and relations wi th all mtions as 
, 
reselling of our material by another neutral m tion might .nvolve 
us] even though this would involve the government in~a new inter-
pretation of international and united States law, as we were at 
3 
the time functioning under previously agreed upon rules. The Pres-
ident took the stand that rules could not be changed for the advan-
tage of one c ont estant ·while the struggle was on, and set his face 
1 
Peterson, OPe Cit., p. 770 
2 
Millis, Ope Cit., p. 99. 
3 
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Jennings Br¥an, p. 395. 
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resolutely aga1re t any acti on which would be clearly a violation 
1 
of American ne utrali tY. 
Our growing trade with England had its repercussions 
in ~ermany, and Mr. Gerard, our ambassad~ in Berlin)repprted that 
Umy job is nade mrder by these sales of munitions"; a growing 
bitterness toward the United States was not difficult to detect 
2 
in the Central Powers. 
If he could not stop the trading now going on wi th war-
ring nations, then he might ~top the possibility of any loans to 
these nations, was the attitude of Secretary Bryan. In a letter 
to the President, August 10, 1914, Bryan wrote: 
"Money is the worst of all 
contraband because it commands every-
thing else.... If we approved of s nch 
loans •••• Otlr ci ti zens wo uld be di vided 
into groups, each group loaning money 
to-the country which it favors and this 
money could not be furnished wi thout 
expressions of sympathy •••• The power-
ful financial interests which would be 
oonnected with these loans would be 
tempted to support the int erests of the 
government to whioh they loaned." 3 
Once again Secretary Bryan was attempting to lead the 
government into making its own international law, for international 
law does not require of the ne utral sovereign that he shOuld keep 
the oitizen or subjeot within the same strict lines of aeutrality 
1 
Bak er. op. ci t ., Vol. 5, p. 1280 
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whioh he is bound to maintain for himself. "The private person, 
if the law of his own 'state or some speoial treaty does not for-
bid, oan lend money to the enemy of a state at peaoe with his own 
oountry for purposes of war, or oan enter into its servioes as a 
1 
soldier, wi thout involving the governlJ~nt of his oountry in guilt." 
The edi tor of the Springfield RepubliC!an knew his law: 
"That our government is rraking 
the international law of the future by 
its disapproval of loans to na. ti ons at 
war is the opinion of the Springfield 
Rep ublioan. whioh :r:eminds us tba t the 
presen t law does not forb id loans of 
money to a belligerent state by private 
oitizens of neutral states." 2 
On August 16, 1914 the announoement of the President's 
polioy, in regard to loans to a nation at war, was telegra~)hed 
to J. P. Morgan and Company. 
"There is no reason why lo~ns 
should not be made to the governments 
of neutral na.tions, but in the judge-
ment of this goverThoont, loans by 
Amerioan bankers to any foreign govern-
ment whioh is at war are inoonsistent 
with the true spirit of neutrality." 3 
In oonsequenoe of this announoement no loans were made 
at that time. 
But on Ootober 23, a teohnioal distinotion between loans 
1 
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2 
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and bank oredits was made followi~ adviae to the President by 
Robert Lansing, advisor to the State Departrmnt. 
" •••• Sinoe the beginning 0 f the 
war. I an informed that one bank alone 
has reoeived oabled instruotions for the 
P8¥ment of more than $50,000,000 for 
Ame ri<lan go ods and that the vo lume of 
this bus ina ss is inc reasi ng. Owing to 
war oonditions, this buying is neoess-
arily for <lash and it is of suob mag-
nitude that the <lash oredits of the 
European governments are being fast de-
pleted. Lately it has been urged by 
oertain manufaoturers and by represent-
at i ,~es of s orne of the foreign govern-
ments, that the baTIks should provide 
temporary oredits for these purohases 
•••• 
n •••• the oritioal time for 
AIle rioan finanoe in our int erm tional 
relations is during the next three or 
four months and, if we allow these pur-
chases to go elseWhere, we will have 
negleoted our fo reigh trade at the time 
of our greatest need and greatest oppor-
tunity •••• 
"For the purpose of enabling 
European governments to make oash pay-
ments, it is suggested to grant to them 
short time banking oredits, to both 
belligerent and neutral governments, 
and when neoessary or desirable re-
plenish their oash balanoes on this 
s ide by the purohase of short time 
Treas ury warrant.s." 1 
With Allied credits established, the "opportunity" for 
inoreasing our foreign trade that Mr. Lansing stated, was not long 
in coming. ~rade with the Allied oountries inoreased approximately 
141 peroent from 1914 to 1915. After 1915 the outstanding indebted-
ness of the Allies in the united States was inoreasing by leaps 
1 
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and bounds. 'l'he New York press, wi th the notable exception of the 
Hearst and the German-la~uage papers, gave the loan stalwart 
1 
support. 
The general sentiment of the mtion for the rerminder of 
the year seemed to be peace and prosperity Vlhich the New :lork l'imes 
summed up in a New Years Day, 1915, editorial: 
" • • •• The promise 0 f the new year 
is that we shall accomplish a peaceful 
penetration of the world r s markets to an 
extent we have IE ver dreamed of. What 
others have shed blood to obtain through 
politics and force ,we shall attain while 
bestowing our benevolence. 
" •••• It is a mew translation of 
the old beatitude, revised; 'Blessed are 
the l.:e epers of the peace for pros peritY2 
shall be wit hin the ir home s and palaces. I if 
The Times was wrong. Prosperity did come, but not through 
peace. Uredits to the British government created prosperity for 
the American blJ.si!l..essman, farmer and worker and edi torial pages 
were reflecting the general trend of good times. The New York 
.American called the surge of prosperity "our financial emancipation 
3 
from t he European struggle." But few looked far enough ahead to 
realize what WOuld happen to the American prosperity bubble when the 
credits ran out. These credits by banks hampered the Federal Reserve 
System but bond loans, if permitted, would remove the problem. Mor-
1 
Peterson, OR. cit., pp. 92, 103. 
2 
Lit. Dig., L, 2 (Jan. 9, 1915) p. 39 0 
3 
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gan once again requested a rulirg from the President on the fea-
sibility of loans and this time Lansing answered via memorandum 
stating that such loans were permissible as the re was a difference 
between the "true spirit of neutrality" and "strict legality." There 
is no record of a written discussion by the President and his ad .. 
1 
visors but the situation was discussed. 
The l!organ- Company si gned aco ntract wi t h the Lieading 
Commission on Septeober 25, 1915. The loan was for ~500,000,000 
and it was issued with a two per cent "spread" through a s~n~icate 
of sixty-one New YorK Houses with 1,500 members throughout the 
country, and hence to thousands of individual investors. Chicago, 
the financial cap'ital of the liliddle West with a considerable 
Gennan population, remained cool. The only serious attack upon 
the loan, however~ was on grounds, not of national policy, but of 
financial safety. This was met by the argument that the Allies 
did not really need money but only foreign exchange. This same 
argument was used to put pressure on the government. When on 
October 14, the books were closed, the somewhat ticlr.lis1Jl si tuation 
2 
had proved a success. Spring Rice, the British ambassador, stated 
in one of his reports\.' concerning the loan: "When it became appar-
ent that a loan was necessary in order to give credit for American 
1 
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" 
exports to Europe, many secret forces began to act in its favor. 
The Government itself undoubtedly wished it, mainly because a con-
I 
tinuance of .American trade depended upon a credi t." 
Soon Arrer.ican ships were carrying practically nothing 
bllt British supplies. Jjusiness with the Allied powers grew by 
leaps and bounds, wi th but onecloud on the horizon; the war might 
end. ~very time there was talk of peace, munitions stocks went 
down from five to 40 per cent. war had brought us prosperity, 
peace threatened to bring cal,amity. Gradually other worries began 
. 
to trouble American industry and finance. Suppose the Germans won--
what then? "No, that could never happen. We have the mrd of A.D. 
Moyes, financial editor of the New York ~imes, that Wall Street 
pioked the Allies to Win at the very start and never wavered in 
2 
this firm bel ief." 
The stock market reports throughout 1916 reveal strikingly 
the close economic relationship between the United States and the 
Allies. The news of the ~erman victory at Jutland caused a big 
drop in the mr.tCet while the exploits of the U-53 (submarine) 
created a temporary panic in which $500,000,000 was lost in 15 
minutes. Early in December the New Yo~'k Times recorded that the 
Gennan peace offer had sent all stocks down. The next day prices 
1 
MilliS, .op. cit., p. 220. 
2 
Engelbrecht, H. D. and Hanighen, F. C.: Merchants of Death, 
pp. 174-175. 
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r"'rooe because there was no fear of "peace." At the time of the 
Wilson peace offer, the TiIhes stated: "Sales of more than 300.000 
1 
shares force most violent slump known in fifteen years." Bant~ 
credits were sharply curtailed, and the Allied governments were 
able to renew the ir bi lIs wi t h the most extreme di fficul ty. The 
news of the d iploIm t ia break wi th Germany on t he 4th of February, 
1917, se~ Bethlehem citee1 up 30 points. Mr. Henry p. DaVidson, 
a partner in J. P. Morgan and Company, bad been one of the mos t 
active opponents of ~ermany'~ "insincere" peace offers; he had 
, 
wished for American particUpation in the war in order to "cleanse 
·2 
us from our self-righteousness. n 
The ootton market also followed the stock rmrket in the 
fear that war might end. By January, 1915, the price of cotton 
began gradually to rise, and continued until the fall of 1916, 
when the German peace proposal caused uncertainty again. On Feb-
ruary 3, the day after diplolilatic relations with Germany were 
severed, the price began to rise sharply and the advance contin-
ued until the spring of 1918, when government price regulations 
were threatened and later inaugurated. Fo~ the greater part of 
the peri od from July 27. 1914 to Febrnary 3, 1917, prices were 
3 
belOW the 1913 average. 
1 
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Thus Amerioa was lending herself prosperity; a prosper-
ity which in the end many eoonomists believe can be nothing but 
false enoomy and wi th the moo t dangerous fOnD of lendi ng money 
known to financiers; the lending of money by private individuals 
to a foreign nation. llhe loan may~e considered purely a pri vate 
transaction, without political considerations, but wnen default 
occurs, it may result in governmental action. An important source 
of friction in international relations arises from the use of 
1 
the diplomatic maohine to assist nations in collecting debts. 
The September issue of Lalollette's Magazine (published 
and edited by Senator Robert M. LaFollette, Wisconsin) carried 
a caustic editorial: 
nWi th the fi rst clash of the 
great European war came President Wil-
son's solemn appeal •••• 'The Uhited States 
must be neutral in fact as well as in 
name' •••• But when you can boom stocks 
600 per cent in nanufacturing munitions 
-- to the Bottomless Eit with neutrality! 
What do Morgan and Schwab care for world 
peace men there are big profits in world 
war? ••• The stocks of the Schwab proper-
ti es which stood at a marl~et value of 
seven millions before they began supplying 
the allies •••• are today given an aggre-
gate 'value' of forty-nine millions. And 
now.we are about to engage in furnishing 
the .illlies funds •••• We are underwriting 
the success of the cause of the Allies. 
We have ceased to be 'neutral in fact as 
well as in name.,n 2 
1 
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The last statement was probably true for a considerable 
number of Amerioans. 1'hrollghout the summer prosperity bad been 
rising in an ever dizzier ourve; by September the steel trade 
had "never seen demand so overwhelming and at the same times its 
output expanding on such a soale under steadily rising prioes", 
, 
by Ootober the railway terminals, both east and west) were begin-
ning to break down under a greater jam of traffio than had been 
1 
witnessed in the most prosperous years of the past. 
Not until the olos~llg days of 1914, and not strongly 
until the follpwing spring was the suggestion pushed that the 
United States by a threat of embargo on war materials might 
foroe the Bri t ish to abandon those drastio interfere noes wi th 
ne utra1 trade whioh were illegal in the eyes of the .Arre r ioan gov-
ernment. Apparently w~ did not recognize the international sig-
nifioanoe of our immense eoonomio power, and we probably oould 
not have used it, if we had, since embargoes would have resulted 
in an eoonomio shook that Amerioan business was unprepared to 
withstand either by knowledge, or vision, or fortitude. 110reover, 
in the hope that the war would soon end-- or yield to the Pres-
ident's efforts to bring about peaoe-- there always lurked an 
exouse for avoiding drastio measures. Thus by the end of the 
year 1914 thetraffio in war materials with the Allies had beoome 
deeply entrenohed in Amerioa's eoonomio organization, and the 
1 





possibility of keeping out of the war by the diplomacy of neu-
1 
trality, was greatly reduced. 
Despite the financial backing and the steady stream of 
war materials flowing to the Allies. the amount of American ma-
terials reaching the ~erman army through neutral European nations 
enraged the British. Lfermany had been aut off from the direct 
purchase of .8merican goods by the British Navy, but a trickle 
of supplies cant inued to reach them. These goods were furnished 
by European neutrals by one o.f two methods; first, the direct re-
exportation of mterials imported from abroad which formed a 
considerable volume of the trade of Germany and the neutrals 
and which had by no means ceased. 'l'he second form was the export 
of domestic products and the filling of the deficit by importa-
tion from abroad, mainly from the united States, d.esuite the fact 
that they bad promised that no material imported from America 
2 
would be exported to Germany. 
The British answer to this situation was the contra-
band list; a long list of materials which might be used in fur-
yW4.ing German war aims~ were not to be shipped by American mer-
chants to European neutrals. This seemed a bold stroke but when 
one is involved in making war, any action to further ~,~ own 
aims is considered justifiable. With the list came a warning 
1 
2 
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from the British that all mercba.nt ships going to Europe would 
be seized and searched and oontraband would be tai~en over and 
fair remuneration given. Dut still Britian hid to be careful not 
to anta.gonize amerioa too far. Perhaps nothing in the early 
days of the war enraged the .dritish military chiefs more than 
the fact that cotton was permitted to go from the United States 
to Germany. Tba t Germany was using this cot ton in the man ufact-
ure of torpedoes to sink British ships and projectiles to kill 
British soldeirs in trenches.was well known; nor did many people 
deny that Great Britian had the right to put cotton on the contra-
band list. Yet, Sir Edward Grey, the British foreign minister, in 
the pursuit of his larger end~ refused to take this step. He 
knew that the prosperi ty of the ;.3outhern states depended exolu-
sively upon tne cotton crop. He also knew that the South had 
raised the 1914 crop with no knowledge that a war was impending 
and that to deny the southern planters their usual access to the 
Gerrmn maricets would all but ruin them. He believed that such a 
ruling would immediately alienate the sympathy of a large section 
of the United Stat es and m~ce our southern Senators and Congress ... 
men enemies of Great Britian. For this reason he did not declare 
1 
cotton contraband until August 20, 19l5.11he South was immediate-
ly alarmed, one reason being the 1914 crop-- 2,000,000 more bales 
2 
than usual. Secretary of the Treasury McAdoo met the situation 
1 
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by iss uing a statement to the press to the effect that the Trea-
sur y would de posi t, if its ho 4- be come ne cessary, $30,000.000 
or more in Southern Federal Reserve Banks far- loans on cotton 
1 
warehouse certificates (August 23, 1915). 
It appeared as if relati ons between the Uni ted Stat es 
and Great Dritian might become strained on the qrestion of neutral 
2 
trade and the exanunation of the mails. Even the cartoonists were 
beginning to sharpen their pene ils wi th anew. tho ugh sti 11 friend ... 
ly asperitY,and John Bull's r.otund form began to appear in our 
papers, often with a string of stolen ~~rican cargoes under his 
arm, in attitudes less than, m roic. "Thousands of American impor-
ters," as Mr. Lansing wrote Mr. Page, were clamoring to the State 
Departmen~ against the British stoppage of cargoes from Germany. 
They were threatening to hold uass meetings to "denounce the dic-
tatorial and illegal policy of Great Britian toward the United 
States" and lobbying for an export embargo as long as Great Bri-
3 
tain continued to treat them "with contumely and contempt." 
On Dece~ber 3, 1914, Ambassador Page was bluntly infor-
med that there w~s "sharp cri ticisn in this co untry" of Bri tish 
high-handedness, and that sone thing wo uld have to be done. This 
new stiffness at last appears to have prodded Page into some real-
ization of the true position and he replied on December 7, with 
I 
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a proposed "working arrangement" with Great Brit~in. The press 
of the na tion was also split on the quest ion of wha t to do. The 
New Yorker Herold (German language) labeled our unrestricted 
trade with the Allies "dollar diplomacylT and added that "all the 
powder and gun factories of the entire lam are working at break-
neck sPied, b'or whom? ••• "They requested that all readers write 
to their representatives to force the government (to act) ani 
hinted that "American arIIE-manufacturers don't care now whether 
2 
there's a revolution in Mexicp or not. n But the mjority' of the 
Arne ri can pr ess backed the PreSident for his stand and the New York 
Morning '.l'elegraph commented that it was the "frank belief of many 
along shore that the British admiralty, under the guise of guard-
ing British interests is making an extension of American ocean 
3 
trade as difficult as possible." 
As the full effect of the British stand became apparent 
to the .A.m3rican public the Literary Digest reported that "our 
press as a whole is by no means willing to accept Sir Edward 
Grey's statement of fact at its face value or to consider his ar-
g uments concll1s ive. IT The vvashington Pes t was very indignant. n Just 
as Germany destroyed Belgium on the plea of military necessity, 
England proposes to destroy American commerce.· i .A. few of the press, 
mostly from the pro-British section of the nation, could see a 
1 
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silver lining in Grey's reply and hinted to the; publia that "the 
note gives promise of an early and sat is faat ory understanding." 
Only two members of the fo urth estate, the New Haven Journal-Courier 
, 1 
and the '{iall Street Journal believed the answer satisfaatory. 
At both ends of the Atlantia passage" .Ameriaan trade 
wit h the Central Powers was sub,j eat before the end of 1914 to a 
"volunt!3-r.v system" of British supervision as astonishing in its 
extent as it was probably abhorrent both to domestia, and inter-
national law. "One hesitates ,to think of the storm of popular 
outrage which would have resulted had the ~ermans been in a posi-
tion to exert one tenth 0 f the interference whiah was soaraely 
2 
notiaed when practiaed by the Allies." 
But the possibility of an, outbreak with Great Britain 
due to the hampering of our commercial relations with the Central 
,owers was averted-- not by a relaxing of British restrictions or 
a change of heart of the American public and government-- but by 
the short-sightedness of Ger~any. For on February 5, 1915, the 
newspapers of the United States were blazing with the headline: 
Gerrranv Proalaims a War Zone • .At the orecise moment when .American 
resentment against the'British trade controls might conceivably 
have produced some tangible results the ~ermans had created a di-
version in whiah all t_,-ought of the trade aontroversy wa.ssoon to 
3 
be swallowed up and-lost. 
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'.rhe British overlooked nothing in an attempt to bring 
Ameri oan industria 1 might behind them. At the annual 0 onvent ion 
of' the Amerioan Federation of Labor in the fall of 1914, the reg-
ularly' aooredited delegates from the ~ritish frades Union Congress, 
who usw.lly oame, were missing; in their stead, however, there 
turned up "two Bri tish labor men," Mr. James Seddon and Mr. Albert 
Bellamy, who were eagerly reoeived and questioned about the war 
1 
by the knerioan labor ohieftains." Whether the British labor rep-
resentatives tipped the balance or oompletely ohanged the opinions 
of Amerioan Labor leaders is unoertain, but at least the results 
were the same. Many of the labor groups, whioh were eyed with sus-
picion beoause of their supposed disinclination to proseoute the 
"Capitalists I war," as agi tators oalled it, were similarly eager 
to display their patriotism. When a big munitions strike broke out 
in the bridgeport faotories, in 1915, Samuel Gompers, head of the 
An18rioan Federation of Labor} rushed off at onoe to stop it and so 
. 2 
"protect the good name and safety of the labor movement." 
Wi th the break off of d iplona t io rela ti ons fo llowing the 
unrestricted submarine warfare note, February 3, 1917, ,:Mr. Gompers 
oabl ed Carl Leg ien, the presi dent of the lierrmn frades· Union Fed-
oration, demanding tr..at he put pressure on hiS government to halt 
submarine warfare; and when the lierman presently responded with 
1 
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the suggestion that Mr. Gompers put pressure on England to raise 
the food blockade. the great Arre ri can labor leader felt that 
1 
Leigen's answer was a patent "evasion of duty." The four Railroad 
Brotherhoods announced on lfurch 10, 1917 that their threatened 
2 
strike would be called off in the event of war and there were 
some lOngShoremen( and munition wori.:.er's strL.:::es of considerable 
proportions; but it seems rather doubtful that labor's National 
3 
Peace Council could rightly claim credit for them. 
The huge volume of ,business enjoyed by the United States 
. 
during the last year of neutrality helpsto explain why no military 
action or economic sanctions were taken against Great Britain for 
her contraband list and her censoring of mail. Exports jumped from 
Over two and one-half million dollars to four and one-third bill-
4 
ion. The war economics as a vmole made the United States a finan-
cial. if not a political. ally of Great Britain and l!'rance • .As 
soon as the liermans struck back at the blockade and the utiliza-
tion of the New 1;'lorld as a ba,se of SU91,lie:3. they found themselves 
confronted not only by the might of Great Britian and her allies, 
but also by that of the united States. As far as the economic war-
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~,Yar costs money, and the expense falls by no means 
wholly on the belligerents. If the European conflict bro ught the 
United States industrial prosperity, it also imposed-- even in the 
ye~rs of neutrality-- a heavy fiscal burden. On the one hand, the 
army, the navy, the merohant mari ne and other services called for 
increased outlays; on the other, diminished iJ,jports cut off cus-
toms receipts, with 1915 being the smallest year since 1899, but 
thereafter unt il shortly a fter the c~ os e of the war go vernmen tal 
1 
revenue showed a steady incr~ase. 
Each time that the berlin Government made a concess ion 
to the United States, such as warning before sinking, it expected 
that Washington would foroe corresponding concessions from the 
Allies. but the united States possessed no means of bringing effeo-
tive pressure to bear upon the Allies without injuring so deeply 
2 
its own commercial interest that the price seemed too high to pay. 
As was explained by Secretary Lansing, in his reply to the Austrian 
protest. August 12, 1915, the United States, accustomed to rely on 
small defensive for ces and on t he right and power to pur chase arms 
a:ld ammunition from neutral nations in case of foreign attack, was 
the last nation in the'world that could afford to establish a pre-
3 
cedent of the kind that was asked. 
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Most of the restrictions that appeared likely to touch 
American interests were gradually arranged by private negotiations. 
Certainly oommerce and trade were De ver more profi.table f or Amer-
icans. The Allied command of the sea, on the whole. was not exer-
cised in a way seriously to in,iure .Arrerioan pookets, but it did 
1 
injure Amerioan pride. 
'rhe deolaration of the unrestricted s Ilbrrarine warfare 
in January, 1917, proved the straw that broke the baok of Amerioan 
ne utrali ty. 
Business interests were bound up with the maintenanoe of 
foreign trade which was controlled by the Allies. But this fact 
by no means justifies the belief that those interests forced the 
United States int 0 the war. From the economio point of view oon-
tinued neutrality was for them the most desirable goal, just as 
for Wilson it was the main polit ical purpose. If condi ti ons of 
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'ilar is not "inevi tab Ie t " 
but proceeds from definite and 
removable causes. 
G. Lowes Dickinson 
At the onset of the European struggle the fact was clear 
that the american people would find it more than ordinairily dif-
ficult to avoid taking sides as this was a ':Vorld War; and theUni-
ted States, the historic asylum of the oppressed. contained a "men-
agerie of nationalities,"l But this did not mean that the American" 
people wanted to get into the fight, nor did it mean that they now 
loved Great Britain • .Although the Ill3.jority of those who took sides 
seem to have favored the .Allies, this feeling was probably more , 
2 
anti-German than pro-British •. 
The pop ula r Arne ri can cone ep t ion t hat ne ut rali ty is a 
clearly defined stat us is erroneous. On the contrary, we shall 
come closer to a correct view if we think of neutrality merely as 
a policy, which, within certain limits, has an almost infinite 
number of p~utations and conbinations. No two authorities can 
agree on a definition of the precise rights and duties of neutrals, 
except as regards specific and (for us) minor matters such as the' 
withholding of direct aid by a neutral nation to a belligerent, or 
the duty of a neutral government to refuse to allow its territory 
to be used as a base for military operations against a belligerent. 
The trade rights of a ne utral are as broad as the power the ne utral 
1 
2 
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is willing and able to assert to maintain those rights. Neutrality 
should IOOan that policy which a country at peace adopts toward 
I 
countries at war. 
In the opening decade of the twentieth century, unbe-
knownst to many Ameri cans, the United Sta tes had become a wo rId 
power. 1'he country's foreign trade had been growing by leaps and 
bounds; by 1913 exports reached a value of nearly two and a half 
billion d ollars. ~xports whi ch bulked so large in the na ti onal 
economy exercised, of course,. a corresponding important political 
2 . 
influence at Washington. There are many writers who attribute 
America's entry into the war solely or largely to these financial 
bonds by which she was bound to the Allies, ancl to the foreign 
propaganda by which she was duped; but these forces must not be 
over-emphas ized. Mos,t .Ameri cans favored the AlIi es be fore the war 
orders arrived or the loans were floated, and the loans were as 
much an expression of sympathy as a mere business transaction. In 
1915 the Germans, too, tried to borrow in this country; but only 
a few German-AIlE r:i cans lent, though the German armies were then 
3 
vi ctorious on every front. 
Mr. Millis, in his interesting book, gives us the impres-
sion that the United States' was caught in the world war primarily 
1 
2 
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/ 
beoanse of the preponderanoe of British propaganda, the subleties 
, 
of British diplorraoy, and the influenoe of vested finanoi aI, oom-
meroial and industrial interests whose fortunes beoame tied up 
with an Allied viotory. These faotors all oonnted. But to single 
them out and stress thern so heavily seems to us to allow too little 
for the m. tural predisposit ion of many .dmer toans fer oertain prin-
oiples and the ir an tipathy for oertain others. liTr. Millis tends to 
igno 1'e the fundamental reasons wh:Ji Ameri can sentiment turned in 
favor of the Allies ani again,st Germany. It is not necessary to 
hunt for a demon either in Wall Street or in Downing Street to ex-
plain the An:erican attitude toward the war. Whatever may have been 
the effect of hired propaganda or the influence of financial and 




Dulles and Armstrong, OPt oit., p. 22; Thus om looks in vain for 
a reference to the faot that there was a treaty gual~9.nteeing .Bel-
gium, that Germany had signed it, and that Gennany's viola ti on 
of it exercised an instantan~tous and persistent effect on Amerioan 
feeling toward Germany. The Belgian dep orta ti ons are oa lIe d nan 
attack upon the unemployment problem in Belgirun and Northern 
Franoe"; it is not mentioned that in 1917 Germany ordered the stop-
page of all public works undertaken by the .3elgian oommunes and 
provinces for the relief of nnemployment, that she had already re-
moved to Gernany many 'of the instruments and rraobines of labor, 
that the forced labor to Which the deportees were condemned was 
work for the enemy, often on military roads and trenches, near the 
front, that henoe the Belgians were Willing to suffer pnnis~~ent 
and go into exile rather than work, and that many Americans pitied 
and applauded them. When Mr. Millis describes the staff of the 
Amerioan Legation in J.3russels and the American corre'pondents as 
naive for not emphasizing that Belgian franos tireurs were teoh-
nioally guilty of atrooities in sniping at the invading troops 
and· that the German high oommand was teohnioally justified in 
lining up local hos tages and shooti ng them, he mis ses the point; 
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There oan be no doubt that there was muoh Allied propa-
ganda; bllt there is considerable doubt as to its effect. It seems 
reasonably olear that .American opinion was anti-German before the 
war began; it also seems olear that Arrerican opinion was outraged 
by the acts of Germany. Belgium was a fact; the Lusitania was a 
fact • .and although .d~i ti sh propaganda unquest lorn. bly embellished 
these facts, its effeot would have been incomparably weaker with-
1 
out them. 
We were unprepared as a people and as a government to 
deal wi th the condi ti ons crea'ted by a genera 1 .c.;uropean war. There 
was no time in the summer of 1914 to sit down quietly to weigh the 
consequenoes of alternative courses to meet a situation which daily 
became more complica.ted, mnch less to think out a ~ong-range pol-
icy. All that our governinent could do was cling to the best pre-
cedents available, even though second thought might have raised 
doubts as to whether they really were applioable to thA new condi-
tions of ID9ritime warfare, especially when the war was being waged 
by the mighty antagonists now loc~:ed in a death grip. vVe stu(}k to 
no emphas is on the illegality of the Belgian ci vi lians action or 
the legality of the German military reprisals would have male the 
amerioan public of that day feel that the Belgian defenderz were 
not acting heroica.lly and justifiably and that the German inva-
ders were not acting in a contrary sense. Other oases could be 
cited of failure to appreciate the origins of the sentiment whioh 
as the war developed played an imp or tan t part in shap ing .Ameri oan 
polioy. The hostile and criminal acts of ~erman agents in the 
United States irritated the publio much more than Mr. Millis can 
remember-- and were placed in a different category from the prop-
aga.nda and publicity work of Allied writers and lecturers. It 
seems to us unreal is tic to imagine that deep-rooted sentiment can 
1 
be dismissed as an im~ortant factor in determining the policies 
of nations; perhaps, 1t is unjustified to assume that its elimin-
ation is necessarily desirable, even though one can prove in spe-
cifio cases it might well be. 
Bailey, Ope cit., p. 613. 
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,', 
the precedents; and they led us step by step rearer the arena. 
What really fr~ppened was that from the very beginning of 
the war American sympathies were engaged. On top of that, and of 
decisive importance, the course which the Government took in denan-
ding observance, of its tradi tional ne utral rights engaged the na-
tional honor of the United States in the defense of the principle 
that its trade should continue and that its mtionals were entitled 
to pr otecti on in the e xerci s e of that trade. When those right s were 
curtailed by Great Britian, ~~ protested. 'Nhen our citizens who 
were exerci sing those rights were killed by Gerlllany, when our ships 
were sunk, and when Germany formally challenged our asserted rights, 
then we went to war. If the basic conception of our policy was 
sound, what other course in self-respect could we have followed? 
Americans sometimes have vague preferences among foreign 
conntries. Though some persons found deep reasons for these perfer-
ences, many who londly preferred one connt:cy to another based their 
choice upon nothing more important than tradition, or the food and 
treatment accorded to them in the hotels and trains of varions coun-
tries they had visited. England was the country tl1at loomed largest 
in the Armrican mind, and aristocratic "Anglomaniacs" admired her 
tremenduously; the common language and traditions, and the idea of 
Anglo-Saxon solidari ty, impressed many; the English and Scotch immi-
grants in hIleri ca gen -rally retained a kindly feeling :';:'or the mother 
country. But Englanl was also the mos t hated m ti on; many people 
cons idered it a DB tter of patriotism to hate the forIjler mother coun-
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try-.. a sent.iment which the millions of Irish never allowed to grow 
I 
cold. 
The German immigrants were equally well di sp osed towards 
their former ]'a therl:and, while many intellectual leaders in America 
had been trained in German universities, and admired Gernany's 
achievements in science ani social reform. 
Even the Irish did not curse the government from which 
they fled more bitterly than did the Russian Jews in Aroorica. In the 
days just before the war. nar:w Americans thought of France more fa-
vorably than in earlier years; but in regard to the other countries 
2 
of Europe people were ignorant and apa thet iC. 
1 
Sir Edward Grey knew his history: 
"ReJa ti ons with the Unit ed States 
differ from those of Great Britain with 
any other country. The two countries have 
one language in common, and the j uris-
prudence of both is founded upon the com-
mon law of England. The Armrican consti-
tution was drawn up and made by men of 
British race, whose descendants form a 
large part of the present population of 
the United States and are still proud 
of their race and conscious of the kin-
ship in blood and the common origin and 
tradi ti ons. The whole people are attached 
to democratic government and human freedom." 
Sir Edward added, however: 
"The sense of common race and or igin 
is closely associated with the historical 
memory of bitter war. ~rmricans do not al-
ways seem to realize that those who left 
Britain to escape from King and prelates 




were not the only British of the ir genera-
tions who loved liberty. Others stayed behind, 
and in time there was established in Britain 
a democracy as free as t hs" t founded in the 
New Horld on the other side of the Atlantic. 
Suocessi ve generations in .Bri tain have been 
brought up to regard the separation of the 
.american Colonie s as the wo rk of a m rrow-
minded King, v',/ho has b"een dead for a hun-
dred years, and the outcome of a political 
system that seems to us to-day as antiquated 
and intolerable as it does to the people of 
the Unit ed States. Hence, amongst ..lime ri cans 
of Bri tis h st ock t here may be the histori cal 
feeling of resentment, ·as well as the sense 
of kinship." I 
. . 
Hence, the pro-British sentiment had little effect on 
pub lic opinion, however it may have influenced our statesmen as 
the dilson administration showed pro-Ally leanings with the excep-
ti on of t he Secretary of State, William Jennings Bryan, who was con-
s idered by his co lleagues as pro-German. Wilson himself was of 
British ancestry, and a strong admirer of British culture. He made 
a genuine effort to pursue a strictly neutral course, but as the 
war progressed he found his sympathies gravitating more and more to 
the side of the Allies, and occasionally in private he would betray 
2 
himself. Once he burst out, "England is fighting our fight. 1I 
Robert Lansing, who replaced Bryan as Secretary of State, 
in his memorandum, "Consideration and Outline of Politics," written 
I 
Grey, Sir Edward: Twenty-five Years, VOl. 2, p. 86. 
2 
Bailey, OPe cit., p. 6140 
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July 11, 1915, said: 
"Ameriaan publia opinion mll..'3t be pre-
pared fot the time, which may come, when 
we will have to cast aside our neutrality 1 
and become one of the champions of democracy. t1 
Lansing also admits that he intenti onally he ld up and pro~ 
longed the disputes to see if sorrethi.z:g could happen to change pub-
2 
lic opinion before an answer had to be sent. 
The ,President's mos t trusted advisor, Col. Edward M. 
House, was strongly pro-ally. Ambassador Page in England was so 
pro-British that instead of representing the United States in Eng-
land, Page represented the British cause to the government in 
3 
Washington. 
But these members of the administration were not the 
nation, although holding positions which might influence the nation. 
'The East was pro-Briti sh, the middle West De utral and the far West 
did not seem to care. Sensing the poli cy 0 f the m ti on, Wilson on 
August 4, when five nations had entered the struggle, issued a for-
mal declaration of neutrality, Which was repeated as successive 
states entered the contest; and two weeks later he made a special 
appeal to his fellow citizens to be "neutral in fact as well as in 
4 
nan:e •••• vVe must be impartial in thought as well as in action." 
1 
War Memories of Robert Lansing, p. 21. 
2 
Ibid., p. 112. 
3 
Bailey, op.' cit., p. 620. 
4 
Ogg, OPe cit., Vol. 27, p. 329. 
-130-
With our neutrality proclaimed we started out with the 
idea that there mu.~t be certain inherent rights of trade, a theSis 
which we consistently mintained throughout our history. Like his 
predecessors-- Washington, Adams, Jefferson and ila.dison-- President 
Wilson was soon engaged in the effort to keep out of war, rraintain 
neutrality, and at the saL16 time make good the illusive and inde'-
ini te d ootrine know as the Freedom of th e Seas. But now there 
was no ser ious que sti on of embargoes or non-interco urse as in the 
days of Jefferson; trade was:too important. When Congress met in 
December 1914, bills were introduced to embargo the export of 
arms and ammunition, one of them sponsored by an influential 
Democrat, Senatoi' Hitchcock of Nebraska. The influences \q~ich pre-
vented its adopti on were not prLm r ily comrne rci '11. The b ill suffered 
from being presented as a humanitarian measure rather than as a 
move to keep us out of the war, and it was atta~ked and defeated 
as preparing an "unneutral" change in our laws after a foreign con-
flict had begun. Nevertheless, the fact that our people had never 
doubted their right and ability to continue trade with belligerents 
and still remain neutral, and the fact that the relinquishment of 
th9.t trade m uld have played havoc wi th rrany fundamental .Anierican 
1 wi 
occupat iOns, were ro ot caus es of Ollr whole a tti tude • 
.<1.S a legal basis foe the position we assumed,we first 
tried to nake use of the Declaration of London of 1909, which de-
fined contraband and etc., but we felt deprived of its real value 
1 
Dulles ani Armstrong, OPe ci t. , p. 24. 
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due to the knowledge that Great Britain had never ratified the dec-
laration and refused to apply it without modifications. f/ith this in 
mind we fell back upon what we claimed to be the recognized rules 
of int ernational law. But in doing so we had to recognize that inter· 
DB. ti om 1 law fai led to give us a definit e code ani that this fai I-
I 
ure would "undoubtedly be the soarce of numerous controversies." 
Further. particula.rly in our dealings with the British, the doc-
trines.we had maintained in the Civil War aame in to plague us. We 
had ourselves broo.dened the i~ea of "continuous voyage", the doc-
trine under whi ch we seized good s which were enro ute to a. ne ut ral 
port but which we asserted had an ultirrate enemy destination; and 
we bad extended the list of contraband. 
Our m'os t serious admissi on was the cable from Secretary 
Br~an to Ambassador Page, December 26, 1914. " •••• that the commerce 
betwen countries which are not belligerents should not be inter-
fered with by those at war unless such interference is manifestly 
an imperative necessity to protect their national safety, and then 
2 
only to the extent the. t it is a necess i ty. 11 
Three imp or tant pr oblerns faced ~resident ~lilson and his 
foreign policy during 1915; the English attempt to blqck indirect 
importa t ion to Germany which he Trvi olently oppos ed" in a seri es of 
notes, the ~erman war zone around England when he informed the 
German governrrent he would hold them to "strict acco untao iIi ty", 
and the sinking of the Lusltania. 
1 
Baker, OPe ci t., Vol. 5, p. 218. 
2 
Dulles ani Armstrong, OPe ait., pp. 26-27. 
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It did not take tlE British long to reach the conclusion 
that the sappression of o~r trade with Germany~ was an imperative 
necessity. As Lord Grey stated: "The object of British diplotnacy, 
therefore, was to secure the maximum of blockade that could be en-
1 
forced \\'i thout a rupture with the United states." Even if the law 
had been di fferent or our previous policy a reversal of this action, 
it is do ub tful il the Bri tis h wo uld have relaxed thei I' hold upon 
neutral commerce. They were fighting for the ir vel~y lives; and to 
2 
them American profits were a ~inor consideration. British restrict-
ions hurt both American pockets .and American pride. Britain counter-
ed our notes by playing a delaying game. and the strategy was per-
fect and, what is more, the United States played the nritish game. 
The longer the State Department deferred pushing matters to a show-
down, the more perfect the British strangulation of Gennany became 
and more closely the United States was bound by economic ties to 
the Allies, and the greater the cm.nce that the German submarines 3 . 
wo uld dri ve the co 1111 try to war. 
It has frequently been alleged that the United States 
could have forced the Allies to respect its rights by instituting 
an embargo on war materials. ,Such a course was repeatedly proDosed, 
but it met with considerable apathy. As the weeks passed by, the 
1 
Grey, Ope cit., Vol. 2, p. 213. 
2 
Bailey, OPe ci t., p. 617. 
3 
Ibid. p. 619 
War iiemories of Robert Lansing, p. 112. 
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American economic structure gradually became so inextricably inter-
laced wi th the cause of the .Allies that public opinion would not 
have tolerated. an embargo. A Literary Digest poll, even at this 
1 
early period, showed the industrial centers against such a move. 
The United States to ole a position which was logical ani which 
fitted both the sentimental and the natioml interests of the coun-
try, mmelY1that we were under no duty arbitrarily to rectify the 
consequances of Dritish control of the sea. We wouli trade where 
• 
we cOUld, and thus flll the gaps caused by the loss of trade with 
. 
Ge rJJany , whose ports, as well as the ports of neighboring countries, 
were largely closed to us as a result of the extension of the con-
traband list and the doctrine of cont inuous voyage. Further we con-
sidered it ob ject iom ble as a 1m tter of principle to change what 
we conceived to be the rules o:f neutrality during the course of the 
war. Thus Secretar.r Bryan wrote to Count von ~ernstorff on April 
21, 1915: 
" •••• any change in i t~ ow n la ws of 
neutrality during the progress of a war, 
which would affect uneually the relations 
of the United States with the nations at war 
wo uld bean unj ustifiable depart ure from the 
principles of strict ne utrali ty ." 2 
The United States had no objection to selling arms and 
ammuni ti on to Germany; b at if she co uld not import them because of 
1 
Lit. Dig., L, 6 (Feb. 6, 1915) p. 225. 
2 
"Papers reJating to the Foreign Relations of the United States. n 
1915, Supplement, The World -dar, p. 162. 
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the British navy. that was one of the misfortunes of war. In short, 
an embargo on munit10ns would favor t:rennany; the absence of om 
would favor the Allies. So the United States followed the profit-
I 
able path of least resistance. 
Tm governrrent therefore cont inue d to pursue a policy 
that violated the true spirit though not the strict letter of neu-
trality; bound the nation even tighter to the wheels of tho Allied 
.economic cha.riot; and so inf1amed the German mind as to provide 
a partial justification-- to :the Gennans at least-- for unrestrict-
ed submarine warfare. Therefore. ~hen. Gennany in February 1915 
proclaimed that the waters surrounding Great Britain were to be 
considered within the seat of war our answer was Wilson's "strict 
accountability" note. Ne stated in that note that: 
" • • •• the Gove rnme nt of the Uni ted States 
wo uld be constrained to hold the Imperial Ger-
man Government to a stri ct accountab iIi ty for 
such acts of their naval authorities and to 
take any steps it might be necessary to take 
to safeguard American lives and property and 
to secure to arne rican cit izens the full e nj oy-
ment of their acknowledged rights on the high 
seas." 2 
There in a few words, is the thesis wrdch. logica,lly 
3 
purs ued, Ie d to war. It was stated before the blossoming of the 
I 
Bailey, Ope cit., p. 623. 
2 
3 
"Papers relating to the Foreign Relations of the United States," 
Supplement, 11he World War, p. 99 0 
Dulles and Armstrong, Ope cit., p. 31 • 
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,', 
"war boom" based on trade with the allies, and seven months before 
the first Allied publi~ loan in this aountry. We were insisting 
on what we ~imed to "be full enjoyment of aaknowledged rights. 
Ih a note to Germany a few months later the same idea appears: 
"The rights of neutrals in time of war 
are based upon principle, not upon expediency, 
and the prinaiples are immutable. It is the 
duty and obligation of belligerents to find 1 
a way to adapt the new ci rc umstances to them." 
The sinking of the Lusitania had aonsequehces from whiah 
German diploIIaay never recove,red. It brought the war home to a 
mass of Americans for whom until then it had been little more than 
a moving picture. It made impossible any sort of understanding 
between the Uni ted St[ltes and Germany as against Allied interfer-
enae with neutral trade. It raised definitely and for the first 
time the question of American participation in the war, and it 
pointed unequivocally to Germany as the enemy of the future. Wilson 
could have broken relations with Germany on the following day; he 
wOllld ha,ve reaei ved a t llmul t of applallse from the Eastern states 
2 
aDd at least acquiescence from the rest of the aountry. His hesi-
tancy was revealed in his "too proud to fight" speech, delivered 
at Philadelphia, three 'days after the sinking. Wilson immediately 
reiterated his statement of "striat acaountability" and asked 
\ 
the German government's disavowal and the reply to Wilson, September, 
1 
2 
"Papers relating to the Foreign ~elations of the United States,-
1915, supplement, The World War, p. 481. 





1915, prom.ised no more sinkings without warnings, although 
negotiations dragged oh into 1916. The severity of the seoond 
note oaused the resignation of Seoretary of State Bryan. 
Wilson's firm stand in his seaoni note was proof that 
he was slowly rejeoting the paoifist attitude and that his. patienoe 
was wearing thin. With the exoeption of the West, the newspapers 
1 
were loud in praise of his aotion. 
The loss of the British liner Arabio, Augllst 19, 1915, 
folllld Seoretary Lansing seri~.llsly oonsidering the severanoe of 
diplomatio relations, bllt Wilson, seemingly determined to bring 
2 
about a peaae oonferenoe, either by persllasion or threats, would 
not approve the aotion, fearing the oountry would not sustain the 
government. The out oome of the inoident was a Wilson viotory. "The 
aountry is undoubtedly baok of me in t he whole na tter, and I feel 
myself under bonds to it to show pa tienoe to the utmost. My ohief 
3 
puzz1e is to determine where patienoe oeases to be a virtue." 
During the seven months after the sinking of the Arabia, 
the German subms. rines re frained from killing Ameri oan oi t izens. But 
a vast amount of suspioion and ill feelings was oreated in the 
United States by the alleged ,maohinations of German seoret agents, 
1 
Lit. Dig., L, 25 (June 19, 1915) pp. 1449-1450, 
2 
Seymour, Am. Dip., p. 130, 
3 
Bai Ie y, op. 0 it., p. 630. 
-13'1-
particularly by their attempts to sabotage the munitions trade. 
Other incidents inaluded the exposure of the Albert papers, the 
recalling, by request of Dr. Constantin Dumba, the Austrian ambass-
ador, charged with fotCenting strikes, and the recall by request, 
of Captains von Papen and Boy-Ed, December 1, 1915, for over-
stepping diplomatic boundaries in regard to the war effort. Although 
many of the alleged German plots were figments of fevered imagina-
tions, the witch hunting hysteria that swept the country deepened 
distrust of Germany, and further prejudiced the Anerican mind 
l' 
against the Central Powers. 
As a result of the prolonged Lusitania negotiations am 
internal disturbanaes it became clear to Wilson that if the war did 
not come to an end, knerican participation was almost unavoidable. 
Wilson's call for mediation, through his personal diplomat, Col. 
liou.se, in January. 1915, and again one year later, was not the med-
dling of an interfering bu.sybody or the dream of an impractical 
visiomry. It was based u.pon the need of escapging from the u.nten-
able position of a neutral. Ending the war by negotiation or en-
2 
tering the war were the only alternatives. On his second trip to 
Eu.rope, Col. liou.se, in his attempt to get a conference meeting of 
the powers, virtu.ally pledged the United States to become a member 
3 




Seymou.r, Am. Dipl., p. 128. 
3 
Baile,y, Ope ait., p. 635. 
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) 
The attempt failed as neither side was desirous of peace at that 
time. 
The rejection of the peace ~lan, especially by the Allied 
powers, and the action of Congress on such bills as the McLemore 
bill, which would have forbidden Americans to sail on contraband--
laden British liners (the bill was sidetracked following a strong 
message from Wilson) brought a lull in American action during the 
perio~ from February to May, 1916. It was a period of watchful 
waiting • 
But the period of watchful waiting ended with the tor-
pedoing of the channel steam~Jthe Sussex, March 24, 1916, with the 
loss of Amer ican lives. Wilson's not e, asking Germany to disavow 
was sent April 18, and the German reply, pledging restriction of 
submarine warfare, arrived May 4, 1916. It was a victory for Wil ... 
son. He averted hostilities, maintained Arnericanprestige and for-
ced the Germans to emasculate their most effective sea weapon. 
But he took such a position that it would be virtually impossible 
honorably ,to avoid war if the Germans should reopen their unre-
1 
stricted submarine warfare. 
The same month (May, 1916) 135,000 people throughout the 
nation marched in "Preparedness Day Parades." Wilson carrying a 
flag led the Washington parade. This was Wilson's appeal to the 
general public, as he bad already appealed to Congress (Dec. 8, 
1 
I bid.) p. 636. 
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1914) stating that provision for woluntary military training would 
be extended, and that the organized militia of the states should be 
developed and strengthened. The war in Europe had proved the failure 
of a small army and Wilson wanted an improTement in our militia, 
1 
without oonscripti on. 
During the nine months following th'e so-called Sussex 
pledge, the German subIIf.l.rines were on their good behavior as far 
as the United States was oonaerned. Amerioan publio opinion was 
therefore left free to 0 once~trate on the aoo Ulllula tion of grie-
vanoes, old and new, at the hands of Britain. Partioularly galling 
I 
was the British praotioe of opening the United States mail, in 
searoh of oontraband being sent to Germany. 'l'he resentment of the 
Amerioan people was further inoreased when it as alleged that 
trade seorets were being filohed from these letters and turned over 
to British commeroial rivals. Then on July 18, 1916, oame the 
British blaoklist, oomposed of 85 persons or fi~ns, with whom the 
British were not to trade. This aot angered the nation; even 
Wilson and the oabinet. The protest of th6 Washington government 
" 
against the blaoklist was based on international morals rather than 
on international law, for Britian had an undeniable legal right to 
2 
forbid her subjeots to trade with firms in the united States. 
The Demooratio Convention meeting in St. Louis, June 14, 
1 
Lit. Dig., LII, 22 (May 27, 1916) p. 1518. 
2 




1910, se1eoted President Wilson to once again head the ticket. Back-
ed by the slogan, "He kept u.s out of war," the oonvention attempted 
to make peace the theme of the oampaign wi th diplomaoy the weapon 
instead of war. The election campaign submerged the war issues on 
the sea. vVilson10f cou.rse, lE.d promis ed nothing. The slogan referred 
only to the past, and was historioally true, but there were those 
who felt that the slogan was a tacit pledge which Wilson was morally 
I 
bou.nd to ohserve. 
The Repu.blicans, me,eting in Chicago, selected a Ju.stice 
of the Supreme Cou.rt. Charles Evans Hugh~S, as his opponent, al-
thou.gh they failed to uake a conc.ete stand on the war situation. 
Obviou.sly Wilson would head the ticket even if the pol-
iticians did not like him; apart from negligible elements alien-
ated by his foreign policy, the rank and file were for him. Indeed, 
he was reco gnized to be stronger than his party, and it was ass u.med 
by Democrats that he would draw heavily from the Progressives and 
from the independent vote. Starting with a somewhat archaio Jeff-
ersonian equ.ipment of political principles, and under the suspicion 
of being a cloistered doctrinaire and amateur, he had proved him-
self a practioal and adroit politician, and adept at divining the 
trend of pu.blio opinion, and a statesman oapable of infu.sing the 
radioal democratio impulses of Bryan into the idealistio program 
I 
Ibid" p. 638 0 
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1 
of the mcxlerate progressives. Hughes, the Republiaan aandidate, 
hoped to bring baak the Progressives who had split off in 1912, and 
most were ready to follow Teddy Roosevelt baak into the fold. The 
elder Henry MOrgenth~, writing in his book, All in a Life-Time) 
remarks oonaerning the pessimism of the Demoarats: 
"1 spent the first few days after my 
return to the United States wi th my old pol-
itiaaI friends in Washington and 1 was shoaked 
at the prevailing poli t ioal atmosphere. Not 
one of the nU:'~lerous. men high in the admin-
istration with whom 1 talked had the slight-
est hODe that President Wilson aould be re-
elected that fall." 2 
Hughes mde many criticisms of Wilson's oonduot of for-
eign affairs. but his own policy was never clear. He was strong 
in the north-east. Where pro-ally senti~ent was strong. but he 
failed to gain many German votes or to offset the Demoarat's 
slogan; "He QVilsot!] kept us out of war." The final outcome was 
alose. New York went Republican, but the returns from the west 
finally sW'ng the tide to Wilson. 
1 
Ogg, OPe cit., iol. 27, p. 374. 
2 
Baker, Ope ait., Vol. 6, p. 34. 
The Democratic victory was accomplished by inroads on 
Repllblican strength among the farming pOPllla ti ons of the newer 
states. These inroads were easy to maKe, for the reason tJ::at these 
pe ople regarded the President as a genlline pro gressi ve, and because 
they thoroughly approved his pacific foreign policy; Hughes, they 
cons idered to bet he candidate of a party domina. ted by reaction-
aries ani jingoes. The much feared "hyphen" vote failed to mater-
ialize. He had avoided war with Germny. Of seven states containing 
the largest numbers of German-Americans, the Democrats carried 
1 ' 
three. Wilson was aotually more favorabl~ to Germany than the 
leading Republicans, espeoially The od,ore Roosevel t. 
Following his reeleotion, aocording to Mrs. Edith Reid, 
a close:friend of Wilson's, the president again was determined to 
bring about peaoe in Ellrope, if possible. "Now the bllrden upon me 
is heavier than ever," he stated. "If we oan esoape entering the 
war and bring about a rational peace it is something worth living 
and d~ing for, and I believe the oountry feels that way or it 
2 
would not have re-elected me." But we must remember there might 
be times when the oompletion of a rational peaoe might require 
war. 
Shortly ,follOWing the election Germany made a move for 
a compromise peaoe, but the Allied answers showed peaoe impossible 
1 
Ogg" OPt ci t. t Vol. 27, p. 381. 
2 
Millis, OPe cit., p. 354. 
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withont a decisive victory. Although Wilson had promised Germany 
1 
to move for peace immediately following his re-election, he waited 
until after the Gennan move, in the middle of December, to begin 
the writing of his peace notes, at which time (December 18) he 
2 
sent identical notes to all the belligerent nations. The pnblic 
reaction to Wilson's ,mOTe followed the general pattern tha. thad 
prevailed thronghout the country following his previous attempts 
at mediation; a pro-Ally east, a neutral mid -west,a disinterested 
3 
west and a drop on the stock exchange. 
The German answer was at first evasive and the Allies 
refu.sed to bargain without the certainty of reparations, cleverly 
concealing their answer, and realizing their goal of inciting fav-
4 
orabl~ public reaction in the United States. 
On January 22, 1917, Wilson gave his reaction to the 
replies of his peace message, in his "peace without victory" ,speech 
to Congress and at the same time asking for a League of Nations to 
preserve peace in the fnture. It was a last desperate attempt to 
win peace for America. It was the final stage of .America.n neutrality. 
1 
Baker, Ope cit., Vol. 6, p. 434. 
2 
Bai ley, OPe cit., p. 640. 
3 
Lit. Dig., LIV, 1 (Jan. 6, 1917) p. 24. 
Peterson, OPe Cit., p. 267. 
4 
Bailey, OPe ci t., p. 641. 
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But Wils on was too late, for on January 8, 1917, the Emperor of 
Germany had secretly promulgated an order for unrestricted submar-
, 1 
ine warfare. Vfuen Josph P. Tnmulty, Wilson's secretary, delivered 
the Associated Press bulletin announcing Germany's resumption of 
unrestricted warfare, January 31, 1917, Wilson stated, "This means 
2 
war •••• " The German not e, announcing tha t a blockade was to be 
placed around the British Isles, showed tmt Germany realized .peace 
was impossible. The British Ambassador, with his ear to the ground, 
reported; "War has drawn 'gradually nearer and nearer to the United 
. 3 
States in s'pite of all their efforts." 
The announcement of the blockade around the British Isles 
brought forth a rupture in diplomatic relations and on February 3, 
1917, Count von Bernstorff was handed his passport. In a statement 
issued to the press, Berostorff said: "I am not surprised. My gov-
ernment will not be surprised either. The peonlein Berlin knew 
what was bound to happen if they took the action they have taken. 
4 
There was nothing Ie ft for the Unit ed States to dO." The Wall 
Street Digest not ed that the "upward movement in the pri ce of stocks 
dates from the day the German Ambassador was banded his passports." 
1 
Baker, OPe Cit., Vol. 6, p. 434. 
2 
Ibid., p. 445. 
3 
Seymour, Am. Dip., p. 191. 
4 
War Manories of Robert Lansing, p. 217 • 
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Throughout 1916 the news of German victories or peace offers bad a 
most depressing effect on the stoak mrket. These facts,*ogether 
with the rejoicing in financial circles over the break with Gennany, 
indi cate the cl os aness of t he economic rela ti onship between the 
1 
United States and the Allies. 
After the rupture of relations with Germany, war was vir-
tually inevitable. Yet Wilson hoped against hope that the Germans 
might avoid ari. overt aot against the United States. But if their 
submarines again destroyed ~rioan ships and lives he would oorre 
before Congress again and recommen~ extreme measm~es. This was a 
wise deoision, for publio opinion in the United States was far from 
unanimous on the desirability of war. If I oould not move faster,tt 
Wilson remrke d to his secretary, "than the nass of our people 
2 
wo uld permit. n 
The exposure of the Zimmerman note. February 24, 1917, 
came as something of a shock to Amerioans to realize tmt Germany) 
if struck by the United States, would strike back in the New 
World. Immediately a tremend~ous wave of anti-German sentiment 
swept over the country, particularly in the hitherto apathetio 
south and southwest, where there was alarm over the threat of 
being conquered by Mexioo. Nor was the immigration-oonscious 
1 
Peterson, OPe oit., p. 267. 
2 






Paaifia aoast pleased by the proposed overtures to Japan. A more 
1 
nearly united .Ameriaa was now one step nearer the brink. 
On February 26, Wilson urged Congress to authorize the 
mounting of guns on Ameriaan me ramnt ships bound for European 
waters. calling it "armed ne utrali ty," am, realizing that fur ther 
aation by Congress was needed. aalled a s p:l a ial sessi on far Apri 1 
, 
6,1917 • .A. filibuster halted the request in Congress, but the aation 
was aarried out Maran 4, through military powers of the exeautive 
2 
offiae and expert gunners wer,e to be supplied by the Navy. The 
sinking 0 f two unarmed merahant. ships, Marah 12 and 19, only added 
tot he 0011 for war. 
The Zimmerman note and the aatualsinkings aonvinaed 
Wilson that peaae was hopeless. The pressure on Wilson to request 
Congress to dealare a state of war aame from many sides and espe-
aially from people prominent in everyday affairs. A state of war 
between Germany and the United States aatually eXisted~ said viae-
president Marshall in a speeah at Montgollle ry. Alabama, on the 24th. 
This opinion was eahoed by Charles E. Hughes, Elihu Root and 
Theodore Roosevelt. "There is now a state of war, and the people of 
1 
Ibid. p. 643. 
~ I . 
Lit. Dig., LIV, 4 (March 17, 1917) p. 687. 
I 
Millis, OPe ait., pp. 404-405. 
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the United States should recognizetbe fact." said Mr. Hughes. 
"GerrIRny is naking war on us and our reply mus t be ei th er war or 
submissi on." affirlmd Mr. Root. Colonel Roosevelt, after pointing 
out that Germany "had steaily waged war upon us" ever since her 
declarat ion of unrestri cted su bmarine war on Jan uary 31, added: 
"Let us face the accomplished fact, admit that Germany is at war 
with us, and in turn wage war on Germany with all our energy and 
courage and regain the right to lmok the whole warld in the eyes 
1,2 
without flinching." 
Wilson's message to Congress, April 6, 1917, was greeted 
with wild ovation. Of the 50 negative votes in the House (373 to 
50), 32 came from Republieans-- mostly of the western progressive 
wing-- one was that of an independent and the remaining one that 
of Meyer Lonion, the Soc ialist member. There were, altogether, 520 
Senators and Representatives; only 56, or about one in ten, had 
3 
dared to cast their votes against the tide. 
But if one dares to trust Mr. Tumulty's memory, there 
was another scene in the White Hoase that night, when the secre~ 
tary talked alone with his chief in the Cabinet room. The applause 
1 
Lit. Dig., LIV, 12 (March 24, 1917) p. 801. 
2 
Roosevelt, Theodore: Fear God and Take Your Own Part, p. 203. 
3 
Cong. Rec., 65th Cong. Special Session, Vol. 55, pt. 1. p. 420. 
-148-
, j 
from the sidewalk orowds as he had dri ven from the Capi tol re-
tllrned to the President's ears. "My message today," Tllmlllty re-
members him say, "was a message of death for our young men. 
How strange it seems to applaud that." Afterward, in the seore-
tary's account. the President broke down and wept, with his head 
1 
on the Cabinet table. 
It might have seemed logioal for the United States to 
have deolared war against both groups of belligerents, jllst as it 
had been proposed that she fight both England and Franoe in 1812. 
A logical answer was that Allied praotioes hurt only 
An:e r ioan property right s. The Uni ted States 00 uld lodge pr"otests 
and perhaps oolleot, damages when the war was over. The German sub-
marine took Amerioan lives and there seemed to be no proper reoom-
pense for lives. So the United States fopght Germany. As the Bos-
ton Globe rermrked: "One was a gang of thieves; the other was a 
gang of murderers. On the whole we prefer the thieves but only as 
2 
the lesser of two evils." 
Whether right,ly or wrongly, Wilson followed the oourse 
of insisting upon the stri ot Ie tter of the law-- at least as far 
as the Germans were conoerned and when Germany felt impelled to 
act oontrary to these "immutable principles" ani "aoknowledged 
1 
Tumlllty. Joseph P4 : Wo<Xlrow Wilson as I know Him, p. 256. 
2 




rights" war 1lecarre imvitable. We had admitted the law of necess-
ity in our earlier notes to Great Britain where trade only was 
involved; but we did not recognize that the law of necessity could 
be inVOked to just ify putt ing the lives of our ci ti zens in jeop-
1 
ardy. Secretary CJf State Eobert Lansi~, said on June 9, 1915: 
"But the sinking of passenger ships 
invo 1 ves principle s of humanity which throw 
into the background any spedlial circumstances 
of detail that nay be thought to affect the 
cases •••• The government of the United States 
is cant endi ng for SOIm th ing much greater than 
mere right s of prop.erty or pri vileges of oom-
meroe. It is oontending for nothing less high 
and saored than the rights of humanity, whioh 
every government honors itself in respeoting 
and which no Government is justified in re-
signing on behalf of those under its care and 
authority." 2 
These grave words, and the aots to which they were the 
prelude, sh ow us tha t in t he last analysis it is the attack on 
human life, rather than the attack OIl property rights, Which is 
most likely to start in motion the tides of resentment which can 
. impelrs country like the United States ihto war. But perhaps 
the decisive factor was sympathy-- gradually shiftil~ to the Allied 
cause. 
Nearly everyone, even Theodore Roosevelt in September, 
1914, thought .it "eminently desirable" to remain neutral. It was 
not until some months later that Roosevelt accused Wilson of "pol-
1 
Dulles ani .tirDlstrong, OPe cit., p. 31. 
2 
"Papers relating to the Foreign Relations of the United States," 
1915, Supp1elmnt, The World War, p. 481. 
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troonery" for not having protested the invasi on of Belgium. His 
ohange of mind is not attributable mainly to politioal motives, 
though his love of politi oal inveoti ve undoubtedly played a part. 
Wba t happene d to him, w m t happened to Pres ident wils on, happened 
to mny other .dmericara, some sooner, some later. 'l'hey saw a 
battle royal in progress, and in their hearts thew took sides. 
Then, as t~ posi tion which our governmont had taken from the 
very out set prod uced the IIR ter ial and Ie gal gro unds fo r parti ci-
1 
pat ion, feeling and faot ooal~soed; we participated. 
"A government can be neutral," said Water Hines Page, 
2 
"but no man oan he." 
-0-
1 
Dulles ani Armstrong, OPe oit., p. 33. 
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